

By Robert South

TRITHEISM CHARGED

UPON

Dr SHERLOCK's

New Notion of the

TRINITY.

AND

The Charge made good, in an Answer to the
Defense of the said Notion against

The *Animadversions*

UPON

Dr. Sherlock's Book, Entitled, *A Vindication of the
Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity, &c.*

South

By a Divine of the Church of England.

L O N D O N,

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TO ALL
Professors of Divinity in the Two
UNIVERSITIES
OF THIS
KINGDOM.

Reverend and Learned Sirs,

Since the Work, I here present you with, needs so great a Patronage; it were to be wished, that it could bring something with it, besides the Cause defended by it, worthy of such Patrons, as I address it to. But, as much below you, as I know it to be, I could think of none, to whom I could so properly apply myself, as Those, whose eminent Stations in our Universities have made them the Fittest, as well as Ablest to countenance a Defense of so high a Point, and so vital a Part of our Religion. Our Church's Enemies of late seem to have diverted their main Attacks from her Out-Works in matters of Discipline and Ceremony; and now, it is no less than her very Capitol which they invade; her Palladium (if I may allude to such Expressions) which they would rob her of; even the Prime, the Grand, and Distinguishing Article of our Christianity, the Article of the Blessed Trinity it self; without the Belief of which, I dare aver, that a Man can no more be a Christian, than he can, without a Rational Soul, be a Man. And this is now the Point so fiercely laid at, and assaulted both by Socinianism on the one hand, and by Tritheism or rather Paganism on the other. For, as the former would run it down by stripping the Godhead of a Ternary of Persons, so the other would as effectually, but more scandalously overthrow it by introducing a Trinity of Gods; as they inevitably do, who assert the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits;

The Epistle Dedicatory.

which I positively affirm, is equivalent to the asserting the said Three Persons to be Three Gods. And I doubt not of your learned Concurrence with me, and Abettment of me in this Affirmation.

*And I do moreover refer it to your profound, and known Learning, to consider and to judge, whether ever the Catholick Church explained the Trinity by Self-Consciousness, as that [wherein] the Personality, Personal Unity, and Distinction of each of the Divine Persons does properly and formally consist: and by Mutual Consciousness, as that [wherein] consists the Essential Unity of the said Persons, and [whereby] they are all Three essentially one God: together with several other such like Terms set down in the Collection immediately subjoined to this Epistle. And lastly, whether the Primitive Church having decreed, and denounced an Anathema to all Users of any *heterodoxia* in these Mysteries, the Church of England, and the Nurseries thereof, the Universities, ought to suffer the greatest Mystery of our Christian Faith to be perplexed, confounded, and even ridiculed by this Man's pretending to explain it by such odd, Unsound, as well as new Expressions; which were never entertained as Terms of any Note or Use even in Philosophy, till Des Cartes and his Followers introduced them; and that without the least thought (that appears) of applying them to the Trinity. I desire, I say, all our Learned Divines seriously to consider, what this must tend to, and will, in all likelihood, end in.*

The Arguments which this daring Innovator (whom I write against) pretends to support his Tritheism, and Innovations by, are but slight and trivial; or rather indeed bare bold Assertions without Arguments: And those also (in the Opinion of most) so thoroughly broken, and confuted already, that what they need more, is rather a Discountenance, than a Confutation. Nor indeed is there any thing

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thing formidable in the whole Book, (which I have here answered) but that one word appearing in the Front of it, viz. [licensed]: and that I must confess looks very formidably and threateningly, both upon our Church and Religion: and it cannot but go to the heart of every Well-wisher to Both, to consider what Advantage our watchful Enemies the Papists will be sure to make of it; who in such Cases never fail to take whatsoever is given them.

And now, Reverend Sirs, what can my design be in thus applying my self to you? Surely it is not so to offer you my poor Judgment, as at all to prescribe to Yours. No; I understand you and my self too well, to be guilty of so sottish a Presumption; Nor is it to put you upon writing Books against this Innovator; for that I think extremely below you. But since the World has heard of such a Thing, as the Decretum Oxoniense (and that so justly to the Credit of that University;) If now Both our Universities would concur in passing their Theological Censure upon such Propositions as have of late so much impugned our Faith, and disgraced our Church; as that of Oxford had passed before upon such Doctrines, as undermined and struck at our Civil Government, (as I think all Christians should be at least as zealous for the former, as for the latter) it could not but highly vindicate the Honour of the Church of England, the Orthodoxy of our Clergy, and of our Two great Seminaries of Learning; which, I assure you, many Foreigners (how undeservedly soever) begin to be something suspicious of, and dissatisfied about, by reason of some late Books published amongst us, and not yet answered by us. And for what concerns this Author's first Discourse concerning the Trinity, I have been assured from a very Authentick hand, corresponding with several Persons of Note for Learning in Germany, that it had given no small offence to the Divines abroad; and particularly,

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berly, that those learned Gentlemen at Lipsick (who write the Transactions) would have censured the new, Heterodox Notions, and equally new, and unjustifiable Expositions of Scripture (which it is full of, and those not wholly unreflected upon by them neither,) at much another rate, than they have done in the Remarks of the Year 1691. p. 246. but that out of a peculiar respect to the Church of England, they forbore, in expectation that some Divine of her own Communion would undertake the Confutation of it. And therefore since those Animadversions upon it, came out so opportunely, as an Answer to so just an Expectation, as well as to so ill a Book; which had both given such offence to foreign Churches, and brought such Scandal upon our own, I hope this Defence of them will find an Acceptance worthy of Those Great Injured Truths asserted in that Discourse, and re-asserted in this. For, high time certainly it is, for all who heartily espouse the Concerns of our Excellent Church (so Practised upon on all Hands) now, if ever, to appear for Her; Considering, That from a New Christianity (the Grand Project of some of late) the Natural and Next step is to None.

And so, Reverend Sirs, to create you no further trouble, having with all the Respect and Reverence due to such great and renowned Bodies, given you an account of the Occasion of this Address to you, as a Thing well deserving your most serious Thoughts, and representing the cause of our Venerable, Old Religion now at stake, (as in truth it is) I humbly leave the whole matter before you, and remain

(As by Duty, and Inclination
equally bound,)

Honoured Sirs,
Your most faithful,
and devoted Servant,

A. A.

A Collection of several Choice, New Theological Terms made use of in Two Books; One Entituled, A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity, &c. The other, A Defense of Dr. Sherlock's Notion of the Trinity, &c. and first Introduced by the said Doctor, for giving the Church a better Explication and a clearer Notion of a Trinity in Unity than it has had for above sixteen hundred years before. Which Collection is as follows:

- S**elf-Consciousness, *Vind.* p. 49. l. 27.
 Mutual Consciousness, *Vind.* p. 52. l. 4.
 Natural Self-Consciousness, *Def.* p. 8. l. 7.
 Natural Mutual Consciousness, *Def.* p. 18. l. 8.
 Intimate conscious Knowledge, *Vind.* p. 59. l. 4.
 Conscious life, *Def.* p. 60. l. 26.
 Self-conscious Principle, *Def.* p. 67. l. 16.
 Natural Principle of mutual Consciousness, *Def.* p. 67. l. 22.
 Conscious Union, *Def.* p. 9. l. 10.
 Natural Unity of Mutual Consciousness, *Def.* p. 33. l. 2.
 Communion of Mutual Consciousness, *Def.* p. 72. l. 9.
 Self-Conscious Love, and Self-Conscious Complacency, *Def.* p. 68. l. 2, & 4.
 Intellectual Sensation, *Def.* p. 77. l. 16.
 Self-Sensation, *Def.* p. 39. l. 24.
 Conscious Sensation, *Def.* p. 8. l. 4.
 Self Conscious Sensation, *Def.* p. 7. l. 15.
 Natural Self Conscious Sensation, *Def.* p. 7. l. 30.
 Natural Mutual Conscious Sensation, *Def.* p. 8. l. 2.
 Feeling each other's Knowledge, *Vind.* p. 56. l. 24.

New Theological Terms.

Self-Consciousness between the Father and the Son,
Vind. p. 60. l. 14.

The Son's feeling the Father's *Will* and *Wisdom* in himself, *Vind. p. 60. l. 22.*

The Son, the Self Conscious Image of his Father's Will and Knowledge, *Vind. p. 60. at the end.*

Continuity of Sensation, *Def. p. 7. l. 12, 13.*

Three distinct Infinite Minds, *Vind. p. 66. l. 22.*

One Individual Nature subsisting thrice, not by multiplying but only by *Repeating* it self, *Def. p. 24. l. 2, 3.*

The Divine Nature repeated in its Image without multiplication, *Def. p. 37. l. 1.*

The same Substance repeated in Three distinct Subsistences, *Def. p. 91. l. 8.*

The same Individual Nature repeated in its living Image, *Def. p. 70. l. 4.*

One Eternal Infinite Mind repeated in Three Subsistences, *Def. p. 94. l. 6, &c.*

Which Terms (with some others like them) are to be substituted in the room of *Nature, Essence, Substance, Subsistence, Suppositum, Person, Hypostasis, and Relation.*

All which (though constantly used hitherto both by Fathers and Councils) yet serving only (as this Author affirms) to *pervert and confound mens Notions and Discourses about the Divine Nature and Persons*, ought utterly to be exploded and laid aside, as *meer Gibberish and Gipsie Cant*; especially by such as account all *Greek and Latin* so too.

Several

Several New, Heterodox, and Extraordinary Propositions, partly in Divinity, and partly in Philosophy, extracted out of the Two fore-mentioned Books.

1.
THE Three Divine Persons are *Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits*; and not to hold so, is both Heresie and Non-sense, *Vind. p. 66. l. 25.*

2.
Unless every Person of the Blessed Trinity, considered as a *distinct Person*, be allowed to be a *distinct Infinite Eternal Mind*, we shall have nothing left us but a Trinity of meer *Modes, Names, and Postures*, *Defen. pag. 8. lin. 24. & pag. 30. lin. 24.*

3.
That which makes a *Spirit* (whether Finite or Infinite) and consequently each of the Divine Persons (which according to this Author are *Three distinct Infinite Spirits*) *One with it self*, and *distinct from all others*, is *Self-Consciousness*, and *Nothing else*. *Vind. p. 67. lin. 11. p. 68. lin. 5. & 13. & 74. lin. 15, &c.*

4.
A natural *Self-Consciousness* makes a *Natural Person*, *Def. p. 8. lin. 7.*

5.
If the *formal Reason of Personality* be that which makes a *Mind or Person* (which with this Author are always Terms convertible) *one with it self*, and distinguishes it from all others, then *Self-Consciousness is the formal Reason of Personality*, *Def. p. 37. l. 8, 9, 10, &c.*

Several New, Heretodox Propositions, &c.

6.
Mutual Consciousness is that which formally unites the Divine Persons in Nature or Essence, and makes them all essentially and numerically one God, *Vind.* p. 68. l. 6, 7, 8. and p. 84. l. 29, and elsewhere frequently.

7.
There is no other mutual *In-being* or *In-dwelling* of the Father in the Son, and of the Son in the Father (called by the Fathers ~~μεταξω~~) *conceivable* or *possible*, but by mutual Consciousness, *Def.* p. 9. l. 15, 16, &c.

8.
The Son and the Holy Ghost are in the Father as in *their Cause*, *Vind.* p. 69. l. 29. Which Term Divines generally decline the use of, using the word [Principle] instead thereof. However this overthrows the foregoing Proposition, *viz.* That the Son can be no otherwise in the Father, than by mutual Consciousness.

9.
The *apostion* used, (with reference to the Divine Persons) by the *Nicene* Fathers, is not sufficient to prove a *Numerical Unity of Nature or Essence* in the said Persons, *Def.* p. 69. l. 1, 2, &c.

10.
The Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Divine Persons is partly *specifick*, partly *numerical*, *Def.* p. 17. l. 27.

11.
It is impossible to conceive a more close and intimate Union in Nature than mutual Consciousness, *Def.* p. 35. l. 22. Whereas an Union in one *Numerical Essence or Nature* is and must be (in the very Conception

Several New Heterodox Propositions &c.

priety or Nation of it) greater and more intimate, as being the Ground, the Reason, and Foundation of the other.

12.

The very Nature and Subsistence of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is *wholly Relative*, Def. p. 27. l. 21. And for their Subsistence, I grant it to be so; but if their Nature be *wholly Relative* too, I am sure there is nothing *absolute* belonging to the Deity.

13.

The Case of a Man and his living Image (though even by this Author's own confession a meer Fiction or Supposition) is a plain Account of the essential Unity between God the Father and God the Son, Def. p. 21. l.

10. That is to say, in a Romance we have a clear Explication of the *quodammodo* of the first and second Person of the Trinity. And in Two, who are actually separate and loco-distant from one another, we have a plain Account of the Union of Two, who both in their Essence and Persons are actually and absolutely inseparable.

14.

If the Three Divine Persons be considered as Three Infinite Minds, distinguished from each other by a Self-Consciousness of their own, and essentially united to each other by a mutual Consciousness (which is the only way of distinguishing and uniting Minds) then a Trinity in Unity is a very plain and intelligible Notion, Vind. p. 73. l. 17. from whence follows another Proposition, viz. the

15.

That the Divine Persons have no other Distinction but what they have by Self-Consciousness, and no other Union but what they have by mutual Consciousness. And

Several New, Heterodox Propositions, &c.

consequently, That the *Trinity* thus stated, really amounts to no more than a *Council* or *Cabal* of *Gods*; and that it is in no degree so much *Prophaneness*, for the *Socinians* to call it so, as for this *Man*, by his Three distinct Infinite Minds, to make it so.

16.

The Three Divine Persons in the Godhead are not only modally distinguished, *Vind. p. 83. l. last* But generally all the Divines in Christendom hold them to be so distinguished, and no otherwise.

17.

There are no *Modes*, no more than there are *Qualities* and *Accidents* in the Deity, *Vind. p. 84. l. first*.

18.

Persons distinct, yet not separate, but essentially one by mutual Consciousness, do not act upon each other, *Def. p. 73. l. 23.*

19.

The Divine Nature or Essence is not a single or singular Nature, *Def. p. 18. l. 13.*

20.

It is absurd to say, That the one Divine Nature of the Father, the Son, and Holy Ghost is *Incarnate*, and yet none but the Son Incarnate, *Def. p. 18. l. last* and *p. 19. l. first*.

21.

One single Essence can subsist but once, or have but one Subsistence, *Def. p. 19. l. 23.* and *p. 24. l. 29.* and yet (for all this) it follows.

22.

One Eternal Infinite Mind is [repeated] in Three Subsistences, *Def. p. 94. l. 6.*

23. There

Several New, Heterodox Propositions, &c.

23.
There is no Distinction between the Divine Essence and a Divine Person, Def. p. 91. l. 28. And yet all Divines speak of the Divine Essence as communicable or common to the Persons; and account of the former as Absolute, and of the latter as Relative; and that surely imports Distinction.

24.
The Divine Essence makes the Person, *ibid.*

25.
The Divine Essence must be acknowledged to be a Person, Def. p. 92. l. 19.

26.
No man has an Idea of an Intelligent Nature or Essence distinguished from a Person, Def. p. 92. l. 10.

27.
[Infinite Mind] and [Infinite Intelligent Person] are Terms as equipollent and convertible as [God] and [infinite Mind] Def. p. 81. l. 23, &c.

28.
There are in God Acts of Sensation, of a different kind and species from Acts of Knowledge: and Self-Consciousness and mutual Consciousness are of the former sort, Def. p. 77. l. 10, &c.

29.
It is the Soul only that can be happy or miserable, rewarded or punished in or out of the Body, Def. 54. l. 31. And if so; what need (say I) can there be of a Resurrection? Such Doctrines certainly (back'd with Licence and Authority) may come to something in time.

30.
We can frame no Idea of Substance, but what we have from Matter, Vind. p. 69. l. first.

31. We

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31.

We cannot imagine how any Substance should be without a Beginning, *Vind. p. 79. l. 6.* And if that be true, then I affirm that Nothing can be imagined to be so.

32.

The Nature of a Spirit consists in *Kiral internal Sensation*, *Def. p. 7. l. 11.*

33.

The Unity of a Spirit consists in *Continuity of Sensation*, *Def. ibid.*

34.

One Numerical Nature, whether *Finite* or *Infinite*, may be repeated without being multiplied: Of the first whereof he often gives us an Instance in a man and his living Image, *Def. p. 91. l. 10.* and of the other in the Divine Nature, it self, *Def. p. 31. l. first.*

35.

A man and his living Image are two distinct men, though the Image is not another man, *Def. p. 31. l. 19, & 21.*

36.

An Image is wholly and entirely the same with the Prototype, *Def. p. 28. l. 16.*

37.

The Soul is the person, and the Body only the Organ or Instrument of it, *Def. p. 51. l. 2. p. 57. l. 11. and p. 58. l. 16.*

38.

The whole entire Personality is in the Soul, *Def. p. 50. l. 20.*

39.

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39.
The Soul is the person; and the Body is taken into the Unity of the said person, *Def. p. 60. l. 22.*

40.
The Soul is not properly part of the Person, *Def. p. 61. l. 3.*

41.
The Body is not a Part of the Person, *Def. p. 60. l. 23.*

42.
The Soul is a Complete Being, *Def. p. 49. l. 30.*

43.
The Soul may be a complete and perfect Person, and yet not a perfect Man, *Def. p. 49. l. 28.* Whereas a Person implies all the essential perfections of a Man, and something more.

44.
A Man with a Body Blind, Deaf, and Lame, is not a perfect Man, [*viz.* upon a Natural and essential Account, not so.] *Def. p. 50. l. 10.*

45.
All Union between Natures is a Natural Union, *Def. p. 49. l. 16.*

46.
The Soul is as much the same *with* or *without* the Body, as the Body with or without its Cloaths, *Def. p. 60. l. 29.*

47.
Unless there be two Personalities as well as Two Natures (*viz.* Soul and Body) the Two Natures cannot be two parts of one human Personality, as they are parts of a Man, *Def. 45. l. 25.* Now, what gross Ignorance is this! For an human Personality, no less than a Par-

Several New, Heterodox Propositions, &c.

a Particular *Humanity*, essentially and metaphysically implies and connotes *Parts*. Though only the *Person* and *Man* himself in the *Concrete* is actually and Physically compounded of them. To which I add, that *Two Personalities* can never be *two parts* of any essential compound whatsoever, but *Two Natures* may, and in the Present instance certainly are. See this further explained, p. 115, 116.

These Propositions (with several others like them) are his *New Dogmata* in Divinity and Philosophy: which as they are most absurd and false in themselves, so the Consequences of many of them, with reference to the Incarnation of our Blessed Saviour, I leave to the Thinking and Judicious Reader himself to draw out, and to the Church to judge of. And possibly some time or other, *Foreigners* also may be presented with a View of them, in a Language, which they understand better than *they do ours*.

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Some ERRATA of the Prefs.

IN the Table of *New Heterod. Propositions* page the last *lin.* 15. for of judge of r. to judge of, p. 22. l. 5. for intire read entire, p. 49. l. 12. for 26th r. 25th, p. 60. l. 14. for singular r. singular, p. 73. l. 5. dele E. p. 76. l. 25. for Essential r. Essential, p. 83. l. 11. for *draſteſivula* r. *draſteſivula*, p. 174. l. 15. for *conuadicting* r. *conuadicting*, p. 236. l. 14. for Infinite r. infinite, p. 244. l. 31. for Thnig r. Thing, p. 246. l. 27. for conlist r. conlist? p. 251. l. 1. for Subſtance r. Subſtance, p. 280. l. 22. for *is euidem* r. *is euidem*, p. 302. l. 15. for 7. r. 6. Where *Animadverter* occurs, r. *Animadverter*. For and indeed, r. or rather indeed, p. 313. last line but two.

TRITHEISM
CHARGED, &c.

AS it may justly be accounted a needless, so it is certainly a Nauseous Task to attempt the Confutation of a Book more than sufficiently confuted already, by the *very Book*, which it was wrote against. For so much I dare, and shall averr, That there is not one Passage in all this Defence of Dr. Sherlock's *Notion of the Trinity*, (as it is called) carrying with it so much as the Face of an *Argument*, (as none carries with it any more) but what may be fully, thoroughly, and with advantage answered out of the *Animadversions*. Nevertheless the Expectation of the World may possibly claim an *Answer*, though such a *Pamphlet* can neither require nor deserve one. And were not the World so severe an Exactor in such Cases, this *pittiful Piece* should for me lie unanswered, and despised for ever; so little do I think it for the Credit of any one to fight with a

Shaddow, or a Vizard, or to combat an Adversary, who is better a great deal at *Hiding* than at *Defending* himself. The *Animadverter* from the very first declared, That in this *Controversie* he would concern himself with none but the Author himself, whom he first wrote against; nor with him neither, but in case of a *Just* and *Scholastick Reply* made to his whole Discourse. And now, how this *puny Thing*, called a *Defence*, comes up to the first of these Qualifications, *viz.* the *Justness* or Commensuration of it to the Book it pretends to answer, will be quickly seen: For if we measure that Book by all the Particulars contained in it, it answers not so much as the *fortieth Part* of it; and if we measure it by the *Number of Chapters*, it catches indeed or rather snapps at several Parts of three Chapters, (far from examining the whole even of these Three) but as for the other Nine Chapters, and the whole Preface, they are entirely pass'd over by it, not only not answered, but (upon the Matter) scarce so much as touch'd. So that by a new and rare *Metonymy* of the fourth or fifth, and in some respect of the fortieth Part for the whole, this doughty Piece must be called an *Answer* to the *Animadversions*. For if the Reader will needs have such an Answer, he must seek for it in the *Title-Page*, for in the *Book* it self he shall never find it. And then, in the next place, for what concerns the *Scholastick Character* of the same, that will eminently appear from those choices and *Scholastick Terms*, which it is all along embellished and set off with. Such as are these, that follow, with Reference to the Animadverter himself, *viz.* *Ingenious Blunderer*, *Trifling Author*, *Wandering Wis*, *Wrangling Wis*, *Leviathan*, *One whose Ridibleness will*
prove

prove him a Man, though he is seldom in so good a Humour as to laugh without grinning, which belongs to another Species, viz. a Dog. A notable Man, and one that can make a shift to read, and to transcribe. And then for the *Animadversions*, they are characteriz'd by senseless Mistakes, School-Terms instead of Sense, Gypsy-Cant, perfect Gibberish, Ignorance and Raving, an hundred Absurdities and Fooleries, Huffing, Swaggering and Scolding, a great scolding Book, Want of Sense, &c. with several more of the like Gravel-Lane Elegancies; and all of them such peculiar Strictures of this Author's Genius, that he might very well spare his Name, where he had made himself so well known by his Mark. For all the foregoing *Oyster-Wive-Kennel-Rhetorick*, seems so naturally to flow from him who had been so long Rector of St. Botolph's (with the well-spoken *Billingsgate* under his Cure) that (as much a Teacher as he was) it may well be questioned, whether he has learned more from his Parish, or his Parish from him. But after all, may I not ask him this short Question? Where is the Wit and Smartness of *Thought*? Where are the peculiar Graces, and lucky Hits of *Fancy*, that should recommend the foregoing Expressions to the *Learned* and *Ingenious*? No, nothing of all this is to be found in this Man's Words or way of speaking. But all favour of the Porter, the Car-Man, and the Water-Man, and a pleasant Scene it must needs be to the Reader, to see the *Master of the Temple* thus laying about him in the Language of the *Stairs*. But what Men draw in from their Education, generally sticks by them for Term of Life, and it is not to be expected, That a Mouth so long accustomed to throw Dirt, should

ever leave it off, till it comes to be stopped with it.

Leaving therefore his ill Language, and worse Breeding to himself and others like him, I shall now address my self to an Examination of the wonderful Work he has presented the World with. And in this I shall begin with the concluding Passage of it, (especially since it relates to that which lyes first in the Animadversions.) And that is a Master-piece of Critical Learning indeed; viz. His charging the Animadverter with a Blunder for deriving a Mystery from *μυστα* or *μύστω*. For says he very Learnedly, *A Mystery is a Thing, and therefore how can it be derived from a Word?* And now is any Man alive able to stand his ground against such an over-bearing Objection? Nevertheless, to answer it as Calmly as may be; Does the Animadverter indeed absolutely, and in *Terminis* say, *That a Mystery is derived from μυστα or μύστω, &c?* Or rather does not the Defender quote the Animadverter as the Devil quoted Scripture, with the Principal words left out, which should govern the whole Sentence? For if we consult the Animadversions, The words are not, *A Mystery is derived from μυστα, &c.* But *A Mystery (according to the common signification of the word) is derived so or so.* And will this Man of Criticism deny that there may be a *Verbat* as well as a *Real* Consideration of a *Thing*, or that a *Mystery*, or any other Thing whatsoever, may not be considered and treated of according to it's *Name* as well as according to it's *Nature*; and that these are two distinct Considerations of almost every Thing that falls under Discourse, and so distinct, that one may pass upon a Thing without the other? Let him deny this if he can, and shew some other Reason besides his

The Objection about the derivation of a Mystery, prov'd only a Blunder of the Objector.

own Spight and Ignorance for such a Partial, Malicious Half-quotation of the Animadverters words. But perhaps he has here a Quarrel at the Particle [A] and instead of [A Mystery] would have it only [Mystery]. But if this should pervert the meaning of the Sentence in English, I suppose it will equally pervert the same in Latine too; since what is sense or nonsense in one Language must be equally so in Another. And therefore we will try how the matter is like to prove, according to this Method. For I think it may be no less a Charity to this Author sometimes to turn English for him into Latine, than what was before shewn him by the Animadverter, in now and then turning a piece of Latine for him into English. Now the words in the Animadverter being these. *A Mystery, according to the common signification of the word, is derived either from the Greek μυστηριον, &c. must in Latine run thus. Mysterium secundum vulgariorem receptam vocis hujusce usum derivatur vel à Græco vocabulo μυστηριον, &c.* Now let this Aristarchus declare, whether there is any fault either of Sense or Propriety in the Sentence thus translated, and where it is. And if this be a true and proper Translation, then I am sure that what appears so in Latine must be equally so in English. But why should I spend words in disputing a thing so obvious to any Man of Sense? For will any one living, who is so, deny it to be a most pertinent and proper way to give an Account of Things by the signification of the words which they are couched under? and withall, to prove and make good that signification yet further, by its derivation from another and more remote word? What Judgment the Reader will pass upon,

upon this Man's Temper and Abilities for this Objection, I know not; but for my own part, I protest I can hardly think him well in his Wits, that he should offer such stuff to Publick View, which one grain of sense would convince him deserves rather to be hooted at than replied to.

But this is not all; for we have him again at his old Blunder about the *Anti-Nicene Fathers*, p. 17. l. 2. though he had been so deservedly corrected and exposed for it before. But whosoever, or whatsoever these *Anti-Nicene Fathers* were, I find it past my skill to perswade the World that the Greek *ἀντι* and the Latine *ante*, signify the same Thing; though to this Author, I confess they may, to whom Hebrew, Greek and Latine come all alike.

And again, in a Greek Quotation, p. 22. (in which sort of Quotations he never fails to shew his Parts) we have these words. Ἡδὲ καὶ ὁ ἱερεὺς, instead of ἡδὲ καὶ ὁ, &c. which indeed is but a false Concord; and that, we know, ought to pass but for a slight thing in a Grammarian above Ordinances. So that we see here that the Trade of Blunders, Solecisms, and false Syntax (as dead as all other Trading is) continues as Quick and full upon this Author's hands as ever. And the truth is, I have had such Experience of him, and know him by so true a measure, that wheresoever there is any thing of Grammar in the Case, I never expect any other or better from him: And I heartily pity all Greek or Latine that falls under his hands.

And so I pass from his *Critical* to his *Polemical* Achievements; not doubting but I shall find him so extremely like himself in both, that neither shall the

Critick

Critick have any Cause to laugh at the *Disputant*, nor the *Disputant* to reproach the *Critick*. Now his whole Work consists of these Two Parts.

I. *First*, A general Scheme or Draught of his *Hypothesis*.

II. *Secondly*, An Answer (as he calls it) to the *Animadvertiser's* Arguments.

I. As to the *First* of which, since it is not brought by way of *Reply* to the *Animadversions*, it might justly be slighted, and, according to all the Laws of Disputation, passed over without the least notice taken of it: And so much the more, because it is little else but a dull tedious *Crambe* *recited* of his *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual-Consciousness* served up again and again, and obtruded upon the Reader *ad nauseam usq;* as if the bare Repetition of his baffled Notions were enough to recover and set them upon their legs again. Nevertheless, that he may not think Tautology a Thing of such Virtue, as to be able to re-settle his broken *Hypothesis* upon any firmer ground than it stood on before; what has been here offered by him, by way of *After-game* in his forlorn Defence of it, shall be duly and fairly examined.

And here, to shew the World that he can write with as little regard to Truth, as sense of Shame, he begins his Discourse with a very gross Falshood, *viz.* That all that he affirmed in his Vindication, &c. concerning a Trinity in Unity, was, That it is a Possible and Intelligible Notion, and no other in Sense and Substance than what the Ancient Fathers made use of to represent.

sent this great Mystery by, though expressed in other Terms, &c. p. 4. l. 18.

Now the first part of this Assertion I affirm in the Face of the World to be scandalously false. For he has not only asserted his Notion of a *Trinity in Unity* (the only Thing here in Debate) to be *Possible and Intelligible*; but also *Plain and Easy*, and *such as solves all Doubts and Difficulties, and clears off all seeming Contradictions about it.* These are his Words, *Vindicat. Pref. p. 1. l. 13. B. p. 66, 68, & 85.* And I do here demand of him, Whether they are so or no? If they are not, Let him declare me an *Impudent Falsificator*; and if they are, Let him, or any of his *Friends of the Trithéistical Tribe*, prove, That *barely Possible and Intelligible* (which is all that he here pretends to) signify the same with *Plain and Easy*, and *solving all Doubts and Difficulties about the Trinity*, (which are the very Words of his *Vindication*) if they can.

As for the next Thing asserted by him, and that with every whit as great a Falshood as the former, viz. *That his Doctrine is the same with that of the Fathers, though expressed in other Words.* He ought (as he has been several times urged and required) to have given the World a solid Reason, why the *Fathers* Meaning should not be rather gathered from their own than from his Words? And why, if they had the same meaning with him, they did not express it in the same Words; the Words being so easy, and obvious at hand to be made use of, and the *Fathers* withal so great Masters of *Philosophy, Rhetorick, and Expression*? And I defy any Man of Sense alive to give a satisfactory Answer to these *Queries*; But not one Tittle does this Author answer to these, or to all that

that have been alledged or argued at large, against this his confident bold-begging Asseveration in the 6th, 7th, and 8th Chapters of the *Animadversions*.

In the next place, with the same Assurance and Untruth, he tells us, *That the Substance of the Article of the Trinity is not concerned in his Hypothesis*, Defen. p. 4. And that there is no Innovation made by it in the Faith, nor any Alteration of the least Term in it,

p. 5. Which (as I said) is a very confident Assertion, and it were well if the Truth of it could support the Confidence. For notorious it is, that this Man has advanced not only such Terms but Notions too, in his *Explication of the Trinity*, as the *Catholick Church* never yet made use of, and such as the generality of our own Church do at this day condemn as *Novel and Heretical*. And then, can this Man say, That he has innovated nothing upon the *Substance of this Article*, which certainly does not consist merely in the Words of it? Suppose an *Arian* should come and brazen it out, and pretend *Orthodoxy* as to the *Trinity*, by saying, *That he owns Three Persons and One God*; as in a certain sence of his own, he may, and no doubt, upon occasion, would: Shall this Profession now warrant him *Orthodox* in this *Article*, when if he should be put to it, to explain this Profession, he would never acknowledge *those Three Persons to be That One God*? It is therefore mere Trifling to alledge the Verbal Profession of a Form, where it is evident that a Man maintains such Doctrines as utterly overthrow the Sence of that Form, I For whosoever holds any Proposition inconsistent with, or subversive of another Proposition held by him, can no more be said truly to own that other Proposition, than if he actually

ally and *in terminis* denied it; since surely there may be a Real and Vertual, as well as a Verbal and Express Denial of Things. But this Author thinks it an abundant Proof of his *Orthodoxy* in the Point before us, that he pleads his entire acknowledgment of the *Athanasian Creed in all the Parts and Expressions of it*. But by his favour I must tell him, that neither is this sufficient, unless he could prove that he cannot Contradict Himself. Forasmuch as a Man (He himself especially) may make a Verbal profession even of that *Creed* also, and yet own and maintain Assertions directly contrary to, and inconsistent with the Sense and Design of it. Now the Design of this *Creed* is to assert such a perfect *Unity* in the *Divine Nature or Essence*, and every *essential Attribute* of it, as shall exclude all Multiplication of each, notwithstanding the Plurality and incommunicable Distinction of the *Divine Persons*. This, I say, is the Design of the *Athanasian Creed*, and does our Author's *Hypothesis* fall in and agree with it? If so, let us make Trial of it, by casting the Principal Part of his *Hypothesis* into the *Athanasian Form*, thus. The Father is [Infinite Spirit], the Son is [Infinite Spirit], and the Holy Ghost is [Infinite Spirit] and yet they are not Three Infinite Spirits, but one Infinite Spirit. So runs the *Athanasian Form*; but then the illative Proposition, viz. *That they are not Three Infinite Spirits*, is a direct Contradiction to this Author's *Hypothesis*, who positively affirms, *That the Three Divine Persons are Three Infinite Spirits*; and I as positively affirm, *That Three Infinite Spirits are Three Gods*. And this, I suppose, makes an Alteration in this *Article* with a vengeance, an Alteration in the very *Substance* of it, if a
Total

Total Subversion can with any Propriety of Speech be called an *Alteration*. But this Author defends not himself only by his Acknowledgment of the *Athanasian Creed*, but also by alledging his perfect Concurrence with the School-Men, *viz.* That he asserts the *Unity of the Godhead in as high Terms as ever the Schools did, even a Natural Numerical Unity thereof, p. 5. lin. 3.* But does not this Man in his *Vindication, p. 114. lin. 26.* tell us, That the *Fathers* (and *Gregory Nyssen* in particular) asserted a *Specifick Unity* of the *Divine Nature*, and meant no other by the *quodam*, than an *Union* in such an one, and that for so holding, none ought to quarrel or find faults with them, forasmuch as they asserted also a *Numerical Unity* of the said *Nature*? And therefore if this Author did indeed hold the *Unity of the Godhead, in as high Terms as the Schools did, I would Know, what should make him talk thus of a Specifick Unity of the Deity in the fore-cited place, and not only there, but of something Analogous to this Specifick Unity, even in this Defence also, p. 17. l. 19.* For I am sure the *Schools* allow of no such Thing. Nor is this all, but he also advances an Absurdity so peculiarly his own, (how falsely soever he may charge the *Fathers*) that none, who had but drank in the *first Elements* of *Logick* and *Philosophy*, ever held, or, I believe, so much as dreamed of before; *viz.* Such an *Unity* in the *Divine Nature*, as is partly *Specifick*, and partly *Numerical*; that is to say, partly *Universal*, and partly *Particular, p. 17. l. 26.* A thing so monstrously illogical and contradictory, That to mention it is to confute it. So that the *Reader* may here see how grossly he is like to be imposed upon; if he takes this Author's

thor's word for a Just and True Account of his Hypothesis.

But he is now entering upon his *Grand Project* (and a great one it is undoubtedly) viz. To give the World a fuller, a clearer, and a more Intelligible Notion of a *Trinity in Unity*, than all the *Fathers* and the *Catholick Church* ever had of it for above sixteen hundred Years before. And, as a Preparation to this, he tells us, *pag. 5. lin. 16.* That the *Great Objection* all along against the *Article of the Trinity* has been the *Unconceivableness of it*: And therefore, no doubt, there must needs be the highest Reason and Necessity in the World for the *Churches* admitting this Man's *New Explication* of it, as the only *sure Expedient* to remove this *mighty Objection*, and so to render a *Trinity in Unity* for ever after *Plain, Easie, and Intelligible*. But I must remind this Author, by the way, That the *Catholick Church*, having ever looked upon this as the *greatest of Mysteries*, never made the *Unconceivableness of it* any *Objection* against it at all: and She had been very inconsistent with Her self, if she had. But he tells us here, *That the Fathers* indeed endeavour'd to help our *Conceptions and Imaginations* of this *mysterious Union* by some *sensible Images*, such as the *Union of the Sun, its Light, and Splendour, of a Fountain and its Streams, and of a Tree and its Branches*; *p. 6. l. 5.* Adding very gravely, *That every one knows this, who has looked into the Fathers*, (as no doubt Mr. Dean has, and so have most Book-Sellers too). But he proceeds and tells us, *That these material Images might serve to render the Notion of a Trinity in Unity Possible and Credible, p. 6.* And if they did so much, I affirm, that they did that, which the *Catholick Church*

Church (being otherwise certain of the *Article* it self from the Scripture) then fully acquiesced in, without venturing or proceeding any further. And where then, I pray, was the Defect of these *material Images and Resemblances*, as they were used and applied by the *Fathers*? Why, our Author in the next Words tells us, That the Defect of them was in this, *That they could not help us to conceive what kind of Union it is that is between the Divine Persons*, p. 6. l. 16. But this I deny, as utterly false. For first, this *Mysterious Union of the Divine Persons*, which the *Fathers* endeavoured to give the World some Resemblance of, was, as to the *Kind of it*, an Union in *Nature, Essence, or Substance*; and that in Opposition to an Union by bare *Consent*, or any other Union whatsoever, less than that in *Nature or Essence*. So that the *Kind of Union* is here assigned. And then, as for what he says of the *Inability* of these Resemblances to help us to conceive of this *Kind of Union*; If he means, that they could not help us to any *Conception of it at all*, this also is false; for so far as the Resemblance reach'd, the *Conception* formed thereupon might reach too; the first indeed was but Imperfect, and consequently the other could be but Proportionable. But if He means, that the said Resemblances could not help us to a *full and perfect Conception* of this Union, I must tell him, That neither did the *Fathers* then pretend to it, nor the Church to this Day need it. And I demand of him whether he, or any Man living, can frame in his Mind such a *Conception* of it? Or can inform us how, and by what particular Way this Substantial Union passes through all the Divine Persons so, that with full

full reserve of their Personal Incommunicable distinctions they shall yet become one, *in*, and *by* one and the same Numerical Divine Nature, common to them all? No; the Learnedest Doctors of the Christian Church have always looked upon this as a Mystery beyond their Reach; and though they were sufficiently satisfied of the *Possibility* and *Credibility* of the Thing it self by the forementioned *Resemblances*, and (which was a much greater Conviction) stood assured of the *Truth* of it by *Divine Revelation*, yet as to a full and comprehensive Knowledge of the matter of the Article, they ever accounted it above their Conceptions or Explications, and revered it with a Distance suitable to such Apprehensions. This I say was the Judgment and discreet Conduct of the Catholick Church about this important Point of Faith.

But this Author, it seems, is of another Mind, and having took up a quite different design is resolved upon a very different Method; and accordingly he here declares, *that the Dean* (that is himself) *is certainly in the Right* (as he always is, if you will take his own word for it) *in searching for some Image or Resemblance of this Mystrious Union in the Unity of a Spirit*; giving us this Reason for it, *That God is a Spirit, and that a Mind or Spirit is the truest Image of God that is in Nature*, page 6. lin. 21. And this may be allowed him for a good Reason, provided it be joined with Another, without which it is no Reason at all; And that is, *That he himself Knows*, or (in the Language of *des Cartes* from whom he is now borrowing) *has a clear and distinct perception, what a Spirit, and what the Unity of a Spirit is, and wherein it consists*; for otherwise he goes about to explain one unknown Thing

Thing by another, which is equally unknown it self. Which kind of method, I must tell him, the Fathers in the Resemblances they gave of a Trinity (and which he so much slight) were too good Disputants to make use of. And therefore 'tis to be hoped, that this Author both has himself, and will impart to us, such a clear and distinct Notion of a *Spirit*, and of the *Unity of a Spirit*, as may be fit to found such an Explication of the Trinity upon, as he has promised to oblige the World with. And this we must expect to find (if we find it at all) in the following Propositions, viz.

That we know nothing of a Spirit, nor of the Unity of a Spirit neither, but what we feel in our selves, p. 6. at the end. And this we are to look upon as the Corner-stone in the New Structure he intends us of a *Cartesian Trinity*. After which he advances two other Propositions, p. 7.

1. *That the very Nature of a Spirit consists in Internal or vital Sensation.*

2. *That the Unity of a Spirit consists in the Continuity of its Sensation.*

Both which Propositions must be Examined. And here in the

First place, I deny that there is any such Thing as *Sensation*, whether *Internal* or *External*, belonging to Spirits not vitally united to Organized Bodies. For *Sensation* is properly the perception of a sensible Object by a sensible Species of it imprinted upon and received into the proper Organ by which each sensitive faculty operates and exerts it self. This, I say, is Sensation, and accordingly, as it is *External* or *Internal*, so it has *External* or *Internal* Organs allotted to it; but still both of them

them *Corporeal*. And therefore for this Man to talk of *Spiritual Sensation* is non-sense and a contradiction in the Terms, and consequently not to be allowed. It is true indeed that the word [Sense] with the derivatives of it [sensible] [sentiment] and the like, do often signify intellectually, as [*sic sentio*] is as much as *sic judico, sic existimo*. And [*this is my sense of such a Thing*] is all one as to say [this is my *opinion* of it] and accordingly so far it may and does agree to *Spirits* (though yet I cannot remember that I ever read the Term [*Sensation*] signifying intellectually but amongst the *Cartesians*.) But the Question here is not about the word [Sense] so taken, *viz.* in a large, popular, and improper signification; but, as this Author still takes it, *Strictly Properly*, and *Philosophically*, and as contra-distinct to *Knowledge*, and as he speaks of it, *Defen. p. 77. lin. 21*. Where he says, that *he who cannot distinguish between Intellectual Sense and Knowledge, is as unfit to meddle in this controversy, as a blind man is to dispute of Colours*. I say, in this sense, and as thus taken by this Author, I absolutely deny that there is any such Thing as *Sensation* belonging to separate *Spirits*. For all cognitive or perceptive *Acts*, that a Spirit is capable of, are *Acts of Cogitation or Intellection*, direct or reflex. And I do here further affirm, that nothing can be alledged as perceivable by this supposed *Sensation*, which a Spirit does not fully perceive by the said *Acts of Cogitation or Intellection*. So that if there really were such a thing as this *Sensation*, it could be of no use at all to a Spirit to perceive any thing by, whether without or within it self. And therefore I would have this Author take notice, that I both deny the thing, and challenge him

him in his next *Defence* to prove, by Argument, that there are in *Spirits*, not vitally united to Bodies, any such Things as Acts of *Spiritual Sensation*, distinct from Acts of *Cognition*, or *Intellection*. For all *Sensation*, in the very essential Notion of it, imports a dependance upon Matter: and it is not this Author's getting a *Cartesian* mis-applied Word by the end that can over-rule the Sense, which both *Philosophers* and *Divines* have universally hitherto understood, and used it in. In the

2d. place, I affirm it to be the greatest Absurdity and Paradox in the World to hold, *That the Nature of any Thing consists in any Act proceeding from that Thing*; and consequently I deny that the *Nature of a Spirit does or can consist in Sensation*, (allowing the Word here for Disputation sake). Forasmuch as this *Sensation* (still supposing such a Thing in a *Spirit*) must proceed and flow from the *Nature* of that *Spirit*; and, upon that account being *Postnate* to it, cannot be that wherein the said *Nature* does consist. This I know to be in effect the same Argument with the first, brought by the *Animadverter* to prove it Impossible for *Self-Consciousness* to be that wherein the *Personality* of *Created Beings* doth consist. And so long as the *Being* or *Entity* of the *Agent* must in Order of Nature precede its *Action*, I affirm the Argument to be unanswerable, and am not ashamed again and again to own it for a Demonstration. Nevertheless, since this Author, to evade the force of the fore-mentioned Argument, shamefully changes the Terms of it, by putting the *Principle* instead of the *Act* it self, pag. 39. it is not impossible but that (in his next *Defence*) he may do the same here, and tell us, That

by *Sensation* he means not the *Act* but the *Principle of Sensation*; that is to say, that he means that by it, which the word never did, or can properly signify. In short therefore, I demand of this Man, whether this Term [*Sensation*] so often used by him signifies the *Act*, or the *Principle of Action*. If he owns it to signify the *Act* (as all Men of Sense and Philosophy know it does) then I affirm, that it cannot signify the Principle of Action but by a *Metonymy* of the *effect* for the *Cause*: And I do affirm further, that (since in declaring the strict and Philosophical Truth of Things, Tropes and Metonymies are by no means to be allowed of) no Man's *after-meaning* ought in dispute to be admitted in bar of the Confutation of his exprest words. For if this should take place, there could be no discouraging *ad idem*, and consequently no *Argumentation* in any Case. And yet this is this Author's constant way (and that even to the Degree of Impudence) that being baffled in his words he still takes Sanctuary in his *meaning*, which practice we shall have frequent occasion to expose him for. But however to cut off all subterfuge from this Shifter, if we here admit *Sensation* to be taken for the *Principle of Sensation*, it is certain, that this *Principle* must be the *Essence* of the *Spirit* which this *Sensation* is said to belong to; (the *Essence* of every Thing being the proper Productive Principle of all the Operations of that Thing;) But then we must observe also, That the *Essence* of every Thing sustains the office of a double Principle. First of an *Internal Principle* giving Being to the Thing of which it is the *Essence*; and Secondly of an *efficient Principle* of all the Actions or Operations belonging

belonging to that Thing; and it discharges the office
 of the former antecedently in Nature to that of the
 Latter: so that the same *Essence* is a Principle of *Be-
 ing* before it is a Principle of *Action*, even with refe-
 rence to the same Agent; and consequently as it is a
Principle of Action it is not properly and formally a
Principle of Being. And this Argument with any one
 acquainted with the True Principles of Philosophy (of
 which this Author understands not one Tittle) quite
 overthrows that assertion of his, *viz.* That the *very
 Nature of a Spirit consists in Sensation*, and that whe-
 ther we take it for the *Act*, or *Principle of Sensation*;
 and pluck it up by the very roots. But I shall refer
 the Reader, for his further satisfaction, to my Vindi-
 cation of the forementioned Argument, where I shall
 more fully canvas and confute this pitiful shift; not
 being willing to anticipate that here, which will come
 in more directly and naturally in another place.
 Thirdly, As I have shewn, That the *Nature of a Spi-
 rit* cannot consist in *Sensation*, so I affirm, That nei-
 ther can the *Unity of a Spirit* consist in the same. For
Unity being the first Transcendental mode or Affection
 of *Being*, and so in reality the same with it, and con-
 sequently in order of Nature preceding all *Acts* flow-
 ing from it, can never consist in any such Act or Num-
 ber of Acts whatsoever. These Arguments I know
 are wholly Metaphysical; but the Dispute being
 about *Spirits*, as to the Nature, Unity, and Actions
 of them (things essentially abstracted from *matter*)
 the very condition of the subject neither affords nor
 admits of any other, or more excellent solution, than
 this. Well; but notwithstanding what has been argued
 against bare *Sensation*, may not the *Unity of a Spirit*
 consist

consist in *continuity of Sensation*. For this is it, which this Author here expressly asserts, p. 7. In answer to which I must demand of him, whether he has a *clear and distinct Knowledge* what this *continuity of Sensation* is, and wherein it does consist? If he has such a Knowledge of it, why then does he usher it in with those Terms of doubting and uncertainty (*as I may so speak*) for [*so speaks, and so says*] must not be admitted in giving a Philosophical state and account of Things. But if on the other side this Author has not a distinct Knowledge of *Continuity of Sensation* (as it is manifest from his inability clearly to express it, that he has not) then let us consider what an Explication of an Unity in Trinity he is like to give us from a Thing which he neither distinctly knows, nor can clearly express. For if he could do the former, what Reason can there be why he should not be able to do the latter? Now his method in explaining the Trinity (which he promises us such great Things from) is this. He first tells us, *That he is certainly in the right in seeking for an Image of the mysterious Unity of the Divine Persons in the Unity of a Spirit*, p. 6. l. 21. and in the next place he tells us, *That we can know nothing of the Unity of a Spirit but what we feel in our selves*. And here in the last place he tells us, *That all that we feel in our selves is this Continuity of Sensation*: but what this is he does not express, and gives us but too much Reason from his own words to conclude that he cannot. So that here we have an Explication of Unity in Trinity by *Continuity of Sensation*, but who shall explain to us this *Explication* is self? For admit that the Unity of a Created Spirit carries in it the nearest Resemblance to the Unity of
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the Godhead in the Three Persons, yet how can this Unity of a Created Spirit be explain'd by *Continuity of Sensation*, when the very Terms of this Explication import a direct contradiction to the Nature of the Thing pretended to be explained by them? For I defy all Mankind to form in their Minds such a Conception of *Continuity* as does not essentially imply in it connexion of Parts; and where there are Parts there must be extension, and consequently Divisibility: So that the sum of all is this, That the mysterious Unity of the Trinity is explained to us by the *Unity of a Spirit*; and the *Unity of a Spirit* which can have neither Parts, Extension, nor Divisibility, is explained to us by something which necessarily implies them all. For in giving an Account of the Nature of a Thing by *Continuity*, nothing but a Real Continuity, a Continuity properly so called can take place. And it will be in vain here for this Author to plead that we Know not the *Nature of a Spirit*. For this he had told us before (in the 7th, and 8th pages of his *Kindication*) and that therefore not being able to express it adequately, we must be contented to express it as well as we can, viz. [by so speaks, and so says, and by *Continuity* where there can be no Parts]; for such a Plea, though admitted, would manifestly give up his Cause, by shewing that he had undertook to explain the *Unity in Trinity* by such an *Unity* as he himself can neither conceive nor express. We have seen therefore what these two Propositions, viz. That the very Nature of a Spirit consists in Internal Sensation; and the *Unity of a Spirit in Continuity of Sensation*; amount to: but let us now see how he proves them; for, I fanſie, the World will hardly take them upon his bare *αὐτοῦ ἑν.* And

And here, supposing that I need not tell the Reader, That this Author, by *Sensation*, and *Continuity of Sensation*, means *Self-Consciousness*; we shall find that his Argument runs thus. So far as a Man feels himself, or is self-conscious, so far he is one entire Person. For it is a self-evident Proposition, That in an Intelligent Self-Conscious Being, [self] can reach no further than he feels himself. And I would desire any thinking Man to tell me, how he knows himself to be a distinct and separate Person from all other Men, but only by this, That he feels his own Thoughts, Volitions, Passions, &c. but feels nothing of all this in other Men, p. 7. l. 14.

But what wretched Inconsequences are these? Self can reach or exist no further than a Man feels himself, and therefore a Man's feeling himself and his Existence is that wherein Self and the Existence of self does consist: It follows indeed from hence, That his Feeling is the measure of his Existence. So that one cannot extend beyond the other, but that does not therefore place his Existence in his feeling (that he does exist). A particular determined Portion of Matter cannot reach or exist beyond the Quantity that bounds or determines it; but does the Existence and Being of that Matter therefore consist in this Quantity? The Body of a Man cannot extend further than its just Stature, but does the Body therefore consist in its Stature? Again, A Man cannot (as this Author says) know himself to be a separate distinct Person from all other Men, but by Self-Consciousness and Internal Sensation, and therefore, forsooth, these are and must be the Things wherein his being a distinct Person does consist. And let any one alive shew that this Argument proves any more if he can. But this Man confounds the Principles

ple of Knowledge with the Principle of Being all along. Whereas the Point here is, Whether the *Unity* and *Distinction* of a Spirit consists in *Internal Sensation* as the formal Reason of it, not whether *Internal Sensation* be that, whereby alone a Spirit can Know it self to be one with it self, and distinct from all others? For though this latter be granted to this Author as often as he pleases; yet the former will be as stiffly denied him. I find and feel my self to be one Man, and to be distinct and separate from all others; but does this therefore make me to be so? Or does my being so consist in my feeling my self to be so? One would think that a Man should be ashamed to argue at this Rate; especially having been baffled in it more than once. But it is a Custom, which he is grown old in, *To be baffled and to talk on*, and it is too late to cure him of it now.

In the mean time there are some other choice Things, which deserve our consideration, and particularly this: So far (says He) *as a man feels himself, or is Self-Conscious, he is one entire Person, where this Self-Conscious Sensation ends he becomes a distinct and separate Person, p. 7. l. 13.* But is it possible for the mind of Man to imagine any one to be an *entire Person*, and consequently *one in himself*, and yet not *distinct* from all others besides? when the very essential Notion of *Unity* connotes *Distinction* too; and when according to all the Rules of Philosophy, that which is the *Principle of Constitution* to any thing, is the Principle also of *Distinction* to the same. Every Thing being distinguished from all other Things by what it is in it self. Continuity of Sensation (he says) makes a Man one in himself, and the *ending*, or *ne plus ultra* of that Sensation.

Sensation makes him a distinct Person. And yet he appeals to every Thinking Man whether he knows himself to be a distinct Person any other way than by this Self-Conscious Sensation. Whereas he had said but just before, that it is the ending of this Self-Conscious Sensation which makes him a distinct Person: and if so, can he then know himself to be a distinct and separate Person by that which must be at an end before he can be a distinct Person? Certainly a grosser and more fullsome contradiction scarce ever dropped from the Tongue or Pen of Man: and if this be not Non-sence in the highest, and gibberish truly so called, I dare averr, that Bedlam affords none.

But his Complement to the Animadverter must not be passed over so; for whole Instruction, (forsooth) he says, he was so large in his Discourse about Sensation and Self-Consciousness, p. 7. For since he is so very kind, he must give me leave to be as Charitable in my Admonitions, as he was liberal in his Instructions; and accordingly to advise him for the future to keep his Instructions to himself, and what he can spare, to bestow upon his Boys, that so they may not at their Father's Age come to need such correction as their Father has had. And whereas he says, the Animadverter understood not one word of his Hypothesis, I must here tell him in the Animadverter's Name, That he accounts it no disparagement at all to any Man of Sence not to understand Him, who speaks none.

But he proceeds, and to shew us how methodical he is in his Absurdities, he tells us, *That the Dean* (as certainly no man living was ever so much a Dean in his own Eyes) *having observed, That the Uni-*

ty of a single Spirit consists in such a Natural Self-Conscious Sensation, this led him on to that other Notion of mutual Consciousness which may be between Three distinct Spirits, and make them Naturally one (as much as Three can be one). p. 7. l. 29. And that in good earnest is a limitation with a Witness; a limitation amounting to an utter Negation of the Thing, which it is applyed to: It being impossible for Three distinct Absolute Beings (which Three distinct Spirits certainly are) to be One by one Numerical Nature belonging in common to them. But besides, observe the fallacy couched under this Ambiguous Parenthesis (*as much as Three can be one*) for by [Three] here he may either mean *Three Spirits*, or *Three Persons*: And he imposes grossly upon his Reader, and begs the Question besides, if he supposes that *Three Divine Persons* cannot be more United than *Three Spirits*; or that *mutual Consciousness* is the greatest Union that *Three Persons* are capable of. Both which are utterly false, and the very Things now under Dispute. And we shall presently shew the vast disparity between *Persons* and *Spirits*, with reference to the Union, which each of them may admit. But our Author goes on thus. If (says he) a *Natural Self-Conscious Sensation* makes a Spirit one with it self, why should not a mutual Conscious Sensation Unite Three into One? For if *Natural Unity* extends as far as *Conscious Sensation*, then if *Conscious Sensation* extends to Three, why should not These Three be acknowledged to be *Naturally One*? p. 8. l. 1. To which I answer First, That it has been already shewn, that although this *Conscious Sensation* be that whereby a Spirit knows it self to be One and distinct from all others, yet it is not that

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which

which makes it so (and the supposing of this is the *main* *idea*, which runs through this Man's whole Hypothesis) and consequently, whatsoever is argued from this supposition, towards the proving the same of *mutual Consciousness* with reference to Three Spirits, which had been asserted of *Self-Consciousness* with reference to one, must fall to the ground with it. But secondly, Because he asks a Reason why *mutual Consciousness* may not give *Natural Unity* to *Three Spirits*, as well as *Self-Consciousness* does to one? (though the former is the greater Absurdity of the Two) yet since both Assertions are equally false, I shall give this one Reason against Both, *viz.* Because *Consciousness* or *Sensation* is not properly *Nature* but an *Affection* of *Nature*, or an *Act* springing from it; and therefore *Unity of Consciousness* or *Sensation* cannot be properly *Unity of Nature*, nor consequently can it constitute the subject it belongs to, *Naturally One*. And whereas, according to his *Sophistical way*, he calls it a *Natural Self-Conscious Sensation*, p. 7. l. 30. If by *Natural* he means that wherein *Nature* does consist, or which gives *Being* and *Unity* to a Thing, in that Sense, (as it has been proved all along) *Self-Consciousness* cannot be termed *Natural*: But if by *Natural* he means that which proceeds from *Nature* that is true, but comes not up to his Purpose. Well; but supposing that *Consciousness* or *Sensation* were indeed the *Nature* of the Thing Conscious, or (in other words) that, wherein the *Being* of the said Thing did consist, and consequently that *Unity of Consciousness* were *Unity of Nature* too (as it is certain that neither of them are) yet for that very cause I deny

deny that this *Consciousness*, and *Unity of Consciousness* can belong in common to *Three distinct Absolute Beings*. For as much as every *Absolute Being* is constituted such by a *Particular, Proper, and Distinct Nature* of its own, belonging to it and included in it, and distinguishing it from every other *Absolute Being* besides; and therefore it is impossible for any particular Nature Numerically one, to be in any more *Absolute Beings*, than in one Alone. In three several Persons indeed, whose several Personalities, and Personal Distinctions consist properly in *Three Distinct Relations*, nothing hinders but that the same *Numerical Nature* (if Infinite) may be in them all; for as much as the same *Numerical Nature* may sustain all these *Three distinct Relations*. And herein consists the great Disparity between *Spirits* which are absolute Beings, and the *Divine Persons* which are not so; and this is true Reason and Consequence, and proof against all that this Novellist can alledge against it. But after all, in the third and last place, The very ground upon which this Man builds from first to last, in proving That *Mutual-Consciousness* or *Sensation* gives natural *Unity to Three distinct Spirits*, is false, and sinks under him. For he supposes all along, that this *Mutual-Consciousness* is one *Numerical Natural Act*, which upon his Principle, viz. [*That the Three Divine Persons are Three Infinite Spirits.*] I utterly deny; and on the contrary affirm it to be only a complex and collective *Unity* consisting of and containing in it *Three distinct Acts of Consciousness*, whereof one belongs to each of his *Three Spirits*, and is that whereby each Spirit knows or feels (let him call it which he will) all that

can be said of them or of any one of them. *End.* [The word] is

M is *in*, or is *known* or *felt* by the other Two Spirits. This I affirm, and challenge this Author, when he enters upon this dispute again, to disprove. For whatsoever is the *Act* of an *Absolute*, *distinct Being*, must it self be as distinct as that Being is. And so his Principal Notion of *Three distinct Spirits being naturally one*, by one *Mutual Consciousness* extending to them all, falls to nothing. For surely *Three distinct Consciousnesses*, or *Acts of Consciousness* (which this *Mutual Consciousness* consists of) can never make Three Spirits naturally One; since these Three Acts are not *Naturally* but only *Collectively one* themselves; and accordingly under that Unity and no other can they be expressed by that one Denomination [*Mutual Consciousness.*]

But he proceeds, and to shew the World what an Iron-Neccessity, or rather what a Cruel Bondage one Imperious Absurdity will bring the Maintainer of it under; he tells us in the 8th page, *That it was This*, (*viz.* his Notion of *Self-Consciousness*, and *Mutual-Consciousness*) *that forced the Deem* (as no Absurdity affects Mr. Dean's Priviledge of standing alone by it self) *to speak of the Three Infinite and Eternal Persons in the Godhead, under the Character of Three Infinite and Eternal Minds.* For this Conscious Sensation, whether *Self-Consciousness* or *Mutual-Consciousness*, can belong only to *Minds*. Which latter I here absolutely deny; and in this one word [*Minds*] plurally used by him he manifestly begs the *Question* again, and supposes the Chief Thing to be proved, *viz.* *That there is a Plurality of Infinite Minds to which this Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness must belong*: For what [*Minds*] else can he here mean? Not finite
or

or created Minds, For he himself in the 67th page of his *Vindication*, denies that this *Mutual-Consciousness* can belong to any created Minds or Spirits. So that it is evident, that he here speaks of *Infinite Minds*, (which (as I said) being the Thing chiefly disputed, ought to have been proved by him before presumed :) and consequently that he speaks also of such a *Self-Consciousness* and such a *Mutual-Consciousness* as import *Infinite Knowledge*; and since they do so, I deny that they can belong to any more [*Minds*] than one, I say, than to *One Eternal Infinite Mind*, which is *God blessed for ever*. For being Acts of Knowledge they follow and flow from the Divine Essence and Nature common to the *Three Persons*; and are no more than the Divine Omniscience terminating upon all and each of the *Persons*, as so many Particular Objects contained within its adequate Object, which is all Things Knowable. Admitting therefore that this *Self-Consciousness*, and *Mutual-Consciousness*. (being nothing else but the Divine Omniscience thus diversly terminated) may infer a *Plurality of Persons* Knowable in the Godhead, yet I utterly deny that they do or can infer in it a *Plurality of Minds*: forasmuch as the said Acts belong to the *Three Divine Persons* (as has been just now observed) by virtue of that *One Infinite Mind*, from which they flow, and which is numerically one and the same in all Three.

But this Author is now upon an higher strain, and resolving (under the Protection of a Licence) to open himself farther than before; tells us in plain Terms, That if every Person in the Trinity, considered as a distinct Person; be not a distinct Infinite and Eternal Mind, there is (he confesses) an end of his Notion,

p. 8. And I think it had been well for the Church and himself too, if it had never had a *Beginning*. But then he adds (with unsufferable Presumption and equal Falshood), *That with that there will be an End of a Trinity of Persons also, and that we shall have nothing left but a Trinity of Modes, Postures, and Names, not in the Unity of the Godhead, but in the Unity of One Person, who is the whole Deity.* These are his detestably *Heretical* and senseless Words. In answer to which I demand of this Confident Man, How he dares, in defiance of the Doctrine of the Catholick Church, place a *Trinity of Modes, Postures, and Names* upon the same Level, as if they all indifferently amounted but to the same Thing? Whereas *Names* are certainly of Arbitrary Imposition; whether God or Man imposes them; and *Postures* none ascribe to God but that silly Sort of Men, the *Anthropomorphites*. But as for *Modes*, they result eternally and necessarily from the Divine Nature, and eternally and inseparably remain in it, and without import such distinct Relations as can never coincide in one and the same Person: and how then can this Ignorant Man talk of the *Unity of one Person who is the whole Deity or Godhead*, when these Three Relations can never concur in such an *Unity of Person*; but all of them may and do concur in the *Unity of the Godhead*? In a word, I do here ask this bold Man, whether he will venture to affirm, That the *Divine Nature*, determined or modified by such a certain subsistence or subsisting Relation is a *meer Mode or no*? and I do here leave it to his second Thoughts, whether he will venture to say so. And if not, why does he here against his Conscience reproach the Doctrine of the
Catholick

Catholick Church (for so it is) as if it established a Trinity of *meer Modes*? Which it is so far from, that I do here affirm against this Author, and others who speak like him upon this Subject, That according to the sence of the Catholick Church, *The Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Relative Modes of Subsistence, or Three subsisting Relations of one and the same Infinite Divine Nature included in all and each of them; or again, They are the Divine Nature it self subsisting with Three distinct Relations.* This, I say, I affirm, and doubt not but that to all Men of sence it confutes the Three Divine Persons being Three *meer Modes*, and shews, withal, what an irrational Blasphemous Cavil it is to call them so. For certainly a *Mode* in concretion with the Essence, cannot with the least pretence of Reason be called a *meer Mode*. And This I do again avouch for the Doctrine of the Catholick Church concerning the Trinity; and do over and over challenge this *Pere Novellist* to disprove it if he can.

But in the next place he is for confirming his *Theological Assertion* with this Invincible Argument (as he thinks, Poor Man!) p. 8, 9. If (says he) every distinct Person in the Godhead considered as Distinct, be not an Infinite and Eternal Mind, as it must be, if every distinct Person be God (unless any Thing else than an Infinite Mind can be God) then, though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them Three Eternal Minds, yet there is no *Heresy* in it, nor any intended by it. In answer to which I must tell him, That I shall not much concern my self about what he intends (it being his old way, when he is pressed with his Words, to fly to his Intentions) but shall only consider what his words express or infer: And whether they carry any *Heresy* in them

them or no, shall appear presently. And in order to this, I must remind him of these Two Things.

First, That [God] and [*Infinite Eternal Mind*] are Terms perfectly equipollent. And

Secondly, That in Terms equipollent, putting one in the room of the other, you may argue with the same consequence from one, that you can from the other.

According to which rule we will try the force of his Argument, by proposing it with the bare change of one of the forementioned Terms for the other, Thus. *If every distinct Person in the Godhead, considered as distinct be [God] as it must be if every distinct Person be an Infinite and Eternal Mind [unless any thing else than [God] can be an [Infinite Mind] then though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them Three Gods, yet there is no Heresy in it; nor (in spight of his words) any intended by it.*

Now let this Author consider how he will allow of this Conclusion; for if his own Conclusion holds good, this is certainly good also; since the Validity of the Consequence is the same in Both; the Matter of the Argument being the same, and the Form of it the same too. There must be therefore a gross Fallacy in the Argument it self, and it lies in the Homonymy of the Term [*as distinct*]. For the English Particle [*as*], and the Latine [*quà* or *quatenus*], thus applied has Two Significations. 1. The first importing any Qualification specifying, affecting, or any way denominating the Subject: and so [*a Person as distinct*], signifies no more than [*a Person who is distinct*], or a Person under this Qualification or Denomination]: 2. But, secondly, the other Signification

fication of the Particle [*as*] is causal, and imports a causal Connexion of the Term to which it is joined, with some Predicate or Attribute belonging to the Subject; and so [*a Person as distinct*], signifies as much as [*a Person because distinct*, or by reason of his distinction]. And this makes an Attribute to be necessarily and universally predicated of its Subject; so that if the Subject be multiplied, the Thing predicated of it must be multiplied too; but in the former Signification of the Particle [*as*] it is not so; for as much as the Predication imported thereby is only Accidental, and has no causal, necessary, nor Universal Connexion with it's Subject. Accordingly in the causal sence of the Term [*as distinct*] I must tell him, that no Person in the Godhead [*as distinct*] is an *Infinite Eternal Mind*; that is to say, This Attribute belongs not *formally* to his Distinction; and that his Distinction is not the cause or reason that it is affirmed of him. For it is an Attribute Springing from the *Divine Nature*, which is in the Person, and not from his Personality or Personal Distinction; for as much as that does not properly and formally make him to be God, nor is that wherein his Godhead does precisely consist, though by Reason of the *Persons* including in him the *Nature*; it does indeed imply and suppose him to be God. And thus all the Ancient Orthodox Divines and Doctors of the Church distinguish in each Person Two things, though intimately and inseparably United, *viz.* The Godhead or Divine Nature, and the Personal distinguishing Relation, so that what agrees to the Person upon one Account, does not properly belong to him upon the other; and consequently to make the Personal Distinction the Proper

Reason of any essential Predication, is utterly false and illogical. And accordingly to say, that [*Infinite, Eternal Mind*], which is an Essential Attribute of the Divine Nature as such, belongs to any One Person, by reason of his *Personal Distinction*, is false; forasmuch as this would infer it to belong to that Person only, since his *Personal Distinction* belongs only to himself. It belongs indeed to him, though distinct, but not because distinct, but wholly because of his *Divine Nature*, which belonging equally to all the *Divine Persons*, all the *Essential Attributes* of the said *Nature* must equally belong to all the *Three Persons* too. From all which it follows, That since [*Infinite, Eternal Mind*] is an Attribute not springing from *Personal Distinction* even in *Distinct Persons*, nor agreeing to the said Persons upon that account, but springing wholly from that *One Divine Nature* which is *Common* to them *All*; it can never infer, the *Three Persons*, though *Distinct*, to be *Three Infinite Eternal Minds*; since, as I shew before, the Connexion between [*a Distinct Person*] as the *Subject*, and between [*Infinite Mind*] as the *Predicate*, not being *causal*, the Multiplication of the *Subject* can never infer the Multiplication of the *Predicate*. And this I affirm to be a full and true Account of this Matter, and a clear Solution of the *Fallacy* which this Man's whole Argument depended upon; and consequently that his *Tritheistical Hypothesis*, That the *Three Distinct Divine Persons* must be therefore *Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits*, is, even by his own Confession, (would he stand to it) at an end. And the Truth is, there is nothing in his whole Book but pitiful wretched *Fallacy* join'd with gross Ignorance of the *Subject* he writes of, from first to last. And

And yet, after all This, he makes his *Hypothesis* the only Rule to understand most of the *Scriptures* by, which represent to us the *Union* between the *Father* and the *Son*: and particularly that about the *Incarnation*, expressed *John 14. v. 11.* by the *Son's* being in the *Father*, and the *Father* in the *Son*. For (says he) That the *Father* should be in the *Son*, and the *Son* in the *Father*, so as perfectly to comprehend and be comprehended, with several like Expressions, is made very Possible and Intelligible by a mutual conscious Sensation, but nothing else will afford us any Conception of it, Def. p. 9. To which I answer, what if it does not? And what *Christian* is concern'd to have any such Conception? For did the *Catholick Church* ever pretend to any beyond the bare Knowledge of the Signification and Sense of the Terms in which it was revealed? And did not the bare *Revelation* of it sufficiently make out the Possibility of it to us, without any further Explication? What does this *Profane Man* mean thus to state the very Possibility of a Thing expressly reveal'd in Scripture, upon his *New-found Exposition* of it; so that, unless this be admitted, we must (even in spite of *Revelation*) look upon it as Impossible? Good God! whither are we running? But to shew moreover, That his *Exposition* is as Forced as *New*, Our Saviour expresses this *Circumincission* by words importing mutual Inexistence: But, says this Man, (a Man made, it seems, to Correct *Revelation* it self, by putting it into properer Words.) That such a mutual Inexistence cannot be conceived Possible, unless we understand it of *Mutual Consciousness*; that is, of quite another Thing from what the Words signify: for certain it is, that mutual Inexistence is not mu-

tual Consciousness, nor can *mutual Consciousness* be *mutual Inexistence*. But, in short, will this Man say, That the *mutual Inexistence of the Father and the Son* (understood according to the very Letter) implies in it a Contradiction? I question whether he will dare say so, whatsoever the Thing asserted by him may infer: For as for that piteous Objection, against the same Thing's *comprehending another Thing and being comprehended by it, &c.* it is a meer Toy, founded only in that old Maxime, *Omne continens est majus contento*, drawn off from *Material Quantitative Beings*, and so not applicable to *Immaterial and Spiritual*; as has been fully shewn in the 9th Chapter of the *Animadversions*, p. 299, and 300. But if this Author will not venture to say, that such a *mutual Inexistence* (understood according to the Letter) implies in it a Contradiction, then let him give the Church a Satisfactory Reason, Why our Saviour's Words should not be understood in their own Natural, Proper Sense, but in this Man's New Sense, which is both Improper and Figurative, and never heard of before. But with a bold Front he says, That the ~~Expression~~ here spoken of is not otherwise *Possible and Intelligible*, (which Two Words he is perpetually jumbling together, as if there might not be many things *Possible*, and yet by Humane Reason not *Intelligible*). But I must here tell him (what I dare say he knew not before) *viz.* That it is one thing *Positively to apprehend and know a Thing not to be Possible* (which I desire him to prove this *mutual Inexistence* (even understood literally) not to be); and another Thing *not to apprehend or Know, How or by what way a Thing is Possible*. And this latter I affirm ought never to supersede our Assent
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to any Thing; if revealed to us; nor to make us doubt of the *Revelation*; nor are we at all concerned about any further Explication of the Thing so *Revealed*, nor whether we ever know any more of it or no; And this in my Opinion may serve an Εὐπρησ-*Man* (which is but another word for a Theological Quack) a great deal of trouble. But so far is this *Man's Mutual-Consciousness* from being the only Thing that can render this *ἑξαρπίστος* intelligible, That unless a *Mutual Inexistence* be presupposed, no such Thing as a *Mutual-Consciousness* can here take place; since it is essentially founded in that. For surely Father and Son must exist mutually in one Another, before they can know or be conscious to themselves that they do so. But this point of the *ἑξαρπίστος* has been so fully debated, and so thoroughly cleared in the *Animadversions*, both in the seventh Chapter from page 201, to the 207. inclusively; and in the ninth Chapter from page 295, to 301. that there needed not to have been so much as one word said of it here. But, as I hinted before, though this Writer be confuted never so often, he takes no notice of it; but still keeps on Writing, and (for ought I see) will never hold his hand, till the Bookfeller holds his.

In the next place, he seems to fall a pitch Lower than usual, and to be upon the complaining strain, as that Men are *spightful*, and will not treat Mr. Dean and his *Absurdities*, according to their *Dignity*: nor allow him such fair *Quarter* as other Writers (he says) have met with in the same Cause. Adding withal, That it is not to be expected, that in a matter of so high a Nature, we should have such a comprehension of it, as to leave no difficulties unexplained. Which I confess would be
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a fair Allegation from another Man; but not from him. For has he not declared, *That his Notion of a Trinity solves all doubts and difficulties about it?* See his *Vindication*, p. 66 l. 2. and 85. l. last, and where all difficulties are solved, can there remain any *Unexplained?* Now I ask this Man, Are the words here quoted by me his, or are they not? If they are his, then let all Mankind judge whether this Man has not *eaten shame and drunk after it* (as the word is); who can, without the least sence of it, so grossly contradict himself in the face of the World. But however let us hear what he says. And here we have him alledging the Fathers setting forth the *Trinity by the Sun, and its light and splendor, by a Tree and its Branches, a Fountain and its Streams, or a Mathematical Cube*: and then bringing up the Rear of all with these Questions. *Are not these Accounts* (says he) *much more chargeable with Tritheism, or Sabellianism, than the Account he gives of them by Three Minds or Spirits?* For are not the Sun and its light and splendor, as much Three, but not so much one as Three Conscious Minds? p. 9. To which I answer peremptorily, That the Sun and its light and splendor (not being Three distinct *Supposita*) are much more one, than Three distinct *Minds or Spirits* (which are Three *Supposita*) can possibly be; and cannot be more Three, than Three distinct *Minds or Spirits* necessarily and essentially are. But I would have the Reader here observe, what a wretched Sophism he is now Trumping upon him, by arguing *ab Imparibus tanquam paribus*. For is an Account of a Thing by way of Allusion, and an Account analogous to a Definition, all one? Is a similitude or bare Resemblance of a Thing, and a proper Representation or Description of the Nature of

of that Thing the same? Is there not a wide difference between shewing what a Thing is like, and what it really and properly is? And to demonstrate that the Fathers applyed the fore-alleged Instances of *Resemblance* to the Trinity in a quite different way from what this Author here does, when he represents the Three Divine Persons as *Three Infinite Minds*, can he shew us, That the Fathers ever positively affirmed or predicated any of the said *Resemblances* used by them, of the Three Divine Persons so, as to say, *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Sun, Light, and Splendor?* But this Author Categorically affirms, That *Father, Son and Holy Ghost, are Three distinct Minds or Spirits*; and will he call this a bare Resemblance, and no more? Nay; does he not give this as their *True and proper Denomination*, joining them together and affirming one of the other by a *strict*, and logical Predication? and must this pass for a meer Resemblance too? Wherefore I would have his *Ignorance* take notice for the future, that an *Allusion to a thing per modum similitudinis*, and a *proper Account* of it, *quoad rei veritatem*, and dogmatically representing the *Nature of the said Thing*, do vastly differ, and consequently, That to argue from one to the other can be fit for none but him, whose Known Talent it is only to *shift* and to *shuffle*, and instead of answering his Adversary, to put a Trick upon his Reader.

But he tells us, That he is now for *discoursing something in general concerning a Trinity in Unity, and concerning the words whereby to express it*. And here, as a foretast of the rest, it is something pleasant to see how he expresses himself page 10. lines 17, 18. Where, having said, that a *Trinity in Unity is such a Distinction*
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and such an Union (and why not Unity?) as is peculiar to the Godhead. He adds, That there are some faint Resemblances of it in Nature, yet Nature has nothing like it. Now I would have this Acute Author tell me, How there can be Resemblances without Likeness, or Likeness without Resemblance? For I never knew Two Things resemble one Another, but they were like one Another too: Resemblance being nothing else but the Agreement of Two or more Things in any one Qualification: and it is that Agreement which renders and denominates them properly *like*. But if this Man means by *Likeness* an entire Universal Agreement in all Respects, I must take the boldness to tell him that he speaks *Nonsense*. Forasmuch as to be properly *like* a Thing, and to be an Absolute Exact Copy of a Thing, wholly differ: there being a Rule in Logick, (which I can assure him is as little a Friend to him, as he can be to that) That *Omne simile est dissimile*; that is. That all *Likeness*, in the very Essence of it, imports a *Disagreement*, in some Respects, as well as it denotes an *Agreement* in others. After which horrible Thick-piece of Nonsense it might justly be expected, that I should sprinkle this Rude Author with some of those Rhetorical Flowers which he had so liberally bestowed upon the *Animadverter*; such as *Ingenuous Blunderer*, and *one without Sense or Reason*, &c. but I shall only admire him under the Character which he has so modestly assumed to himself, pag. 43. of being (forsooth) an Εὔπνους-Man; since if ever he could pretend to that Title, it must be here: for surely to find out a Resemblance where there is no Likeness must be an Εὔπνους worthy of the greatest and most celebrated Invention. Otherwise to give it its due

due Character, it is a confounded, shameless, Non-sensical contradiction, and it is hard to imagine what it is like, unless it be this Author's *Case of Non-resistance*, set off with *Horse and Armes*, as a Comment upon the Text, or a Gloss upon the Case.

And now in accounting for the words by which the *Trinity* is expressed (according to his usual way of complementing the Fathers) he tells us, *page 12. line 18, 19. That they in their disputes upon this subject wanted words adequately to express their sense.* Which I for my part can see no Reason to grant him: for though their sense and conceptions fell exceedingly short of the sublimity of that subject (as when a finite Reason discourses of an *Infinite Being*, it cannot but do) yet it is wholly *gratis dictum*, That the Fathers wanted words fully and adequately to express their own sense and conception of *it*, for surely, so far as any one conceives of a Thing, if he has a Command of the Language he makes use of (as the Fathers plentifully had) he may express himself proportionably to what he conceives.

But not to insist any further upon this. We have our Author in the next place upon no small Tryal of his skill, and that in such an Instance as (he well knows) will very nearly affect his whole Hypothesis. For finding the World not very ready to digest his Scandalous Notion of Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits, he would fain slide it out of their sight by casting a mist before their Eyes; and that is by offering to persuade the World, That the word [*Mind*] may be as well applyed to the Three in the Godhead as the word [*Person*]. To which purpose he tells us *page 13 line 17. That the word [Person] signifies not only*
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distinct but also *separate subsistence*, and was first used to signify separately subsisting Beings, such as Men and Angels, and from thence was applied by Theological use to signify also Persons having only a *distinct subsistence*, as these in the Blessed Trinity have no more. Thus says He. In Answer to which, and in direct contradiction to what he has here affirmed, I deny that the Term [Person] does, or ever did signify *separate subsistence*, but only *complete subsistence*. For though in its original use it signified indeed separately subsisting Persons, such as Men and Angels; yet I deny that it signified them under the Particular Notion, or formality of *separate*, or properly denoted their separation, but only their *completeness*. And this is undeniably proved from the Received Definition of a *Person*, That it is an *Intelligent Completely subsisting Nature*, or an *Intelligent Nature with, or under a complete subsistence*. So that an *Intelligent Nature* is one part of the Definition, and the *complete subsistence of it* the other; which making up the whole of it, it is manifest that it is Indifferent to signify all *Intelligent Natures* thus completely subsisting, whether they be *separate* or only *distinct*; and that without any regard either to their *Separation* or bare *Distinction*; forasmuch as neither of these make any part of the Definition of a *Person*, as has been shewn; And therefore though I grant that the word [Person] was first applied to signify separate Subsistences, and afterwards used to signify the Subsistences of the Godhead which were only distinct but not separate, yet I deny that it did this by a Translation of the word from one sense or signification to another, but only by enlarging and extending the use of it (mark that) to more Things, than it was actually

actually applied to at first; yet still so, that it was applied with the same Propriety to them all, and without the least change of its original Signification. From all which I infer, That the word [Person] is a common Term equally drawn off from, and equally predicable of [Persons] under both these ways of Subsistence, viz. *Separate and barely Distinct*.

But before I proceed further, I shall from the foregoing Particulars remark these Two Things.

First, That this Author, by asserting the word [Person] to signify originally, not only *distinct* but (what is more) *Separate Subsistence*, has given the Socinians that Advantage, which the contrary Notion of it quite cuts them off from: For most of their Arguments against a Trinity of Persons in the Godhead are drawn from a Supposal, That the very Notion of a Person imports and signifies a *separately subsisting Being*; and if this Author asserts the same, too, he fairly plays so much of the Game into their hands; and he must not think to resume it at his pleasure, and to beat them off from the True and Proper Signification of the Term (as he makes it) without being told by them, That it is wholly precarious for him so to do, and a meer *Petition: Principii*.

But, Secondly, I must tell him also, (which yet can be no News to any one) that he does by the same very grossly contradict himself: For having in the 13th Page said, that the Term [Person] signifies not only a *Distinct*, but *something more*, viz. a *Separate Subsistence*: afterwards in the 15th Page, He says, That the Word [Person] is properly enough applied to the Three Divine Persons: because all that is essential to the Notion of a Person belongs to each of them, though they do not

subsist separately : which is a manifest Contradiction to what he had said before in the 13th Page. For if a *Person* signifies (as he there affirms) not only a *Distinct*, but also a *Separate Subsistence*; then how can the Word [*Person*] be properly applied to these *Three Subsistences*, which are *Distinct* but not *Separate*? Or how can he truly affirm, *That all that is essential to the Notion of a Person, belongs to each of them*, if a [*Person*] signifies (as he said before) not only a *Distinct*, but a *Separate Subsistence*? For whatsoever is included in the proper Signification of it, must needs be essentially included in the Notion of it too. But let him go on: for while he is contradicting himself, he is in his Element; and it would be as unkind, as difficult, to offer to take him out of it.

But he proceeds; and with great confidence, and without the least pretence of Proof, tells us, *That it has by Use obtained*, That the Term [*Persons*] signifies such as have a *separate Subsistence*, and the Term [*Subsistences*] such as have only a *Distinct Subsistence*, as those of the *Trinity* have, and no more.

To which I answer positively, That no such *Distinguishing Use* has ever yet obtained; but that the Use of Both Terms is, and all along has been promiscuous; the *Persons* of the *Trinity* having for these 14 or 15 Centuries at least, been as often and commonly expressed by the Term [*Persons*] as by the Term [*Subsistences*], if not much oftner. And therefore this Difference of the Signification of these Terms is perfectly arbitrary, and of this Man's own Invention; as he who takes upon him to make *Divinity* may as well take upon him to make *Distinctions* too. And therefore whereas he would make
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the word [*Person*] signifie one sort of Persons; and the word [*Subsistence*] signifie another sort; I do again tell him here, That [*Person*] is a common word to both, and in this *Mystery* differs no more from [*Subsistence*] than Two synonymous Words differ from one Another: And I challenge him to produce out of the Writers of the Church any thing so much as tending to a Proof, That it is otherwise.

But he now comes (as he says) to apply this Discourse of his about *Persons* and *Subsistences* to his own Hypothesis about *Minds* or *Spirits*; and that in these Words; What I have said of the Word [*Person*] is with equal Reason applicable to the Word [*Mind*]. The *Animadverter* (he says) objects against the Dean, That a *Mind* or *Spirit* is an *Absolute Being*, *Nature* and *Substance*. And I grant it is so in the Common Use of the Word, as applied to Created *Minds* and *Spirits*; but so is a *Person* also as much as *Mind*, p. 16. l. 10. But stay here, good Sir, stay a little. For this I utterly deny, having before demonstratively shewn, That though the word [*Person*] in the Original Use of it was actually applied to Beings of an *Absolute* and *Separate Subsistence*, (such as *Angels* and *Men*), yet that even then they never signified them under the Proper Formality of *Absolute* and *Separate*, but only of *Complete Subsistences*; and by consequence equally agreed to all *Complete Subsistences*, whether *Separate* and *Absolute*, or only *Distinct* and *Relative*, as the *Divine Persons* are; so that here is not only the Use of the word [*Person*], but also the Definition of it; making it equally applicable to both these sorts of *Subsistence*, viz. *Absolute* and *Relative*. But, on the other side, I would fain know of this Author, Whether

ther the Definition of a *Mind* or *Spirit*, can agree to any but to an *Absolute Being, Nature* or *Substance*? and if it can agree to none else, how it can be applied to a *Subsistence* perfectly *Relative*, (as all the *Divine Subsistences* are) so as in its Original and properest Signification to signify that too? which yet (as I have shewn) the Definition of a [*Person*] properly does.

Well, but admitting (though not granting) that the Term [*Mind* or *Spirit*] may be drawn off from its Proper and Received Signification and Definition, so, that *Three Minds* or *Spirits* may signify *Three Distinct Relative Subsistences* of one and the same *Infinite* and *Eternal Mind* or *Spirit* included in *All* or *Each* of them: I say, if the Term [*Three Minds*] may be brought to this Signification, it must have been by a long received Custom, which this Man calls *Theological Use*: And then I require this Author to shew us such a *Theological Use* of this word [*Mind*]; that is, a Concurrence of all *Divines* for several Ages throughout the Catholick Church expressing the *Three Divine Subsistences* or *Persons* of the *Godhead* by *Three Distinct Infinite Minds*; that is to say, *Three Relatives* by *Three Absolutes*. The Term [*Persons*] indeed has been applied to these *Three Subsistences*; and that both from the Original Signification and Definition of the Word, as also from the constant Use of it by the Church for many Centuries; But the term [*Infinite Minds*] was never plurally applied to them upon either of these Accounts by any *Orthodox Divine* or *Writer*; unless this Particular Author's making use of it in his pretended *Vindication* of the *Doctrine* of the *Trinity*, &c. can be called the *Theological Use* of the Word:

Word: for I suppose, That neither are all *Divines* included in him, nor is he to be thought equivalent to them all, whatsoever he may think himself. Nevertheless for his own and the Worlds satisfaction, I shall shew him *what Theological use* of the word [*Three Minds or Spirits*] instead of [*Three Divine Persons*] I meet with. And first of all *Theodore* in his first Book *Hereticarum fabularum*, and the 18 Chapter tells us of a certain Sect called the *Peratae*, who held in the *Divine Nature* $\eta\epsilon\alpha\varsigma\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\upsilon\varsigma$, $\eta\epsilon\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \upsilon\varsigma$: So that here is one *Theological use* of the word [*Minds or Spirits*] thus applied; for him. And *Valentinus Gentilis* held in the Godhead *Three Eternal Spirits or Minds*; of which one was called by him the *Essentiator*, and the other Two the *Essentiati*. (In which I cannot see what he differs from this Author.) So that here is another *Theological Use* of this word for him. And thirdly his Friend *Stephanus Carcellan*, in his Treatise *de Trinitate*, frequently calls the *Divine Persons Tres aternos Spiritus*, asserting a *Specifick Unity* between them (which this Author also would fain be at) and denying a *Numerical*. So that here is a *Third Theological use* of the same word to comfort and encourage him. And I wish him all the Credit and Satisfaction that such *Theological Company* can give him. In the mean time, whereas he tells the World in the close of this Paragraph, *That when the Dean* (as he calls him) *speaks of Three distinct Infinite Minds which are essentially and inseparably one, he could [mean] nothing more* (where he gives us meaning against words again) *than Three distinct Intelligent but not separate Subsistences*, p. 16. l. 20. I must tell him in answer to this, That if he here speaks of *Three distinct Minds* as *Essentially one* by one and the same *Numerical Essence*

sence (which is the only *Essential Unity* here spoken of with reference to the *Trinity*) it is an intolerable contradiction: Forasmuch as each *Mind* or *Spirit* being one, by a particular *Essence* of it's own constituting it such a Particular *Mind* or *Spirit*, *Three distinct Minds* or *Spirits* can never be essentially one, by one *Numerical Essence* belonging to them all; which yet the *Three Persons* in the *Blessed Trinity* are and must be. And whereas he says, *That by Three Minds he means Three Intelligent Subsistences*. I ask him whether these *Three Subsistences* are *Relative* or *Absolute*. If he says *Relative*, I do here tell him, that then they are not *Three Minds* (a *Mind* being defined *An Intelligent Immaterial Substance*;) which imports nothing *Relative* in it at all. But if he says, that these *Subsistences* are *Absolute*, I then affirm, That they are not the *Three Persons* in the *Trinity*; which, as such, both are and of Necessity must be *Relative*. So that it is evident, that this Man knows not which way to turn himself, nor how to speak of the subject he is treating of, with any consistency with common sense. And this makes his Boldness the more unpardonable in saying, *That he needs ask no other Pardon for affirming the Three Divine Persons to be Three Infinite Minds, but for the use of a word which the Schools had not Consecrated*, p. 16. l. 24. In answer to which, since he here charges the non-using of it only upon the Schools, I challenge him to shew me any other Writers of the Church, accounted Orthodox, who have made use of it; or affirmed the *Three Divine Persons* to be *Three distinct Minds* or *Spirits*. Let him, I say, assign them, if he can. And if he cannot, the using of the word thus applied, must even by his own Confession, p. 9. l. 3. be an unusual way

way of speaking at least; that is to say, a *καρροποι-
νία*; and if it were no more than so, let him shew
how he is able to justify the Use of that, which a
General Council had denounced an *Anathema* to the
Users of, in these high Points about the *Trinity* and
Incarnation. But this is not all, for I come upon him
yet further, and demand of him, how he will answer
to the Church, not only his presuming to introduce
such a *καρροποιία* in treating of this high Mystery,
and that in the Room of the anciently received Terms;
but his venturing to do this, when he himself confesses
and declares, as he does in the 26th pag. lin. 13. That
there could not have been more proper Terms used by the
Church to express a *Trinity* in *Unity* by, than those An-
cient ones made use of all along about it: viz. than
Three Substances in one Individual Nature, which (he
says) differ nothing from each other but in their diffe-
rent manner of *Substance*. These are his Words. And
when the Impartial Reader has perused them, and
compared them with what is cited out of his *Vindica-
tion* concerning this very Term [*Substance* and *Sub-
stances*] amongst others set down in the second Chap-
ter of the *Animadversions*, and the 63 and 64th pages:
I suppose he will find it high time to bless himself.
For I here challenge this shameless Man to reconcile,
or do any thing like reconciling, what he says here, to
what he has said there, if he can. And yet as great a
Perversion, as a word mis-applied and forced from its
true Signification must inevitably cause in so nice, as
well as great, a Point as this is, it is not however barely
this Author's nor hereafter using this Term [*Three
Minds* as equipollent to *Three Persons*] that will justify
him, if he still retains the Sense of it; and therefore

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Preface to
the *Animadvers.*
p. 7.

5.

I must here tell him, That if he holds the *Three Divine Persons* to be *Three Distinct Infinite Absolute Beings*, *Three Distinct Infinite Spirits*, *Three Distinct Infinite Substances*, (as *Substance* stands contradistinguished to *Subsistence*); let him abandon and lay aside the Use of the word [*Minds*] never so much; he is yet a *Tritheist*, and a Real Assertor of *Three Gods*.

But after all, the Judicious Reader may here observe, what a pleasant Manager of *Controversie* this Man is. For he first asserted, the *Three Divine Persons* to be *Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits*, affirming withal, in most impudent manner, That to hold otherwise was *Herese* and *Nonsense*; see his *Vindicat.* p. 66. *lin.* 26. But when the World cried out of this scandalous *Tritheism*, and the *Animadverter*, even in the

See a Pamphlet Entitled, *The Trinity set in its true Light*, p. 5. *lin.* 28.

Judgment of the *Animadverter's* spitefullest Enemies, had thoroughly confuted it: and, on the contrary, maintained, That the *Three Divine Persons* are *Three Distinct Subsistences of one and the same Infinite Eternal Mind*, included in, or belonging to *all and each* of them; Why then, this Man (according to his Excellent and Known Talent of *Tacking about*) fairly comes over to his Adversary so far as to proclaim shamelessly to the World, That though he spoke indeed of [*Minds*], yet he meant only [*Subsistences*]; whereas it is impossible that *Minds* should be *Subsistences*, or *Subsistences* *Minds*. Such a Felicity is it for a Man, whose [*Word*] is so apt to throw him into a Plunge, to have a trusty [*Meaning*] still ready at hand, to fetch him out again. But if this be to defend an *Hypothesis*, then the way to carry a Cause is to give it up, and the surest Conquest, to quit the Field.

In the next place, he passes from the distinction of the

the *Divine Persons* to the Unity and Identity of their *Divine Nature*. And here (according to his constant custom of charging the Fathers with some defect or other in expressing themselves) he tells us, *That they were at a greater loss for words to express this latter by, than the former, p. 16. l. 26.* There being but one word to do it, *viz.* the *ὁμοούσιον* and this too of it self not sufficient. Concerning which I must tell him in the first Place, That the Truth receives no prejudice at all from there being no other [*one word*] to express this Unity or Identity of the Godhead in the *Divine Persons* by; since (God be thanked) there are several very significant words and ways to explain this [*one word*] by. But the main question is, whether the *ὁμοούσιον* be sufficient to express this or no? And here I must tell this presuming Man who denies it to be so, First, That the *Nicene Fathers* and the *Catholic Church* with them then thought it so. And secondly, That the Nature of the Thing necessarily proves it so. And in order to this I would have him take notice, That the sence of the word *ὁμοούσιον* is to be measured by the proper condition of the *ἰδέα* which it relates to, and therefore, though the word *ὁμοούσιον* may in it self be indifferent to signify either a specifick or numerical Agreement in Nature, (according as the Nature is to which it refers) yet when the *ὁμοῦ* is joined with an *ἰδέα* importing such an Essential Unity in it as renders it incapable of all multiplication, (as an *Ens summe perfectum*, or an *Infinite Nature* in the very notion of it must be) there the *ὁμοούσιον* must of necessity signify an Agreement in a numerical Unity and Identity of Nature, and no other: for still the condition of the *ἰδέα* is to measure the sence of the *ὁμοούσιον*. And ac-

cordingly I do affirm against this Man, That there is no such Thing as *Specifick Unity* or *Identity*, or any Thing like it, or *Analogous* to it belonging to the *Divine Nature*; but only a *Numerical Unity* and no more. Which being the highest and perfectest sort of *Unity*, is above, and instead of all other Unities whatsoever. And the reason of this is, because all *Specifick Unity* of *Nature* is founded in the Imperfection and defect of the said *Nature*, as rendring it capable of multiplication; which is certainly a defect; And let him take this Rule with him for once; which I defy him to overthrow, viz. That in *Naturam non multiplicabilem non cadit Unitas Specifica*: for as much as *Specifick Unity* is but one common conception of the Mind gathered from the Agreement it finds in a Plurality of Particular Natures amongst themselves; as every Created Individual has it's particular *distinct Nature* to it self, and not a Part of a Common Nature shared amongst all the Individuals. But will this Man affirm, that there are *Three particular Divine Natures* out of which the Mind may form such a *Specifick Unity* as we have been speaking of? Let him therefore either renounce his very share in common sense and Reason, or disclaim this abominable Absurdity of a *Specifick Unity* in the *Divine Nature*, or of any Thing so much as like it, or *Analogous* to it, or (in his own words, p. 17.) that *perfectly answers it*. And whereas he alleges the Fathers explaining the *hypostasis* by examples of a *Specifick Unity* in Created Beings, I tell him that the Fathers used not these Examples as Instances for representation of the like *Unity* amongst the *Divine Persons*; but as a ground for arguing *a minore ad majus* against the *Arians*, who would not allow so much as a *Speci-*

a *Specifick Unity* of Nature between the Father and the Son: whereupon the Fathers thus argued against them, If you will allow the Generation of a Son in the *Divine Nature*, certainly it ought to be more perfect, or at least as perfect as that which we observe in men: and since the perfection of Generation in them, is for a Father to produce *his like*, shall men generate others of the same nature with themselves, and shall God generate one of quite another Nature from his own, as a *Finite Nature* must necessarily be? This was the force of their Argument, and it was directed against the *Arians*; but never were these Explications alledged as adequate Representations of the same Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons, that was in Men. But (as it was intimated before in the *Animadversions*) no doubt this Author has been all along pursuing this *Tritheistical Whimsey* of a *Specifick Unity*, only in order to the providing an Unity of Nature for his *Three Infinite Minds or Spirits*: which (by all the Wit of Men and Angels) can never be proved capable of any greater Unity than *Specifick*. But this Point about a *Specifick Unity* of the Godhead has been so thoroughly debated, and the Impossibility of it so clearly demonstrated by the *Animadverter*, Chap. 7. from the 178 to the 188 page, That this Man should have done well to have answer'd what was to be found there before he troubled the Reader with the same old baffled story again. I conclude therefore against this Author, that the *Argument* applyed to the *Divine Persons*, does fully and sufficiently express the *Numerical Unity* and *Identity* of the *Divine Nature* belonging to them, without importing any Thing of *Specifick Unity* in the same, or any thing so much as *Analogous* to it.

After

After he has done with the *opinion* he excepts against the Terms [*Single* and *Singular*] as applied to the *Divine Nature* : But he first draws them off from their proper and received Signification, according to which all Divines, whether Schoolmen or others, have in treating of the *Divine Nature*, generally used them, expressing the said Nature by no word more commonly than by *Singularis essentia*, & *singularis Natura*. And does this Man now think to take this word by a wrong, *esotick signification* (of which more presently) and in the strength of that to run down and cast the True and Genuine sense of it ? Which, besides the confusion it must needs bring upon all Discourses about the Godhead, and the *Divine Persons*, will not fail also to give mighty scandal to all sober and learned Men, both Papists and Protestants, who are concerned to have these weighty Points, not only truly stated, but also warily treated of. For my own part I must declare, That I never met with stranger and more untheological Assertions, than what this Author has concerning the Application of the Terms [*single* and *singular*] to the *Divine Nature* ; and yet the true sense of them lies plain and obvious almost in all Scholastick Writers. So that whatsoever is signified by *Hoc unum*, *Individuum*, and *numericum unum*, the same also is signified by *singulare* ; they being all but synonymous words to express that greatest and perfectest *Unity* which we call *Numerical* ; and it will be hard to assign where we may properly apply any one of them, and not as properly apply the other. So that if this Author would but have understood these and the like Terms in the same sense in which both Philosophers and Divines use them, he could never have abused

abused the Subject he wrote upon, nor exposed himself with such false and scandalous *Assertions* as these that follow.

1. *That the Unity of Nature between the Eternal Father and Son is such an Unity as is both Specifick and Numerical.*

2. *That the Divine Nature is not a Single or Singular Nature,* p. 18. lin. 13.

3. *That upon supposal of the Singleness or Singularity of the Divine Nature, the whole Divine Nature cannot be Incarnate in the Incarnation of the Son, without the Incarnation of the whole Trinity thereby,* p. 18. lin. 18.

4. *That one Single Nature can subsist but once, or have but one Subsistence,* p. 19. lin. 23.

All which Four Propositions I find in the compass of less than three whole Pages, viz. 17, 18, 19. And they are of that vile Import, that I defie either *Arian* or *Socinian* to speak more against the Unity of the Three Divine Persons in one and the same Infinite Divine Nature, than this Man in some of the forementioned Propositions has done. But I shall consider them particularly, though they are much fitter for the Publick Censure of the Church, than for any Private Man's Confutation. And first for the

1. First Proposition, viz, *That the Unity of Nature between the Eternal Father and Son is such an Unity as is both Specifick and Numerical.*

This is fully and plainly asserted by this Author, (though not in these very Words) as the Reader will find in the 17th page and 19th line of this Defence. Where speaking of the Unity of Nature between the Eternal Father and Son, he affirms, *That there must be that in it that perfectly answers that Specifick Sameness of Nature.*

Nature that is between Father and Son in Humane Persons; of which, but four or five Lines before, he had given an Instance in *Abraham and Isaac*; and withal, that it must not only perfectly answer, but much outdo it too. But now, on the one hand, Nothing can perfectly answer one Instance of Specifick Unity or Sameness, but another Instance of the same Kind; forasmuch as Two Kinds or Sorts of Unity can never perfectly answer one another; nor, on the other hand, can any Sort of Unity outdo a Specifick Unity but a Numerical; For no one Specifick Unity can do more towards the Uniting the Things it belongs to, than another; there being but one and the same formal Effect common to all Specifick Unities, which is to render and denominate their respective Subjects Specifically one and no more. This, I say, is all that a Specifick Unity can do, and if more be done, it must be by a Numerical. But again, in the 27th Line of the same Page, He tells us to the same purpose, *That the Unity or Sameness of Nature between the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is not a meer Specifick Sameness*; which Words must imply and inferr, *That it is a Specifick Sameness*, though he affirms it to be also something more. To which Passages we may add Two more altogether as full for this Complex Sort of Unity, viz. One in page 114. line 26. and the Other, p. 121. l. 22. of his *Vindication*.

From all which it is manifest, That this Author holds such an Unity or Sameness of Nature in the Divine Persons, as is both Specifick and Numerical; which I affirm to be as gross an Absurdity as the Reason of Man can well imagine. For a Specifick and a Numerical Unity are not Two degrees of one Kind, but Two several

several *Kinds* of Unities. Two Unities differing *toto genere*; and consequently such as cannot possibly coincide into any one Unity which shall comprehend and partake of both. For a *Numerical Unity* is the Unity of *One Individual Nature* or *Being* and no more; and a *Specific Unity* is the Unity of *Several Particular Individual Natures* or *Beings*: and therefore unless the same Thing can both be *One Individual* and *no more*, and be *Several Particular Individuals* too, for any one to assert the *same Unity* to be both *Specific* and *Numerical*, (as this Author undeniably does) is a monstrous Contradiction. But this has been so fully laid open already (as to that part of it especially, which concerns a *Specific Unity* in the Divine Nature); that to say any more of it would be but a needless Repetition: And so I proceed to the

2. Second Proposition, viz. *That the Divine Nature is not a single or singular Nature*, Def. p. 18. l. 13. which I, on the contrary, positively assert it to be, upon these following Considerations.

First, That the Divine Nature is either a *Singular*, or an *Universal Nature*; but not an *Universal*, and therefore a *Singular*. The Consequence is manifest, because *singular* and *universal* adequately divide *Being*; and therefore there can be nothing but what must fall under one of the Members of the Division: and then, that the Divine Nature cannot be *Universal*, is as evident; because if so, it must be drawn off from several particular Natures; but there are not several particular Divine Natures for it to be abstracted or drawn off from. Add to this, That the Denial of the *Singularity* of the Divine Nature would overthrow its very *Existence*, for nothing *exists* but *Singulars*.

I

Secondly,

Secondly, *Individuality* and *Singularity* of Nature are the same thing, both of them importing the *greatest* and *perfectest* degree of *Unity*, which is *Numerical*; and consequently since this very Author affirms the *Individuality* of the Divine Nature, p. 18. line 12. the *Singularity* of it must be granted too.

Thirdly, This Man all along supposes *Singleness* or *Singularity* essentially to imply in it *Subsistence*, but this is a gross Mistake; for neither does it imply it in the *Essential Notion*, nor yet in the *Real Existence* of the *Thing*. Not in the *first*, For the *Singularity* of a Thing belongs to its *Essence*, even as preceeding and abstracting from its *Subsistence*, as something posterior to it; and therefore it does not essentially imply it. And accordingly, when we consider the Divine Nature abstracted from its respective *Subsistences*, (which we may and often do) we still consider it as one *Numerical Individual Substance*, that is to say, in its highest *Unity* and *Singularity*; and therefore the *Essential Notion* of *Singularity* does not imply *Subsistence* in it. Nor, in the next place, does it necessarily imply the same, as it actually exists: For the Second Person of the *Trinity* assumed the *Humane Nature* without its proper *Subsistence*, but not without its proper *Singularity*. For it was one *Numerical Individual Single Humane Nature* which he took upon him; so that upon this Account also *Singularity* does not necessarily infer *Subsistence*.

But here I think fit to observe, that the word *single* or *singular* (which are here the same; there being but one *Latine* word *singulare* for both) may be taken in Two very different Sences. *First*, In its strict and most proper Sence; for *Numerical* or *Individual Unity* of

of Nature. Or, Secondly, in a larger and less proper Sence, for that which has but one Subsistence only; and this is not so properly called *single*, as *solitary*, and by no means applicable to the *Divine Nature*, which has not only *One*, but *Three Subsistences* belonging to it. This was the Sence in which the *Sabellians* used the word, or rather which they put upon it, contending for, and allowing only a *μονοθεον*, that is, such a *Divine Nature* as was capable but of *One Subsistence* and no more. But such a *Singleness* in the *Divine Nature* the *Catholick Church* neither knew nor owned, and yet still maintained the *Individuality* and *Numerical Unity*, and consequently the true and proper *Singularity* of the same. And will this Man now, from the Improper Signification of the word [*Single* or *Singular*], as applied by the *Sabellians* to the *Divine Nature*, deny the *Divine Nature* to be a *Single* or *Singular Nature*, according to the true, proper and generally received Sence of *Singularity*, which, both with *Logicians* and *Philosophers*, is so perfectly the same with *Numerical Unity*, that it is impossible for any thing to be *Numerically One* and not *Singular* too? But how positively soever he denies the *Singleness* or *Singularity* of the *Divine Nature* here, he asserts it as positively (and that as the *Universal Concurring Sence* of all the *Fathers*) in his *Vindication*, p. 121. line 18. where he roundly tells us, *That all the Fathers assert the Singularity of the Godhead, or Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence, and that the Three Divine Persons are united in this One Numerical Essence, which (according to the Fathers) he calls the Singularity of the Godhead.* This, I say, he expressly says in the place alledged; and I desire him to reconcile it to what he says every

whit as expressly, in page 18. line 12. of this Defence; viz. *That the Divine Nature is One Individual Nature, but not one single or singular Nature.* And again, *that one single Nature can be but One Person, whether in God, or Man;* and yet further, p. 19. line 23. *That it is demonstrable that one single Nature can have but one Subsistence.* So that if he will abide by what he says in this Defence, he absolutely cashier's whatsoever he himself had elsewhere owned to be the sense and language of all the Fathers; and (he might have added) of the Schoolmen, and all other Divines besides; nor is this all; but he utterly overthrows also a *Trinity of Persons* by averring it demonstrable, that there can be no plurality of *Subsistences* in one single or singular Nature; and if no plurality of *Subsistences*, then I am sure no plurality of *Persons* neither. But (thanks be to God) though he uses this Big word *Demonstrable*, yet what he calls *Demonstration*, others account not so much as a probable Proof, where he is the *Demonstrator*. And let none wonder that he can so scandalously contradict himself in Two Books, who so often does it in the space of Two lines.

But, methinks, what he alleges out of *Victorinus Afer*, for disproving the singularity of the *Divine Nature* in *Three Persons*, comes something with the latest; viz. those Notable Words of his, *Non oportet, nec fas est dicere, Unam esse substantiam, Tres esse Personas*, p. 19. l. 2. In opposition to which one forlorn Testimony it were easy to allege forty Fathers at least constantly expressing the *Trinity* by *One Substantia*, and *Tres Personae*; but that I think it very needless to assign who does so, when it is hard to assign who does not. And therefore as for his thus recurring to *Victo-*

rinus

rinus Afer; I must take the Boldness to tell him, that this is not so much a Quoting as a Weeding of Antiquity; since surely a more Incompetent Authority in the present subject could not well be found; as the Circumstances of the Man might easily evince. For this *Victorinus* was old before he became a Christian; and when, upon his becoming so, he betook himself to write upon some Articles of the Christian Faith, he did it so perplexedly and obscurely, and very often so dangerously and unjustifiably, as to his way of expressing himself, that the Learned Dr. *Cave* (but with a modesty equal to his Learning) gives this Character of him in his *Historia Literar.* p. 181. *Non videtur ubiq; Fidei Dogmata satis accurate percepisse, saltem non satis feliciter expressisse.* So that for ought I see, this Defender might as well have quoted the *Epistole obscurorum virorum*, or even himself for the Elegancies of the Latine Tongue, as *Victorinus Afer* for an Authentick Director, how we ought to conceive, or to express our selves about the Article of the *Trinity*; But to conclude this head; what design this Man could have in thus stripping the *Divine Nature* of its singularity by making a difference between this, and its *Individuality* (unless he thinks hereby the better to introduce his *Tritheism*, and, in time, to give another sense even of *Individuality* too) I cannot imagine. But I doubt not but his not duly stating & distinguishing the Terms used in disputation, will quickly drive him headlong into the grossest Heresies. And so I pass to

34. His *Third Proposition*, which runs thus, *That upon supposal of the singleness or singularity of the Divine Nature, the whole Divine Nature cannot be incarnate in the Incarnation of the Son, but the whole Trinity must thereby be incarnate too.* Now

Now this blessed Proposition is borrowed from the *Socinians* also ; and is as arrant *Socinianism* as any part of that whole Herefy. But the Answer to it is this, That in the Incarnation of the second Person , the whole Divine Nature is incarnate, but not *wholly*; That is to say, *non-quoad omnem suum subsistendi modum*, not in respect of all its Modes or ways of subsisting, but only of one Alone, *viz.* that founded in Filiation, and proper only to the second Person of the *Trinity*; And therefore since the Godhead is not incarnate under that *proper mode of subsisting*, which it has in the Father, nor under that other which it has in the Holy Ghost; the Incarnation of the whole Divine Nature in the Son does not infer the Incarnation of the whole *Trinity*, since the said Nature is not hereby Incarnate as to those *other Two modes of Subsistence*, which it has respectively in those other Two Persons. And this passage I recommend to the Reader's Observation, as one Notable Instance of those Intolerable Heterodoxies which this Man's denying all *Modes* in the *Divine Nature*, will and must inevitably plunge him into.

4. As for his Fourth and last Proposition, *viz.* *That one single Nature can subsist but once, or have but one Subsistence.*

This is so beyond all bounds of shame, Scandalous and Heretical, and so absolutely destroys Three Personal Subsistences in one single Divine Nature, That I shall say nothing in Answer to it (having sufficiently overthrown it by what was said before) but only set down the Doctrine held by all Catholick Divines, and Writers in direct opposition to it.

Viz. That one and the same *Numerical, Individual, single*

single Divine Nature has Three distinct Persons, or Subsistences so belonging to it, that it exists in Common in them all, and severally in each of them.

This I affirm to be the *Catholic Doctrine*, and shall say no more to the fore-recited shameful Proposition, but leave both it and it's Author to be argued down by that Authority which is much abler and fitter to deal with such Persons and Doctrines, than any Disputant can be. In the mean time, if these Villanous Heterodoxies should (as was hinted before in the *Animadversions*, Chap. 12.) chance to cross the Water, with what Tragical out-cries and clamorous reflexions upon our Church would both *Papists* and *Protestants* from all Parts Eccho them back to us again? Only our poor Church has this one small happiness amongst her many unhappineffes at present, that many of those who receive her Revenues, and wear her Honors, and (in requital of Both, invade her Doctrines) yet (thanks be to God) neither do nor can carry her disgrace further than the Reach of their Native Tongue.

But our Innovator rests not in his former Explications of the *Trinity*, but offers us another and a plainer, and that is by a *Man and his living Image*, (if any one could tell where to find it). However the Notion of it is, as the rest were, perfectly his own; and (if possible) extremely more Absurd. And to lay it before the Reader it is thus: He considers a Man seeing himself represented by Reflexion from a Glass, or some such Body, (for it is an Image by Reflexion only which he here professes to speak of). Now, says he, let us suppose this to be a living Image, and that such an one as should exactly answer it's Pratatype, not only in its external Features, Colours,

Colours, and Postures, but also in the internal Acts of the Soul; such as Knowledge, Volition, Joy, Grief, &c. So that as the Man himself Knew, or Willed any Thing, the Image likewise should exactly Know and Will the same. This supposed, He tells us further, *That this Image would be another Person from the Prototype, but not another Man*; forasmuch as he supposes the Prototype and the Image to have the same Numerical Humane Nature in them both, and that so, as to perform all the Acts of a Man both in the One, and in the Other. This is the Account he gives us of this *living Image*, in order to his Explication of the Trinity by it. And I shall bring it under a particular Examination. But before I do so, I require this Author to tell me, Whether, in pag. 6. of this Defence, he does not profess to lay the Foundation of his New Hypothesis in giving an Account of the *Mysterious Union of the Divine Persons by the Unity of a Spirit*? And whether he does not withal declare *himself certainly in the Right*, in pitching upon that as the best way of explaining the said Union; and not the best only, but indeed the only fit and proper way of doing it? forasmuch as in the strength of it he does with great Contempt reject all the *Material, sensible Representations* which the *Fathers* were wont to set forth this *Mystery* by; making it his Business to substitute his own Account of this *Mysterious Union of the Persons from the Unity of a Spirit*, as the only thing that could make it Intelligible: This is certainly so, as appears from the fore-cited place; and since it cannot be denied, I desire this Author, in the next place, to inform me how the Explication of this *Mysterious Union by a Man and his living Image*, is explaining it by the *Unity of a Spirit*:
and

and whether the *Man*, or his *Image*, or *both*, be *Spirits*, and the *Resemblance* between them be this *Unity of a Spirit*, which he spoke of in the place alleaged? And if they are not, I demand with what face he can reject the *Material Representations* made by the *Fathers* of this *Mysterious Union*, and give the *World* another of his own from an *Instance* altogether as gross and *Material*, but withal *Impossible* and *Unintelligible*; as shall appear in the process of what we have to say upon it? But all this *Author's Writings* are such perfect *Antipodes* to themselves, that no *Man* who knows him, will expect to find him consistent with himself in any thing. But to proceed, I come now to examine, whether this *Notion of a Man* and his *living Image* has in it such a peculiar fitness (as this *Author* pretends) to represent and explain to us the *Mystery of the Trinity*; and in order to it I shall lay down this *Assertion, viz.*

That a *Notion* supposing a *Thing Impossible*, and implying in it a *Contradiction* to, and *Inconsistency* with itself, can never explain any, and much less the highest *Mystery* of our *Religion*.

In order to the proving of which I shall consider *Three Things*.

1. What an *Image* in the proper *Signification* of the *Word* is.

2. What an *Image* by *Reflexion* is.

3. What is to be understood by an *Impossible Supposition*.

1. As to the first of which; An *Image*, according to the general *Nature* of it, is such a *Likeness* of a *Thing* as both represents it, and proceeds from it; and that, either as from a *Principal Efficient* producing it,

or as from a *Causa exemplaris*, at least, according to which it is produced. Which I add because of *Artificial Images*, formed according to, and so proceeding from that Idea or Pattern in the Mind of the *Artificer*; drawn from the Thing, which the Image designed by him is to represent. So that an *Image*, whether *Natural* or *Artificial*, essentially implies these Two Things as the General Conditions of it, *viz.* A *Representation of*, and a *Production* either *by*, or *from* the Thing represented by it. *Firstly*, An *Image* by *Reflection* is, when the *visible Species* flowing from any Thing, and striking upon some such Body as *Glass*, *Water*, or *polish'd Metal*, are return'd back from thence, and thereby represent the *Idea* which they originally flow'd from. And such an *Image* this Author here speaks of; for he says, *It is a Mental Image by Reflexion*.

3. In the *third* place, An *Impossible Supposition* may be said to be so in a double respect. *First*, In respect of all *Natural Second Causes*, as exceeding all the *Force* and *Virtue* of such *Causes*, to effect the Thing so supposed. And I deny not, but that the *Supposition* of a Thing *Impossible* in this sense, may have its Use sometimes to give us some Light into, and *Explication* of other Things. *Secondly*, A thing may be said to be *impossible* in respect of a *Contradiction* involved in it; so that no Power whatsoever can effect it. And the *Supposition* of such *Impossible* I affirm to be of no Use for the *Explication* of any Thing whatsoever; Forasmuch as the Mind of Man can have no formed Conception of them; and yet, whatsoever helps it to the Knowledge of another Thing, must do it by being first known it self.

Which

Which things premised, Let us now see what this Author holds and asserts concerning this *living Image* set up by him; that we may hereby find whether it involves in it any Contradiction or no; and it will appear, that he asserts these *Three Things* concerning it.

1. *That this living Image by Reflexion has its whole and sole dependence upon the Prototype.*

2. *That there is one and the same Numerical Humane Nature, both in the Prototype and the Image.*

3. *That the Prototype and the Image are Two distinct Persons.*

These Things, I say, he asserts of his *living Image*; concerning which I remark as follows.

1. That to assert an *Image by Reflexion* to have its *sole and total dependence upon the Prototype*, (as this Author says it has) while it has an equally necessary and essential Dependence upon the *Body*, which it is reflected from, is a Contradiction.

2. To assert, That *One and the same Particular Humane Nature* subsists in *Two Particular Persons* locally distant from one another, (as the *Prototype* and the *Image* are) is a Contradiction.

3. To assert, That an *Image by Reflexion* (which is a *Being* incapable of subsisting by it self) is a completely subsisting Person, endued with an *Humane Nature*, and consequently consisting of an *Humane Soul* and *Body*, is a Contradiction; and again, For it to be an *Humane Person*, endued with an *Humane Nature*, (as this Author asserts it is) and yet not to consist of such a *Soul* and *Body*, is another Contradiction.

These *Absurdities*, and innumerable more derivable from them, are all involved in this Author's *No-*

tion of a *Living Image* by *Reflexion*, having the same *Numerical Humane Nature* with the *Man* himself, and having its *sole Dependence* upon him; and yet being a *separate Person* from him.

But not to insist upon these Absurdities at present, (which common sense and Reason must needs abhor, and fly from) yet since this Notion is designed to explain and represent to us the *Union* (or rather *Unity*) of the *Father* and the *Son* in *one* and the *same Divine Nature*, surely there ought at least to be no gross disparity between this *living Image* and the Thing intended to be explained by it, especially as to those particulars wherein the *Resemblance* must and ought to consist. But whether this be *so* or *no*, will appear from the following comparison. As

First, There is a mutually necessary *Existence*, both of the *Father* and the *Son*, so that the *Father* can be no more without the *Son*, than the *Son* without the *Father*; the Relation being *Inseparable*. But it is not so in the *Man* and his *Image*; for the *Man* may cease to be a *Prototype*, and subsist without the *Image*, though the *Image* cannot subsist without the *Man*.

Secondly, The *Son* has an entire *Total* dependance upon the *Father*. But so has not the *Image* upon the *Prototype*, as depending as much on the *Body* from which it is reflected, as it does or can upon the *Man* whom it represents, and perhaps more.

Thirdly, The *Father* and the *Son* are mutually in one another, and that by an *Intimate Inexistence*, as the words of our Saviour expressly prove, *John* 14. 11. But the *Prototype*, and the *Image* cannot be in one Another, as being locally distant from each other.

Fourthly, The *Person* of the *Father*, and of the *Son* are

are

are only *distinct*, but otherwise inseparably United ; But the *Prototype* and the Image are so *Divided*, as to subsist in an Actual Separation from one Another ; The Place and *Ubi* of the one, (as we observed) being not the Place or *Ubi* of the other.

And now, to sum up and draw the foregoing Particulars together. Let us on the one side suppose *Two Persons, viz. The Eternal Father and Son* ; and these first, by a *mutual Necessity Coexisting* ; and then *one of them, viz. The Son*, having his sole and total dependance upon the other ; and thirdly, *Both of them mutually inexisting in one Another* ; and lastly, *Only distinct in their Subsistence, but by no means Separate or Divided*. Let all this, I say, be supposed on the Part of the *Eternal Father and Son* ; And on the other side, let us suppose *Two other Persons, viz. The Prototype and his Living Image*, and these, without any *Necessary Coexistence with one Another* ; and the latter not having it's sole dependance upon the former, and both of them such as cannot mutually exist in one Another, and withal are not only distinct in their respective Subsistences, but also actually separate and locally divided from each other. Now, I say, when we have collated all these Disparities together, must not that Comparison (think we) give us a blessed edifying, Representation of the Unity of the *Eternal Father, and Son* in the same *Numerical Divine Nature*, when one side of the Comparison is so far from being an Explication of, that it is a direct, Irreconcilable contradiction to, the other ?

But as we first waved the consideration of those monstrous Absurdities that were involved in this notion of a *Man* and his *living Image*, with reference to the *Eternal Father and Son* ; so let us at present wave the

the forementioned gross disparities between them also, yet still this Notion is utterly unfit to give us any *Explication* of the *Trinity*, as being every whit as Difficult, if not more Difficult for the Mind of Man to conceive, than the *Trinity* it self. For the grand Difficulty here, is to conceive how one and the same *Infinite Nature* can be in several *distinct*, though intimately *United Persons*; And the *Thing*, which this Author would explain this by, is a *Man* and his *Image*, where he supposes one and the same *Numerically* subsisting *human Nature* to be in Two locally distinct, and separately subsisting *Persons*. But now in this Case, is it not much more conceivable, that an *Infinite Nature* (whose boundless perfection reaches to more ways of subsisting than one) should subsist in several persons, and those only *distinct*; than that a *Particular finite Nature* (which can have but one *Subsistence*) should subsist in *Two Persons*, and those also *locally* distant, and separate from one Another? I appeal, I say, to any Man of Judgment alive, whether this be not the greater and more inexplicable Difficulty of the Two? For the mind of Man finds an utter Contradiction in making a *Finite Being* exist at once in Two distant Places or *Ubi's*; but in the former, though it finds an insuperable Difficulty, yet it can allege no Contradiction. And therefore I say again, that it is in the highest degree senseless and irrational to assign that as an *Explication* of a *Thing*, which is more difficult, perplexed and Inconceivable, than the *Thing* it self which it pretends to explain. Which yet is the case here of a *Man* and his *living Image*, as the Notion of it has been stated and applied to the present subject.

So that this wonderful *Euporia* of a clearer Idea of
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the *Trinity*, than ever the World had before, has these Three Excellent Qualifications to recommend it.

1. That it supposes and builds upon several Things utterly contradictory and impossible.

2. That it makes one Thing the Representation of another, between which yet (as to the very particulars wherein the Resemblance should be) there is the highest and utmost Disparity. And

Thirdly and lastly, That it offers to explain a Thing Difficult, obscure, and by human Reason not Comprehensible, by another Thing which is ten times more so.

So that if this must be the Lot of the Church of England to sit down, and see her most Holy Religion practised upon by such wretched *Innovations*, as can tend only to ridicule and expose the chief *Articles* of it to the Scorn of *Arians*, and *Socinians*, and all this, under pretence of explaining them; I can but say, God deliver our poor Church from such *Explainers*, and our *Creed* from such *Explications*. And, as I heartily commiserate the *Unhappy State* of that, so I really pity this *Holy Man* himself, that he should be thus suffered to go on venting his *Scandalous Heterodoxies*, without finding either Friends to Counsel, or Superiors to Control him.

Nevertheless should we, with a *non obstante* to what has been said, comply with this Man's absurd Notion so far, as to allow his *Prototype* and his *living Image* to bear such a peculiar Resemblance to the *Eternal Father* and *Son*, (as he pretends, but can never prove them to do) yet how does this any way explain, or give us (as he calls it) any *Idea* of the

Trinity?

Trinity? For are the *Father* and the *Son* the *Trinity* without the *Holy Ghost*? And how does this *Prototype* and *living Image* set forth to us the *Procession* of the *Holy Ghost* from both of them, when it makes no mention of any *Third Person* at all? The *Son* indeed issues from the *Father* in the way of *Knowledge*, by a *Reflex Act* thereof, expressing his *Infinite Nature* and *Perfections*; whereupon, as it is the *Property* both of *Knowledge*, and of an *Image* to represent some thing, so if this *Prototype* and *living Image* can be of any *Use*, to help our *Notions* of the *Eternal Generation*, it must be by its *Representing Quality*. But now the *Holy Ghost* issues from the *Father* and *Son*, *per modum voluntatis*, by an *Eternal Incomprehensible Act* of *Love* streaming from them both; and the *Property* of *Love*, we know, is not to represent (as *Knowledge* does) but to unite to the *Object* known. And here, I pray, what does the *living Image* do towards the setting forth of this? Why our *Author* indeed makes the *Prototype* *One Person*, and his *living Image* *Another*; but do these *Two* by an *Act* of *Love*, or any other *Act* proceeding jointly from both, produce a *Third Person*? If not, what *Idea* of a *Trinity* can be drawn from these *Two*? But if this *Author* will say, (as he says things no less *Abfurd*) That the *Prototype* and his *living Image* do produce some certain *Third Person* distinct from Both of them; and so answering to the *Holy Ghost* in the *Trinity*; I desire him to tell the *World*, what kind of *Thing* this *Third Person* is, and by what *Name* it is to be called, and expressed; for I never yet heard or read of any such, nor am I so much an *Evangel*-Man, as to fetch it from my own *Invention*.

But

But, besides all the foregoing Absurdities, it is worth observing, what a notable cast of his Ignorance he gives us about *Emanation*, Def. p. 28. l. 10. And, in order to it, I think fit to shew, What an *Emanation* and a *Cause by Emanation* is. Now a *Cause or Principle by Emanation* is, that which produces its *Effect* or Term, without any intervening Action really distinct from either the Agent or Effect. And accordingly, That is properly called an *Emanation*, or an *Effect by Emanation*, (for the word here signifies passively) which issues immediately, naturally and necessarily (unless hinder'd by a supernatural power) from the Substance of its productive Principle: Concerning which, we are to observe also, That though a *Cause or Principle by Emanation*, in a large sence, is reckoned an *Efficient Cause*, and reduced to it, yet in the strictest and properest sence of an *Efficient Cause*, it is not so; as not producing its *Effect* by an *Action* or *Efficiency* properly so called, but only by *Resultance* or *Efflux*, (which are the best words which Philosophers have to express the peculiar Causality of it by). And now to explain what I have said, by Instances. All *Properties* are said to be *Emanations* or *Effects* resulting from their *Forms*. And all *Accidents* immediately affecting and issuing from their *Subjects* are *Emanations*. And all sensible and intelligible *Species*, flowing from the Things which they represent, are *Emanations*. And the Light issuing from the Sun is an *Emanation*. To all which we may add, the Substantial derivative Modes belonging to the *Divine Nature*. Which being premised, let us see what *Propositions* this Man advances upon this Subject. As *First*, That an *Image* is not an *Emanation* but a *Reflexion*: which is manifestly *Oppositum in Apposito*. For an Image

by Reflexion in Things Material is Both; viz. an *Emanation* from the *Prototype* or *Exemplar*, from which the *Species Sensibiles* issue or proceed; and a *Reflexion* from that (whether *Medium* or *Object*) upon which they terminate, and from which, by *Repercussion*, they are return'd back again. *Secondly*, He tells us, That the *Son* and the *Holy Ghost* are not *Emanations* from the *Father*. But on the contrary, I affirm, That the *Son* is an *Emanation* from the *Father*, and the *Holy Ghost* from *Both*. For though *Generation* expresses the particular way of the *Son's* issuing from the *Father*, and *Procession* the particular way of the *Holy Ghost's* issuing both from *Father* and *Son*, yet *Emanation* is here a general word properly applicable to, and expressive of both of them. And accordingly *Aquinas*

Non accipimus de processio secundum quod est in Corporalibus, vel per motum localem, sed per actionem aliquam, sicut in exterioriorem effectum, ut calor a calefactore in calefactum. Sed secundum emanationem intelligitur, utpote Verbi intellectus, a Dicente quod dicitur in 1^o 1^o sic fides Catholica processionem ponit in divinis. Aquinas, 1^a 2^a 27. Ar. 1. in C.

he affirms, That the *Son* proceeds from the *Father*, not as an *Effect* from a *Cause*. (viz. an *Efficient Cause* properly so called) but by way of *Intellectual Emanation*: Affirming which, That this is the *Catholic Faith*. And one of higher Note in the Church than *Aquinas*, even the Great *Augustine* himself owns and commends the *Doctrine* of *Dionysius*, concerning the *Eternal Generation* of the *Son*; for that, in his explaining of it, and speaking of the *Father* as a *N^o* or *Mind*, and of the *Son* as the *A^o*, or *Word* of that *Mind*, he expressly calls the *latter* an *Emanation* from the *former*, in those words, *N^o & ineffabile A^o*, where *ineffabile* signifies properly *Emanatio*, not *Effluvia*, which all know are *Terms* Synonymous. *Artemasius* Tom. 1. p. 465. Edit. Colon. It is true indeed, That in the *Son's* issuing from the *Father*, and the *Holy Ghost's* issuing from

from Both, there is, besides the *Terminus produens*, and the *Terminus productus*, assigned also an Act or Action, *viz.* Generation with reference to the Son, and Spiritation to the Holy Ghost; yet because these are not Actions or Efficiencies properly so called, *viz.* distinct Entities from the *Terminus produens*, and *productus*, but really identified with both, therefore the Production both of Son and Holy Ghost are truly and properly to be reckoned *Emanations*. Thirdly, The Defender affirms, That an *Emanation* is of the same Substance, *viz.* specifically the same with that from which it proceeds; of which I desire him to shew me so much as one Instance in the whole World, if he can. Fourthly, That an *Emanation* multiplies Natures and Substances, as being individually distinct from that, from which it issues; which yet in the Son's issuing from the Father, and the Holy Ghost's issuing from both, is certainly false; for though these *Emanations* multiply Persons, yet they do not multiply Substances. Nor are these two Propositions, *viz.* the Third and Fourth, less false with reference to those other forementioned *Emanations* or *Emanative Effects*, set down by us: for, since none of them all are Substances, they can neither be said to be Substances specifically the same with, nor Substances individually distinct from those several Substances from which they flow. Fifthly, and lastly, he tells us, That when the Fathers call the Holy Spirit *procedens*, it is not in the Sense of *Emanation*, but of *Myfterious Procession*. To which I answer as before, That he here opposes Things fairly subordinate; *viz.* a General Term to a Particular. For *Procession* is really and truly an *Emanation*; though every *Emanation* (it being a more ge-

neral word) is not a *Procession*; and therefore, for this Man to say, (as he here does) That the Holy Ghost is called *perBore*, not by *Emanation* but by *Procession*; is just as if one should say of Peter, That he is not a *living Creature*, but a *Man*. From all which it follows, That this Author is grossly ignorant of the True Philosophical Sence of the Term *Emanation*; sometimes applying it to one Thing, and sometimes denying it of another; but *Both* at a venture, and just as People use to play at *Blind-Man's-Buff*.

In fine, I conclude from what has been discoursed upon this whole Matter, That this Author's Fiction of a *Man* and his *living Image* ought not to be admitted or endured, as at all *Explicatory* of the *Trinity*, but to be rejected as a most *sensless, self-repugnant, absurd Notion*, as he has stated it, and fit only to abuse the Minds of Men with wrong and perverse Apprehensions of this *great Mystery*. The Scriptures indeed call the Eternal Son *the Image of the Father*, *Coloss. 1. 15.* and speak also of *Adam's* begetting a Son *after his own Likeness*, *Genes. 5. 3.* But both these places import a quite different sort of *Image* from the *living Image* insisted upon by this Author. For the *Ratio Imaginis* in both these consists not barely in *Representation* and *Production*, but in such a peculiar sort of *Production*; as is by *Generation*. For the Holy Spirit has all the Natural *Essential* Perfections of the Father and the Son, and consequently a substantial Likeness to both; and is without produced by them, and proceeds from them: But because this is not by a *Generative Production*, (which is the Proper, Natural way of conveying Substantial Likeness) therefore the *Latine* Fathers never give the

Title

Title of *Image* to the Holy Ghost; though some of the *Greek Fathers* indeed upon the forementioned Account, sometimes in a less proper and strict sense, do). From which it follows, That since the Son's being the *Image of the Father*, consists not barely in his Representing him, or being produced by him, but in his being produced by way of *Generation*, nothing can truly and strictly represent *How* he is the *Image* of his *Father*, but a *begotten Image*, an *Image intellectually begotten*; and begotten not only in the *Likeness* of a *Specific Nature*, but of the same *Numerical Nature* with him, who begets it. And since none of all these Conditions do or can possibly agree to this Author's *living Image with reference to its Prototype*, it follows, That it can never be a True and Proper Representation of the *Eternal Image of the Father*; as being upon all Accounts wholly of another Kind, and therefore unspeakably dishonourable in its Application to the Son of God.

The Fathers indeed sometimes set forth the substantial likeness between the *Eternal Father* and the Son, by a Man's seeing himself in a Glass. But never did they intend this for a true and proper Representation of, but only for a Popular Allusion to, the Mystery they were treating of; nor, as sufficient to afford Arguments to prove any Thing strictly and logically concerning it, (whereas this Author frequently argues, and that in the strictest way he can, from this Case of a *Man and his living Image*) but only as Instances fit enough to found Similitudes, Resemblances, and Illustrations upon; further than which, they would never go. And this I think most worthy of our Particular Observation concerning those great Men, as to the

the Case before us, *viz.* That in all their Attempts to give the World some small, dim Resemblance of the *Trinity*, they still drew their Allusions from Things that had a real Existence in Nature, and were obvious to sense, (as unequal as they well knew them to the great Subject they applied them to.) But never did they venture to express or describe it by impossible Suppositions, and Schemes of Things that never were nor could be, nor by bold Fictions and *Chimera's* formed wholly in their own Brain: No, this Province was wholly reserved for this Author, the great Corrector and Chastiser of all that ever wrote before him: and especially (*as in Duty bound*) of the *Fathers*. For as to his Notion of a *Man* and *his living Image*, it is manifest, that he does not offer it as a bare Resemblance of the *Trinity*, and no more, but rather as a *Parallel Instance*, or, at least, very near one, and such as gives us a *True and proper Representation* of this Mystery; which, I must tell him, is much more than a *faint Resemblance* of it, or a mere *Allusion* to it. For in several places of this Book of his, he cites it and refers to it, as a *Rule* whereby to speak and conceive rightly of the *Trinity*; and not only so, but also as a *medium* whereby to argue concerning it, particularly p. 63. l. 20. p. 70. l. 4. p. 87. l. 14. & 25. And to show us yet further, of what use and virtue this extraordinary Notion is, he tells us, *That this gives us in its count also of the modi subsistendi, viz. of the Real Subsistence of the same Individual Nature in Three, upon a different manner*, De l. p. 37. l. 15. And a more useful piece of Instruction for our better understanding of the *Trinity*, no doubt, there cannot be. But then are not these *modi subsistendi*, *Persons*? and has not this

Man

Man several times, both in his *Vindication* and in this his *Defense*, utterly denied *all modes in God*, putting them in the same Rank with *Accidents*, and equally exploding both, with Reference to the Deity. Let him deny this, if he can; and if he cannot, let the Reader take notice what a kind of Disputant this is, who having first denied, *That there are any Modes in God*, is now for offering us an *Account or Explication* what these *Modes* are. But this being only an Absurdity and a Contradiction, is in this *Author* not much to be regarded. But that which is infinitely more unjustifiable, is his audacious obtruding the same Romance of a *Man* and his *living Image*, as the best Key for the Interpretation of Scripture, and that in the most important points of Religion, with great Prophaneity, calling this figment of his own making, *The plain Account of the Essential Unity between God the Father, and God the Son*, 7. 21. 1. 10. Which words are so derogatory to the Sacred and Mystrious *Unity* here spoken of, that, I dare say, no Church in Christendom would have endured them but this. For they manifestly contain in them these Two Scandalous Propositions.

First, That a *Plain Account* may be given by us of the most Mystrious, Incomprehensible, and Unaccountable Thing, that God ever proposed to the Belief of Men; as the *Numerical Essential Unity* (which is the *Unity* here spoken of) between the *Eternal Father* and the *Son* confessedly is.

Secondly, That a meer Figment, a Romance, and an impossible supposition of what never was, nor is, nor can be, viz. A *Man* and his *living Image*, is a most proper (if not absolutely the best) way, to give this *plain Account* of the said *Unity* by.

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These Propositions, I say, (which are evidently contained in his forecited Assertion) are Intolerable. And I do here aver, that they are these daring offers to give the World *Plain Accounts, clear Ideas, new Representations, and further Explications of the Trinity*, (unknown to the Church heretofore) which have not only driven this unhappy Man upon an *Hypothesis*, which is downright *Trisbeism*, but have also terribly shaken the whole Belief of this Article in some Mens Minds, and quite extinguish'd, and cast it out of others. But such effects must be expected from Heresy, when it can walk about and face the World with a *Licence* in the Front of it.

But after all these high pretences, does any one by this new piece of Imagery, and this Man's Discourse upon it, find the *Trinity* more explained to him than before? or rather does not the whole Discourse seem wrote in the *Seraphick* way and style of *Jacob Behmen* or *George Fox*? it being nothing from first to last but a mere *Jargon* of Unaccountable, Incoherent, Obscure, dark stuff, and nothing so fit as a *Dark Room* to speak it in. How it may pass the World, I know not, but, I fancy, not so currently as some imagined. And therefore if I might advise the profound Author of it (since he has the *Gazette* so much at his service) he should, upon Publication of the next Auction for Pictures, take care to get his *Living Image* into the *Collection*.

And now, in his Conclusion of the Account given by him of his *Hypothesis*, he endeavours to remove a great Objection against it: For both the *Antapologist* and the *Animadverter* had charged him for stating the Notion of a *Trinity* in Unity so, as utterly to take away the

the *Mysteriouness* of it ; which Charge he would here ward off ; and he attempts to do it, by taking shelter in the *Ambiguity* of the Term *Intelligible* ; which may be either taken at large for that which may in any degree be understood ; And so, none doubts, but God or the Divine Nature may be in some Respects *Intelligible* ; and yet, for all that, remain upon many other Accounts *Unconceivable*. Or, *Secondly*, *Intelligible* may be taken for that which may be fully and perfectly understood ; and whatsoever is so, I am sure, can have nothing *Unconceivable* in it, unless *conceiving* be one thing, and *understanding* another. Now I affirm, that where we may form a Notion of a Thing not only *True*, but also *Plain* and *Easy*, and withal, such as *solves all doubts and difficulties about it*, and *clears off all seeming Contradictions to it*, that Thing is fully and perfectly *Intelligible*, and consequently can upon no Account be reckon'd *Unconceivable*. And such a Notion of the *Trinity*, has this Author in his *Vindication*, &c. forty times told us, that his *Hypothesis* affords, and therefore according to the said *Hypothesis*, a *Trinity* in *Unity* can have nothing *Mysterious* or *Unconceivable* in it. As for the Instance he brings of God's *Eternity* ; which (as he says) must be owned to have a great deal in it *Unconceivable* by our Reason, and yet to be *Intelligible* enough so far as that Notion of it reaches, viz. That it is a duration without Beginning or End, p. 36. l. 15. I say this comes not up to his Case. Since he neither does nor can pretend, That this Account or Description of *Eternity* makes the Notion of it so plain and easy as to solve all doubts and difficulties about it, and clear off all seeming contradictions to it (which yet he affirms that his Notion of a *Trinity* does). For if there

could be such a Notion of *Eternity* as should do all this, I affirm, that even that high Attribute of God could have nothing *Unconceivable* remaining in it. Let him therefore leave off such *Sophistical Trifling* with his Reader ; since, for an Object to be in some Degree *Intelligible* , is one Thing, and to be so intelligible as to be *plain and easy with all doubts and difficulties about it solved*, and all *seeming contradictions cleared off*, is quite Another. The former indeed may consist with the *Mysteriousness* of the said object upon several other Accounts, but this latter neither does nor can upon any Account whatsoever. So that if this Man would but keep to the *Question* , and abide by his own positive repeated *Assertions* (which he is perpetually shifting and flying from) the Charge of his *making the Trinity no mystery at all*, stands as full and clear against him, as that two Contradictory Propositions can never in their full Latitude be verified of one and the same subject.

But since a *Plain and easy Notion of a Trinity in Unity*, and such as solves all doubts and difficulties about it, must needs sound very oddly in the Ears of all sober Christians, who have hitherto accounted it *Incomprehensible* in the very Notion of it, I cannot see how this Author will relieve himself, but by finding some *Theological Use of the word Mystery* , that may over-rule the common and received sense of it. And here to help him in such a strait for once, I will refer him to a Choice Author called *Liberius de Sancto Amore* (but his true name is *Le Clerk*) who in his first Theological Epistle Entituled *de Unione Hypostaticâ duarum Christi Naturarum*, affirms, That a *Mystery*, and particularly that of the Union of Two Natures in the Person of Christ

Christ (as it has been all along accounted) has nothing ἀκατάληπτον (i.e.) Incomprehensible in it. *Mysterium magnum est, non quòd sit in se ἀκατάληπτον, sed quia de eo sine Revelatione Novi Testamenti nunquam homines cogitassent*, p. 10. Again in his third Epistle bearing this Title, *In quâ S. Trinitatis Mysterium explicatur*, after he had congratulated the present Age, that amongst the many Advantages accreving to it from the Cartesian Philosophers, they had made those Things plain, easy and obvious to the World, which our Ancestors had represented as ἀρρησιβάστα (i.e.) unsearchable and unintelligible: He proceeds to these Passages with reference to the Trinity, *Mysterium illud quod hætenus Theologis omnibus crucem fixit, facile explicatu esse, modo recta ineatur via, contendimus*, p. 96. and that he himself took this right way of explaining it, he all along supposes. And again, p. 99. *Horum alterutrum fuisse oportet, vel S. Trinitatis Mysterium facile tum conceptu fuisse (scil. Temporibus Apostolorum) vel nullum tale Mysterium, quale hodie creditur, ab Apostolis fuisse prædicatum*. Again, p. 100. He tells his Friend (and that with Equal Impudence and Falshood) that upon the Principles of the Reformed Churches, *Necesse est fatearis, nihil esse in hoc negotio ἀκατάληπτον, idq; clarâ, nisi fallor, explicatione verum esse non frustra Tibi ostendemus*. And again, p. 102. *Incomprehensibilis non aliâ de causâ habita est S. Trinitas, quàm quia hætenus Theologorum omnium scopulus fuit, non quòd in se capi non possit, &c.* So that we have here furnished our Author with some Theological Use of that Expression (thanks to Le Clerk for it) *That the Notion of a Trinity is a plain and easy Notion, and contains a full solution of all doubts and difficulties belonging to it.* But then we are

to take notice withal, that we must not think to attain to such a Notion of it but *conditionally*, viz. by following the Explications he gives us in his forementioned Epistle, *De Unione Hypostaticâ*, &c. nor can we (as he tells us) make use of the Notions there laid down by him, to any purpose, without a previous and thorough knowledge of the *Cartesian Method*, p. 7. (as indeed nothing can be so kindly as a *New Philosophy* to graft a *New Divinity* upon). Well then, in this his first Epistle he asserts (as he does likewise in the Two next,) That the *Three Divine Persons* are *Tres distinctæ Cogitationes*, or *distincti modi cogitandi*, or *Distinctæ Series Cogitationum*, in one and the same *Divine Essence* or *Nature*, sustaining the said three *Cogitations* or *Modes*, or *Series of Cogitation*. He defines also *Cogitation* to be *quicquid in mente nostrâ fit cujus conscii sumus*, p. 5. which manifestly implies and amounts to *Self-Consciousness*. From which particulars so prepared, it is not unlikely but that our Author, according to the old Rule of *Inventis addendi*, might carry the Notion something further, and improve the *Three Cogitationes* into *Three Spiritus aut mentes Cogitantes* (*Substantia Cogitans* being the Definition which *Le Clerk* gives of a *Spirit*, p. 6.) So that as *Le Clerk* had provided three *distinct Cogitations* or *Self-Consciousnesses*, our Author might very easily find out *three distinct Minds* or *Spirits* for them to belong to: especially since *Le Clerk* had also marked him out a way to *Unite* those *Three Spirits* again in that Proposition laid down by him, p. 7. *Spiritus per solam Cogitationem Uniri possunt*, which might naturally enough lead our Author to some Acquaintance with *Mutual Consciousness* too. And then for *three Distinct Infinite Spirits*,

Spirits, which make the third part of his *Hypothesis*, though *Le Clerk* (as we have observed) says nothing of them here, yet in his *Όϋολογία* or *Metaphysicks*, he speaks of the *Three Divine Persons*, as of *Three Infinite Minds United*. Which Opinion (he says) is *Platonick* and *Intelligible*; and prefers it before that of *One Infinite Mind* extended to *Three distinct Cogitations*, or distinguished by *Three Self-Consciousnesses*. Which he says (as this Author says also) was taught by the *Fathers*, though they knew not how to express it *Intelligibly*: and indeed is the same which he himself pretends to hold in these *Theological Epistles*. So that, although, I readily own the Difference of these Two Men's *Hypotheses*, according to the different molds they have cast them into, yet since *Le Clerk* has furnished out *Three Self-Consciousnesses*, and found out a way of *Uniting Spirits by Mutual Consciousness*, and lastly preferred the *Platonick Opinion of Three Infinite United Spirits or Minds*, I cannot for my life persuade my self, but that this Author took his *Hints* and *Rise* from *Le Clerk*, and by a very little adding and changing made a shift to patch up an *Hypothesis* of his own, out of *Le Clerk's* Materials; no other objection appearing to me against it but that *Le Clerk's* Book was wrote in *Latine*. But I leave it to the Learned and impartial Reader to judge of this. As for the Book here spoken of, it is a small *Octavo* Printed at *Saumur* in *France* (though expressed in the Title Page by *Irenopolis*) *Anno Domini* 1679. And very narrowly escaped being burnt there also for the Heresy contained in it; some good Friends of his (it seems) then in power, stopping the Sentence, and so preventing the Disgrace. As no doubt this Author
also

also has found several good Friends of the same sort, who have stepped in between his writings and the catching Element: though many Worthy and wise Men are still of Opinion, that the *flame* which these wretched Papers have already kindled in our Poor Church, will hardly go out, till the Church has paid its debt by kindling another upon Them.

And thus I have examined and gone over the first general part of his Book, giving us the same account again (which his Vindication had given us before) of his dull, heavy Hypothesis. Heavy indeed in it self, but made ten times more so by the Repetition. And so I pass to the other general part of his work containing his pretended Answers to the *Animadvertiser's* Arguments. But before I enter upon this, I have something to account with him

First, Concerning the Use of the School-Terms in general; and *Secondly* concerning one more particularly used in the *Animadversions*.

I. As to the first of these, which this Author with so much Insolence and Ignorance, professedly explodes, it is known, that they have been, and are universally received, owned, and made use of in all matters of Scholastick Debate, and Argumentation by Men of Learning all the World over. For besides, that there is no Art, Science or Profession whatsoever, but what has its peculiar Words and Terms appropriate to it, whereby the skilful in the said Art express their Notions, and Conceptions of the Things belonging to it, I would fain have this Opiniator tell me, whether the Community of the World, and Philosophers consider the same Things after the same manner? and if they do not, whether they can or ought to speak of them

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in the same manner or no? Men in common converse apprehend things only in their gross bulk, as they incur into their Senses; but as long as Reason and the Mind of Man refines upon the reports of Sense (which is the proper business of Philosophy) it will form to it self several distinct Conceptions of the same Things, which the generality of Men take no notice of; and accordingly it must either find, or make different Terms, or words to express these different Conceptions by: And this, Great Sir, by your leave, gave Rise to *Philosophical Terms*, which so much offend you. And moreover, as long as there is Ambiguity in words founded upon one and the same word's signifying several Things, it will be impossible to discourse exactly and scientifically of the Nature of Things, without distinguishing and sorting out these Significations: And this was the occasion and ground of *Philosophical Distinctions*. And, now let this Man (to make his Ignorance of these Terms and distinctions seem the result of his Judgment and his Choice) laugh at all this if he pleases, (for *Ridet sepe, qui ridendus est*) but, for all that, the sober and learned part of the World will not be put off so. There is an admirable Discourse in the Ninth Book of *Politian's* Epistles, wrote by *Picus Mirandula*, in defence of the Schoolmen, and their Terms, to his Friend *Hermolaus Barbarus*; who being Ignorant of them (as this Man and his Followers are) very ridiculously despised and scoffed at them, as they likewise do. And the whole Epistle is wrote with so much strength of Reason, such a felicity, and true stroke of Wit, joined with an equal Elegancy of style, that (were it not wrote in Latine) I would desire this despiser of the Schools

to

to try his skill in answering it. Matters therefore standing thus, all the Question now will be, whether such as *Albertus Magnus*, *Thomas Aquinas*, *Scotus*, and *Durandus* amongst the Ancients, and *Suarez*, *Estius*, and *Valentia* amongst the later Schoolmen, or such Punyes as this Author (of whose learned accomplishments we have so fair a *Specimen* in the ninth and tenth Chapters of the *Animadversions*) be the fitter Persons to prescribe proper Terms, Rules, and ways of Expression to treat of *Philosophical* and *Theological* matters by? And more particularly, whether *Essence*, *Substance*, *Modes of Being*, *Person*, *Subsistence*, *Relation* and the like; Or *Spiritual Sensation* (which is a Contradiction in the Terms) or *Conscious Sensation* (which is as much as *knowing Knowledge*) or *Self-Conscious Sensation*, and *mutual Conscious Sensation*, and *natural Self-Conscious Sensation*, and *Natural Mutual Conscious Sensation*, together with *Self-Consciousness*, and *mutual Consciousness*, and *continuity of Sensation*. I say, whether these latter (which are the arrantest *Cant*, *Gibberish*, and *Behmenistical Nonsense* that ever the Christian Church and Religion were abused with) or the former Terms used by the School-men, and all other Divines for several Ages, be the fitter and more significant to treat of the *Divine Nature* and *Persons* by. I say again, let Christendom and the whole World (except a few Novellists) be Judges of this. I do not deny, nor does any one else that I know, but that there is some Refuse in this sort of Writers: And that was all that the R. R. *Antapologist* reflected upon in his Answer to this Author's Illiterate Apology. So that he need not, poor Man, be so much at a loss to guess how this matter about
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the Schoolmen will be accorded (as he says) between the *Antapologist*, and the *Animadverter*. For both of them profess themselves much more at a loss how to reconcile this Man to himself; and wihal know very well how to distinguish between what is useful and valuable in the Writings of the Schoolmen, and what is useless and superfluous: but own themselves utterly unable, in the Writings of this Author, to find or make any such distinction. Now after this account of the School Terms in general, I come in the

Answer to
the *Anta-
polog* y, p.
19. l. 6.

Second place to give some account also of that particular Term [*the formal Reason of a Thing*] frequently made use of in the *Animadversions*; which, though sufficiently explained in the second Chapter of them, I shall however take into some further consideration; since this Author would fain avoid any Argument couched under it, by pleading that the Term it self is none of his. Which indeed is readily granted him; but yet, if he asserts *the Thing*, (as he often does) and the *Animadverter* puts it for him into a proper Scholastical Term, and so fits it the better for Argumentation, the Term, I assure him, will affect him, and his Arguments, whether he will admit and make use of it or no: for the *Animadverter* will be judged by his Reader who understands Him, and not by his Adversary who does not. Well then; by [*the formal Reason of a Thing*] the *Animadverter* understands that *Internal Principle which makes a Thing to be what it is*. And as *Unity* inseparably attends *Being*, and *distinction* accompanies *Unity*, the same is the Principle of all these; since that, which *internally* makes a Thing *such* or *such* a *Being*, thereby also makes it *one* in it self, and *distinguishes* it from all other Things besides. For still,

according to all Philosophy, *Idea est Principium Constitutionis & Distinctionis*; So that as every Thing is constituted in such an order of Being by *what it is*, so it is distinguished also by *what it is* from every Thing *which it is not*. And for this Cause the Principle here spoken of is called [Formal] because it is the *Form* (taking the word in its larger sense as it comprehends also *Essence*) which makes a Thing to be of such a *Nature*, and which gives it *Unity*, *Distinction*, and *Denomination*. And upon the same Account also, the Term [Reason] is added to the Term [Formal] to show, That this gives the Natural and Proper Answer to the Question, *why a Thing is such or such, what or thus?* As if, for Instance, it should be asked, *why or for what Reason a Beast is said to be a sensible Creature?* the Answer is, because it has an Internal Principle of sense which renders it so; so that this Principle of sense is the *Formal Reason*, whereby it is both constituted and denominated *sensible*. And the like is to be said of other Things in the like Case. This is the Account, which I give of the meaning of the Term [Formal Reason] as it occurs in the *Animadversions*, viz. *That it is that Internal Principle which makes a Thing to be what it is, to be such in itself, and distinct from all other Things, which it is not; and lastly, is the Natural and Proper Answer to all Enquiries a Priori, why or how a Thing comes to be essentially such or such, according to its respective Denomination?* Of all which this Author being wholly ignorant, he thinks he has so entirely cleared himself of *this Term*, and whatsoever has been argued against him, under it, That he declares with Triumph, p. 78. l. 19. *That if the Animadverter thinks fit to try his skill*
again

again upon this Argument, he bids us he shall hear no more of the formal Union of Personality and Union Inor of other such like Terms. But this poor Man should remember how unhappy he has been in his Prophecies. For so he had said before both of the *Scintilla* and of the most learned Answerers of the Vindication of his Case, &c. via. That he believed that he should hear from them no more; when yet he has heard from them Both; and that in a strain so much above his low Talent, that few believe, that even of them will ever hear more from him: and if as they say, *seeing is believing*, so feeling be believing too, I doubt not but by this time he himself also is of the same Opinion. And accordingly, I do here assure this Man of Presumption that I shall produce this and the like Terms in all Disputes with him again and again (having him in the Company of all the *Excellent Scholastic Writers*, both in *Philosophy* and *Divinity*, constantly using and avowing the use of them) and I doubt not but in the strength of them to break through all the *Colossal Arguments* of this his *Sophistical* and slight Discourse.

And so I go on: But before I come particularly to examine his shifting Answers to the *Animal-verter's* Arguments, I think fit to lay before the Reader the plain and true state of the Point between this Author and him; as the most unexceptionable Rule, whereby the Reader is desired to judge between them both.

Now the Chief Heads of dispute between them are these Three.

First, Concerning *Self-Consciousness*: and what dependance the Personality and Personal Unity of Persons, both Create and Uncreate has upon it.

Secondly, Touching *mutual Consciousness*; and how far the *Essential Unity* of the *Three Divine Persons* in one and the same *Numerical Divine Nature* depends upon it. And

Thirdly, Whether the *Three Divine Persons* are *Three Distinct Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*, or no.

Concerning all which severally the Reader is in the first place to observe, That this Author makes *Self-Consciousness* both in Beings Create and Uncreate, the *formal Reason* of *Personality* and *Personal Unity*, viz. *That, which [makes] a Person to be formally a Person, and formally one in himself*; or (in other words) that, wherein his *Personal Being*, *Unity*, and *Original Distinction* from other things *does consist*. And so in the next place, for *mutual Consciousness*, he makes the *Essential Unity* of *Nature*, or *Essence* belonging to the *Three Divine Persons*, to *consist* formally in their *mutual Consciousness*. So that it is this which renders them formally *one in Nature or Essence*. And lastly, He positively affirms, that the *Three Divine Persons* in the *Godhead* are *Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits*, and that it is *Heresy and Non-sense* to affirm otherwise. Vind. p. 66. l. 25.

Thus he holds, and asserts concerning these *Three disputed Points*, as will appear from the following *Passages* in his *Books*, concerning each of them. And

1. For *Self-Consciousness*. *The Self-Unity of a Spirit*, says he (universally by the way reckoning a *Spirit a Person*) *can be nothing else but Self-Consciousness*, viz. *That it is Conscious to its own Thoughts, Reasonings, Passions*, which *no other Spirit is conscious to but its self*, Vind. p. 48. l. 32. *This makes a Spirit numerically one.*
Vind.

Vind. p. 49. l. 2. *The Self-Consciousness of every Person to it self* (viz. of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost) [makes] them *Three Distinct Persons*, Vind. p. 68. l. 5. And, we know no other *Unity of a Mind or Spirit but Consciousness*, Ibid. *The Essential Unity of a Spirit consists in Self-Consciousness*, and it is nothing else, which makes a Spirit one and distinguishes it from all other Spirits, Vind. p. 74. l. 15. *The very Nature of a Spirit consists in Internal, Ideal Sensation*, Defence p. 7. l. 11. *The Unity of a single Mind or Spirit consists in a Natural Self-Conscious Sensation* (Internal Sensation and Self-Sensation being still with this Author the same with Self-Consciousness) Defence p. 7. l. 29. *A Natural Self-Consciousness makes one Natural Person*, Defence p. 8. l. 7. *And Self-Consciousness makes a Mind or Spirit one with it self, and distinguishes or separates it from all other Minds or Spirits*, Defence p. 43. l. 1, 2, 3. And last of all, more plainly. *If this be what he* (the Animadverter) *means by the formal Reason of Personality, viz. That which makes a Mind, Spirit, or Person one, and either distinguishes or separates it from all other Minds, Spirits or Persons*, I do affirm, that *Self-Consciousness is [this formal Reason]*, Defence p. 38. l. 7, 8, 9, &c. I think it extremely needless to cite any more passages upon this head; these being super-abundantly sufficient to prove, That all that is contained in, and signified by *[the formal Reason of a Thing]* is by this Author here ascribed to and affirmed of *Self-Consciousness*, with reference to *Personality, Personal Unity and Distinction*: and that therefore his Rejection of the Term, while he so amply asserts the Thing, is groundless, and indeed Senceless and Ridiculous. But
Secondly,

Secondly, As touching the next head in dispute which is *Mutual-Consciousness*, he has these following Assertions, *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are one by an Internal Consciousness, as every Man is one with himself, that is, they feel each other in themselves, and they are essentially one by a mutual Consciousness as every Man is one with himself*, Vind. p. 46. l. 6. *As the Self-Consciousness of every Person is it self* (viz. of every Person in the Godhead) *makes the Three Distinct Persons, so the mutual Consciousness of all Three Divine Persons makes them all but one Infinite God*, Vind. p. 68. l. 8. *mutual Consciousness makes all Three Persons hominically one Divine Essence, or one God*, Vind. p. 80. l. 29. *The Three Persons are essentially one God by a mutual Self-Consciousness*, Vind. p. 82. l. 32, 33. *The Three Minds* (viz. The Three Divine Persons) *are all mutually conscious to each other, and therefore are essentially one, as the same Mind is one with it self by a Self-Consciousness*, Vin. p. 91. l. 8. From all which it follows, *That mutual Consciousness is the formal Reason of the Essential Unity of the Three Divine Persons in one and the same Divine Nature, or* (in other words,) *That which properly makes them one in Nature, or lastly, That wherein the Unity and Identity of their Nature does formally and properly consist*. This, I say, undeniably follows from the forementioned Passages cited out of this Author. And so I pass to the

Third and last head in dispute, viz. Whether the Three Divine Persons be Three distinct Minds or Spirits? Which this Author positively affirms; as appears from the following Passages. *The Three Divine Persons* (says he) *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three Infinite Minds really distinct from each other*, Vind.

Vind. p. 50. line at the end. And they are Three distinct Infinite Minds, p. 51. l. 5. Again, The Persons are Perfectly Distinct, for they are Three distinct Infinite Minds, and therefore Three distinct Infinite Persons, and so say, They are Three Divine Persons, and not Three distinct Minds, is both Clearly and Non-sense, Vind. p. 66. l. 26. The Three Persons are Three Minds, and therefore as distinct as Three Minds, Vind. p. 91. l. 5. And again speaking of the Three Divine Persons, I grant (says he) that They are Three Holy Spirits, Vind. p. 258. l. 28. And to add the Crowning and confirming Passage of all, (says he) every Person in the Trinity considered as a Distinct Person is not a Distinct Infinite and Eternal Mind, there is, I confess, an end of the Deist's Notion, but then, I doubt, there will be an end of a Trinity of Persons also, &c. Defence p. 8. l. 24, 25, &c.

All which are the Positive assertions of this Author, and in all of them the Things asserted by him are as positively denied by the *Anniductor*. And I thought it highly necessary thus to draw them all together, and lay them before the Reader, that so he may with one easy turn of his Eye, be able at any time to have a full view of this Author's whole Hypothesis; and thereby to track him in all his Sophistical windings and shiftings, in which he shall find him sometimes denying, what he had before expressly affirmed, and sometimes quite changing the state of the whole matter; which, I assure him, is the whole design and artifice (such as it is) of this Book.

And accordingly, that I may from the Premises give a brief state of the Three forementioned heads, The dispute here in the first place between this Author

thor and the Animadverter, is not whether *Self-Consciousness* proves, infers, or declares *Personality*, and *Personal Unity*, as a *Sign* or *Effect* of it, or a *Consequent* from it? For this is not the Question. But whether it be the *Formal Reason* of it, or (in other words) that wherein the said *Personality* and *Personal Unity* properly does consist? which this Author has (and that in Terms signifying only *a Priori*) over and over affirmed, and the Animadverter as positively denied and disproved. And therefore, if this Author shall at any time take up with the former, and say, that it is all one to him, if we allow *Self-Consciousness* to infer and prove *Personality* and *Personal Unity* as the *Sign*, *Effect* or *Consequent* thereof, or affirm it, in a *Causal* Sense, to be the *Reason* of the same. This, I say, is manifestly to change the Question, and to give up the Thing in Controversie between him and his Adversary.

In like manner, for *Mutual Consciousness*; since it is allowed on both sides, That the *Three Divine Persons* are one in *Nature* and *Essence*, The Question is, Whether *Mutual Consciousness* be that wherein this *Unity* of *Nature* or *Essence* does consist, So that by Reason hereof the *Three Divine Persons* are formally One in *Nature* or *Essence*? and not Whether this *Mutual Consciousness* proves, infers, or declares them to be thus One? For this comes not up to the Point. And consequently if this Author says, That he looks no further, and means no more than this, (as his Meaning is still a Bottomless Pit) he evidently abandons his own positive Assertion, and effectually gives up the whole Matter in Dispute. For surely the *Antecedent Reason* of any Thing, and the bare *Sign*, *Proof*, or *Consequent*

sequent of the same can never hold the same place in Argument, nor produce the same Conclusion.

And so likewise in the *Third* and last place, the Question is not, whether the Trinity be *Three distinct Intelligent Persons*, (which in a rightly stated Sence is true) but whether these Persons be *three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits*? That is to say, *Three distinct Absolute Beings, Essences or Substances*? which it is impossible for them in any Sence to be. And consequently for this Man to change the Term [*Minds*] into that of [*Intelligent Persons*], is quite to alter the Question; and so, to relinquish the Thing which he himself had so often, and expressly asserted; and that as the Principal part of his *Hypothesis* contended for: As shall be fully demonstrated when I come to debate this particular Head with him.

In the mean time, I have laid the Premises before the Reader, as the true State of the Point, and as the Measure, which I will deal with this Man upon, and resolve to hold him to. And so I address my self to the Examination of the *Answers* which he pretends to bring to the Animadverter's *Arguments*. Where I cannot but first observe the Complement which he ushers them in with; *viz.* That the Animadverter in the very Entrance runs headlong past all recovery: which, since it must needs bring his Head to the ground first, I heartily wish him this Author's *Forehead* to endure it.

But to come to his Answers, The Animadverter having in direct contradiction to this Author, denied *Self-Consciousness* to be the *formal Reason*, or Internal constituent Principle of Personality in Finite Persons; This Author replies to him these Two Things.

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2. That he never said one word of the *formal Reason of Personality*, in his whole Discourse upon the *Trinity*; nor has at all concerned himself about it. In answer to which, I here tell him, that though he uses not the Term it self, yet if he asserts the *Thing* signified by the Term, as he does by affirming, that *Self-Consciousness* makes a Person to be properly what he is, or in other words is that, wherein his *Personality*, or being a Person does consist, This is all, that the Animadverter expresses by the Term [*Formal Reason of Personality*] and that he has affirmed this concerning *Self-Consciousness*, I refer the Reader to the Passages newly cited to this Purpose out of his Books; which demonstrate the same beyond all pretence or possibility of denial,

Secondly, He says, That it is only the *Unity of a Spirit* with it self and its distinct, and separate Subsistence from all other Created Spirits, which consists in *Self-Consciousness*. In answer to which I must tell him, That this is that very Thing which the Animadverter affirms to be the *formal Reason* of a Thing, viz. that which gives it Being, Unity in it self, and Distinction from all other Things. I mean the *Principal, Original Distinction*, by which it is so distinguished. So that the meaning of this Term being thus adjusted, I shall, without any further regard to this Author's Exceptions proceed to dispute the Thing it self in the Case now before us. In which he reasons thus, p. 37. at the end. *If that be one distinct separate Mind which is conscious only to it self, and feels all that is in it self, and nothing else, and those be Two distinct separate Minds, each of which is thus conscious to it self, and not to each other, then the Dean has gained his Point.* And no doubt

doubt he has, if a *Mind or Spirit's feeling it self one in it self*, makes it to be so. And its feeling it self a distinct, and separate mind from all other minds, gives it that distinction and separation: otherwise, it is a most senseless and ridiculous Inconsequence: For the dispute here is, Whether *Self-Consciousness* be the Principle and Reason of Personal Being and Unity, not whether it be the Proof of it, or that whereby a Man comes to know this of himself? This latter we may allow it to be, but the former it can never be. For as much as the Consequent may indeed infer, and prove both the Being and Unity of the Antecedent, but cause, or give it, it neither does, nor can. So that when he says, *That the Dean has gained his Point*; I suppose he means his Deanry; For otherwise certainly there was never a more absurd inference made by Man, than to conclude, that because a Spirit by an Intimate *Self-Sensation* (as he cants) feels it self to be one and not another, therefore its feeling it self so, is that very thing, which makes it so. And yet so very fond is he of this ~~ἀπορρητόν~~, that there is no drawing or driving him off from it.

But the Defender, it seems, will prove his Point against the Animadverter from his own Maxime laid down in the third Chapter of the Animadversions, page 70. viz. *That wheresoever the formal Reason of Personality is, there is Personality*: And again, *That wheresoever Personality is, there is the Formal Reason of Personality*, viz. *That they exist convertibly, and mutually, and essentially infer one Another*. Whereupon the Defender argues thus. That since there is such a convertible Existence between Person and *Self-Consciousness*, as the *Proprium quarto modo* of it, So that they mutually infer one another,

it must follow that *Self-Consciousness* (even according to the Animadverter's own Rule) is and must be the formal Reason of Personality. To which wonderful piece of Logick I have these Two Things to answer.

First, That *Self-Consciousness* neither exists convertibly with, nor is the *Proprium quod modo* of a Person: for though every Person be *Self-Conscious*, yet every Thing that is *Self-Conscious* is not a Person: as the second and third Arguments do sufficiently evince.

Secondly, That though a Thing always exists convertibly with its formal Reason, yet every Thing which it exists convertibly with, is not therefore the formal Reason of it. Which, had this Man been aware of, he could not have been guilty of such a Blunder, as to make the *Proprium quod modo* of a Thing the Formal Reason of the same. For one and the same Thing may exist convertibly with several Things, though there cannot be several formal Reasons of the same Thing. And does this Man think that the Animadverter, by affirming a mutual and convertible Existence between a Thing, and the formal Reason thereof, does therefore deny, that Thing to exist convertibly with any Thing besides its formal Reason? or that he affirms this convertible Existence to be that which makes this formal Reason? no, it is enough to his Purpose, that it is one inseparable Qualification belonging always to the formal Reason of a Thing, though it does not belong to that alone. I suppose this Author may have heard of that Maxime, *Posita causa ponitur effectus*; and so, *Vice versa*: which is universally true of all causes and effects, relatively considered; so that here is a convertible existence between them (for it is this properly, and not a convertibility in direct Predication, which is here spoken of). Now I would

would know whether this cause has not also its *Specifick Difference*, and its *Property*, and whether it may not sustain several *Relations* upon several Accounts? And if so, will this new Logician say, That because this cause exists convertibly with its effect, it cannot exist convertibly also with its *Specifick Difference*, and with its *Property*, and with its several *correlates*, or if it does exist convertibly with all and each of these, that therefore all and every one of them must be the *formal Reason* of it? I protest I am amazed at his Ignorance, and must declare, that I can find nothing Invincible in all his Arguments, but That. And I hope the Reader will take a True measure of his Logical Talent from his Discourse about *Proprium quarto modo*: which way of discoursing, though I shall not ascribe to him as his *Property*, yet it has so much of a *Property*, that he is like to be known by it.

And so having made good what had been asserted by the Animadverter, concerning the Formal Reason of Personality, I leave *Self-Consciousness* to shift for it self, and proceed to vindicate the Animadverter's *First Argument* against it; which is this; viz. *That Self-Consciousness presupposes Personality in the Thing to which it belongs, and therefore cannot be the Formal Reason of it; forasmuch as nothing can be the formal Reason of that which is in Order of Nature before it.* This is the *Summ* of the *Argument*; and what says this Defender to it? Why, he shifts the Terms, and from *Self-Consciousness* understood (as all the World understands it) for an *Act*, passes to the *Principle of Self-Consciousness*; affirming, That although indeed he speaks only of the *Act*, yet that (by an unfathomable *Meaning* still) he intends only the *Principle* of the said

said *Act*, as that alone which *makes a Person*, or *gives Personality*. And accordingly he discourses, as follows: Suppose (says he) that a Man should reason thus. *Actual Knowledge presupposes a Mind, and therefore Knowledge [in its Principle] is not, and cannot be the formal Reason of a Mind*, Def. p. 39. l. 13. To which I answer, 1. That the Dispute here is not concerning the *Formal Reason of a Mind*, but of a *Person*; and 2. That He who reasons in this manner, quite alters the State of the Question; which proceeds not upon the *Principle* but the *Act of Self-Consciousness*. And so, the true Reasoning must be This; *Actual Knowledge presupposes a Mind, and therefore Actual Knowledge neither is, nor can be the Formal Reason of that Mind*. This, Sir, is the true Arguing upon the Point, according to the Terms, which, on both sides, it has still been expressed by; and in which there is not the least mention of the *Principle of Self-Consciousness*; which is newly and postliminously thrust in, and is quite another thing from *Self-Consciousness* it self. And this is evident, not only from the proper unforced Signification of the Word, importing no more, than an *Act in Conjunction with its Object*, viz. an *Act of Knowledge*, terminated upon *Self*: but also from this Author's own Explication of it, as still setting it forth by words importing bare *Action*. Such as are a Person's *knowing* himself, and all his Internal Motions, as likewise his *actual Feeling* or *Sensation* of the same. These, I say, are the words which he always expresses *Self-Consciousness* by. And will this Man now persuade the World, that *Acts of Knowledge* and *Acts of Feeling or Sensation*, signify the *Principles* of these several Acts? This is so gross

gross a changing the very subject of the Dispute, that I need not make one step further towards the confutation of it. For having beaten him off from his own Terms, which he himself proposed and declared his Hypothesis by, the Argument stands good against him; and having disproved what he had argued from the *Act* of Self-Consciousness, I am not concerned about the *new Medium* he brings from the *Principle*; since the *Act* was the only Thing (so far as words can express Things) which he has all along mentioned and insisted upon.

Nevertheless, to pursue him through his Shifts, I will consider his *Self-Consciousness* even in the Principle of it too; and, in order to this, I shall observe, That in every *Suppositum* or completely subsisting Being, and consequently in every Person (which is only a Rational *Suppositum*) considered as an Agent, these Three Things are to be taken notice of. *First*, The *Form* or *Essence*; *Secondly*, The *Powers* or *Faculties*; and *Thirdly*, The *Acts* proceeding immediately from these *Powers*, but mediately from the *Essence* or *Form* itself operating by them. And now, let us see whether any of all these, as they belong to a Person, give *Personality* or Personal Individuation to that Person. Where, in the *First* place, I affirm, That neither can the *Acts* themselves, nor the *Powers* from which they flow (reckoning the *Act* and *Power* of Self-Consciousness amongst the rest) give *Personality* or Personal Subsistence to the *Nature* to which they belong; and that as, for other Reasons, so particularly for this, That both *Acts* and *Powers* are *Accidents*, and that no *Accident* can give *Personality*, or be the *Formal Reason of a Person*; because the *Formal Reason*

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son of any Thing must be always of the same *Kind* or Rank of Being with the Thing it self, which is *formally* constituted by it. But a Person is an Intelligent Substance, compleated by its proper Subsistence as by its *Substantial Mode*. And nothing *Substantial*, whether it be a Substance it self, or but a *Mode of Substance* (which is always reduced to it) is or can be of the same *Kind* with any *Accident*; since these *Two* make the *Two* grand different Orders or Ranks of Being, and consequently no *Power* or Faculty, nor *Action* proceeding from it, can constitute the *Nature* they belong to, a Person, by being the *Formal Reason* thereof. To which we may add this further Consideration; That no *Accident* can give so much as a *Natural Individuation* to its *Subject*, and therefore much less can it give *Personality* or Personal Subsistence to the same; This being a Degree of Perfection in the way of *Existence*, beyond that of bare *Individuation*, and consequently neither upon this Account can any *Action*, or *Power*, or *Faculty* of the Soul constitute an *Humane* or Intelligent *Nature*, a *Person*. In the next place therefore (having thus shewn, That neither the *Act* nor the *Power* of Self-Consciousness can give *Personality*). Let us see whether it can be derived from an higher Principle of Action, *viz.* the *Form* of the Self-Conscious Being, which is the *Rational Soul*? Now this, we shall find, sustains the Capacity of a double Principle, *viz.* of a *Constituent*, as it concurs with the Body informed by it, towards the Constitution of an *Humane Nature*; and, *Secondly*, of an *Efficient*; and that both *Emanative*, in respect of the *Powers* and *Faculties* belonging to it; and *properly Effective*, in respect of all the *Acts*, whether
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Intellection, or *Volition*, &c. produced by the Instrumental mediation of the said faculties. But now, under which of these capacities is it the *Formal Reason* of a *Person*? why; under neither: For as much as in the *humane Nature of Christ* it sustains *Both* of them, viz. of a *principal part* concurring to the Constitution of the said *Nature*, both as to its *being* and *unity*, and of an *efficient Principle*, giving it all the *Powers* and *Acts properly* issuing from that *Nature*. But for all that, (we know) that it makes not that *Nature* a *Person* by giving it a *Proper humane subsistence*. Since the *Humanity of Christ* has no such subsistence, but subsists by that of the *Eternal Logos*; which shews, that the said *Subsistence* has no such necessary connexion with *Nature* absolutely considered; but that so considered (as in the *Present Case*) *Nature* may be without it. For if it were necessarily included in *Nature* (as *Personality* and the *formal Reason* thereof mutually and essentially *imply* and *infer* one Another) the *humane Nature of Christ* could neither *Naturally* nor *Supernaturally* be without its proper *humane Subsistence* any more than without its *Essence*. For still we speak here, not of such a *Subsistence* as is opposed to *inhesion in a Subject*, and so makes a *Substance*; but of such an one, as is opposed to all *Dependance* upon another, as upon a *Suppositum*, and so makes a *Substance Complete*, and incommunicable, by giving it its ultimate and most perfect manner of Existing. But of this more again presently in my Examination of his Answer to the *Animadverter's* next Argument. In the mean time, the sum of what has been argued is this: That if *Self-Consciousness* neither in the *Act*, nor in the *faculty* or *Power*, nor yet in its higher *Principle*, viz. the form or essence from which it flows,

can formally give Personality or Personal Individuation to the Nature to which it belongs, then *Self-Consciousness* in no respect whatsoever can be said to be the formal Reason of a Person. But you will say, what is it then that formally constitutes a Person? In answer to which, though it is sufficient for me to have overthrown my Adversary's assertion, yet that I may not be only upon the *Negative*, I affirm, that that which formally gives Personality, or constitutes a Person, is an *Intelligent Nature ultimately completed by its proper Subsistence*. This, I say, I hold and let this Man of Arrogance and Ignorance overthrow it if he can. As for what he says p. 40. l. 3. of *Self-Consciousness in the Abstract*, viz. That it is as capable of being the formal Reason of a Person, as *Rationality* is of being the formal Reason of a *Rational Nature*, it needs no other Answer, than that it is precariously and falsely said; For the True Parallel between these two reaches no further than this; That as *Rationality* constitutes and denominates its concrete *Rational*; so *Self-Consciousness* constitutes and denominates its concrete *Self-conscious*. And what then? a [Person] is not the proper concrete of [Self-Consciousness] but a *Self-Conscious Nature or Being*, whether it be a *Person* or no; and a *Self-Conscious Nature* it may be, and yet not a *Person*. By which it is manifest, that this Man understands not what *Abstract* and *Concrete*, *Person* and *Personality* mean. He uses the Terms indeed at a venture, but they may be so many Greek words in *English* Characters, for ought he knows.

But he will not give over the Animadverter so, but has another terrible Objection against that assertion of his, viz. That *Personality is the ground and Principle of Action*,

Action, wheresoever it is ; Bragging (forsooth) that he has been taught other and better Things, viz. That Natura est principium motus & quietis, and consequently of all other Actions. But was he never taught also the Difference between the Principium Quod, and the Principium Quo of an Action? and does he not consider withal, that the Dispute here is not indifferently of any sort of Actions, but only of such as are Personal, and belong to a complete Agent, or Suppositum? And I would fain have this wonderfully-taught Man, shew me any such Action proceeding from Nature, as the Principium Quo, which does not also proceed from the whole Suppositum, as the Principium Quod; and as that which alone claims the proper Denomination of Agent, in respect of the said Action. Which being the true state of this matter, I suppose he has been told often enough, that it is a Complete Subsistence added to Nature which makes a Suppositum, and to an Intelligent Nature which makes a Person. I have no more to say to him upon this head, but that, upon a Review of the Confirmation which I have now given the forementioned Argument, viz. That Self-Consciousness cannot be the formal Reason of Personality, because in order of Nature it follows and presupposes it, I shall not stick (in spite of this Man's Ignorance) to affirm it again and again a Demonstration of the Point against him. And therefore those words of the Defender upon this occasion are very pleasant. 'I cannot (says he) but think how this Animadverter must look when he reads over this Argument again with its triumphant Conclusion, p. 41. l. 26. In answer to which he must give me leave to tell him, that (thanks be to God) the Animadverter's looks are not quite so bad yet, as to put him in any dan-

ger of being mistaken for *this Author's living Image*. And as for his other scoff, that this *Argument was worth its weight in Gold, though, he fears, it will not much enrich the Buyer*, p. 39. l. 9. What is that to him? let him mind his own *Markers*, who never writes to *enrich the Buyer but the Seller*; and that *Seller* is himself: and since he is so, well is it for his Books, and his Bookfeller too, that Men generally *Buy, before they Read*. The Animadverter for his part affects not the Reputation of a *Scribler*, and much less of an *Hackster*. But pass we now, to the Consideration and Vindication of the Animadverter's second Argument against *Self-Consciousness*, which proceeds thus.

Arg. 2.

The Humanity or Humane Nature of Christ is perfectly Conscious to it self of all the Internal Acts, whether of Knowledge, Volition or desire, &c. that pass in it, or belong to it, and yet the humanity, or humane Nature of Christ is not a Person, and therefore Self-Consciousness does not properly and formally give Personality; for as much as it may be in that, which is not a Person. Thus the Animadverter. And what says our Author to the contrary? Why in the first place (according to his constant custom of denying what he had before affirmed) he says, p. 40. l. 10. *That he never [expressly] taught that Self-Consciousness was the formal Reason of Personality.* And again, l. 27. *That he no where makes Self-Consciousness the formal Reason of Personality.* But, as it is very possible for a Man not always to understand his own words, so I would have this good Man know, that he has over and over made *Self-Consciousness* the formal Reason of Personality, whether he understands so much or no. For, if by his forementioned denial of it, he means no more than that he never made

made use of the Term [*Formal Reason*] this is readily granted him ; but then it is arrant trifling, since it is certain, that he has *taught*, and asserted the *Thing* signified by this Term, as effectually and plainly as if he had used the very Term it self. For (to tell him again what I had told him before) *the Formal Reason of a Thing* is that, which constitutes it *such a Being*, giving it withal its proper *Unity* and *Distinction*, whether Natural, or Personal, according as the Thing is, which it belongs to. For all these Three necessarily go together, and essentially imply one another, and consequently there must be one and the same Principle of them all. And now, if we would see whether or no this Author applies all this to *Self-Consciousness*, with reference to *Minds* or *Spirits* (which he constantly makes to be *Persons*) let the Reader cast his Eye back upon some of the fore-alleged Passages ; particularly upon that in *Vindic.* p. 49. l. 12. *That this Self-Consciousness makes a Spirit numerically one with it self.* And in *Vind.* p. 68. l. 6. *That the Self-Consciousness of every one of the Persons (viz. in the Trinity) to it self makes them Three distinct Persons.* And again, *Vind.* p. 74. l. 13. *That the Essential Unity of a Spirit consists in Self-Consciousness, and that it is nothing else which makes a Spirit one, and distinguishes it from all other Spirits.* Likewise in this Defence p. 7. He tells us expressly, *That the Nature of a Spirit consists in Sensation*, (which with him is only another word for *Self-Consciousness*.) Nay ; and to go no further than the very next page to that in which he here so positively declares, *That he nowhere makes Self-Consciousness the formal Reason of Personality, viz.* Defence p. 43. He roundly affirms, *That Self-Consciousness makes a Mind*

or Spirit one with it self, and distinguishes or separates it from all other Minds or Spirits. - And that such a distinct and separate Self-Conscious Mind is a Natural Person. Now I would have this Man in the first place tell us, whether all these Passages have not in them a *causal* sense, but only an *Illative* or *Probative*, and no more? And in the next place, I would have him shew me whether there be any Thing more signified by the [formal Reason of Personality] than what the forecited Passages fully contain in them? and if he cannot prove that there is any more signified by it (as there is not) then let him for the future leave off shuffling, and own, that by what he has asserted in the said Passages, he has made *Self-Consciousness* the formal Reason of Personality with reference to *Minds* or *Spirits*, which he Universally affirms to be *Persons*. And by this I hope the Judicious Reader will see with both Eyes, what a slippery Self-Contradicting Caviller the Animadverter has to dispute with. In the mean time the sum of the Animadverter's Argument against him stands thus. This Author asserts every *Mind* or *Spirit* to be a *Person*; He places this Personality in *Self-Consciousness*; he holds this *Self-Consciousness* to be Essential to, and Inseparable from a *Mind*; (for as much as he positively asserts the Nature of a *Mind* or *Spirit* to consist in it, *Defen. p. 7. l. 11.*) whereupon it does and must follow, That since our Saviour, in assuming the humane Nature, assumed an humane *Mind*, *Soul*, or *Spirit*, he assumed an humane *Person* too; for as much as its Personality was as Inseparable from it, as its *Self-Consciousness* (from which it necessarily resulted) was. Nor will it avail him to allege the Interposal of Supernatural and extraordinary Pow-

er in the present Instance; since such Power, though never so extraordinary and Supernatural, never destroys the Essence, or Essentially necessary Connexion of Things. And therefore if the Personality of a mind be implied in the very Nature of a Mind, a Mind can be no more without its Personality than without its Nature: which would be a direct Contradiction; to the effecting whereof the Divine Power it self does not extend. But on the other side, when we state the Personality of an humane Nature upon the compleat Subsistence of it, which is a mode not necessarily implied in it, the Humane Nature of Christ might very well by the Divine Power be made to exist without it, and so in a supernatural way be taken into, and supported by the Personal Subsistence of the *Eternal Word*. And all this with full accord to the strictest Principles of Reason, without the least necessity of making Two Persons in our Saviour; whereas according to this Author's *Hypothesis*, it is impossible for all the Reason of Mankind to keep off an Humane Person as well as a Divine from belonging to our Saviour by his Incarnation or Assumption of the humane Nature. As for his taking shelter in *Boetius's* Definition of a Person, that will not help him neither; since the utmost that can be proved against it, is that *Boetius* was under a mistake (and one Man's mistake certainly cannot make another in the right): For all, both Schoolmen and other Divines agree, that this Definition strictly taken is defective; and that instead of *substantia Individua* alone, it should be *substantia Individua, completa, & Incommunicabilis*, or something Equivalent to the Two last Terms. For otherwise this Definition also would infer Two Persons in Christ; since there

are.

are Two Individual Substances belonging to him, *viz.* an *Humane* and a *Divine*. But after all we have great reason to believe, that *Boetius* here uses the word *Substantia* for *Subsistentia*, as several of the Ancient Fathers of great note did, and particularly *St. Hilary* in his Books of the *Trinity* very often, and *St. Austin* sometimes; And then the *Boetian* Definition is perfect and good; and no such Consequence of a double *Personality* in our Saviour can be drawn from thence; For as much as the Son of God took our humane Nature without its proper *Subsistence*, into the *Subsistence* of his own *Eternal Person*.

Arg. 3.

And so I proceed to the *Animadverter's* Third Argument, proving *Self-Consciousness* not to be the formal Reason of Personality in Created Beings, which is this. *The Soul in its separate state is conscious to its self of all its own Internal Acts or Motions, &c. and yet the Soul in such a state is not a Person, and therefore Self-Consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality: for if it were, it would constitute a Person wheresoever it was.* This Argument is of the same Nature with the former; each of them being brought as a Particular Negative against an Universal Affirmative. And how does this Defender confute it? Why; by the easiest way of Confutation, that it is possible for Ignorance to give it; *viz.* by saying, *That it is nothing to the Purpose.* But does he know what is and what is not an Argument? and what is to confute an Assertion, or Position, and what is not? Let him know then, That to confute an Argument is properly to conclude the Contradictory Proposition of that which is held by the Respondent or Defendant, and is called by the Greeks *ἀντιλογία*, and by the Latines

tines Redargutio. And here, I would have this hardy Ignoramus own before the World, if he dares, That one Negative Instance does not overthrow an Universal Affirmative as really and effectually as Ten Thousand. But possibly one, who can be of all sides, may be for both sides of the Contradiction too, and hold, That Self-Consciousness is the formal Reason of Personality, Personal Unity, and distinction whereforever it is, and yet that there may be a Self-Conscious Being, one in it self, and distinguished from all others, which is not a Person; of which two Propositions this Man has affirmed the former (though he uses not the Term *Formal Reason*), and the Animadverter asserts the Latter. And the whole dispute shall be resumed, and the Thing debated again presently. But as for that insufferably Rude and Scurrilous Reflexion here passed by him upon the Animadverter, p. 43. l. 33. I shall take no further notice of it now, intending effectually to account with him, both for that, and several other of his *Billingsgate-Scurrilities*, as soon as I shall have finished the Argumentative part of my Reply. In the mean time he declares in a Bravado, p. 44. l. 15. *That if the Animadverter can prove, That the Unity of a Mind and its distinction from all other Minds does not consist in Self-Consciousness, the Dean is then a lost Man for ever, and must be content to follow his triumphant Chariot.* And I on the other side affirm, That if the Essential Being, Unity, and original distinction of every Thing is and must be in order of Nature before any Act can proceed, or be so much as conceived to proceed, from the said Thing; then it has been already proved (and that in Defence of the first Argument) beyond all Contradiction, That the Original Unity

Unity of a Mind and its distinction from all other Minds, neither does nor can consist in Self-Consciousness, Act or Power, these being in Nature posterior to the said Unity and Distinction. And that one known short Axiom, *Agere presupponit esse* (to which we may add also, *esse in se Unum, & distinctum ab aliis omnibus*) utterly overthrows this part of his Senseless Hypothesis. But as for his Scoff of following the Animadverter's Triumphant Chariot in this Case, he will not claim his Promise, as knowing something much fitter for him to follow than that, and some body as fit to follow him.

But I shall now come to debate the Personality of the Soul with him: which dispute, he first tells us, is *nothing at all to the Purpose*; and then very discreetly bestows the full fifth part of his whole work against the Animadverter (*viz.* Twenty Pages of 90.) wholly upon this very point, and this he also calls *making some Sport Reflections upon it*: though more by half than what he has made upon any Two or Three (and those principal) Parts or Branches of the whole Controversy. But whereas he says p. 44. l. 24. *That all this was done only with a purpose to expose Mr. Dean* (forsooth) I must assure him that it is a mistake: for that the Animadverter found this work effectually done to his hands, before ever he set Pen to Paper.

But to proceed. This Author in his Vindication has asserted, *That the Soul without a Vital Union to an Humane Body, is a Person*, *Vind. p. 262. l. 17.* And not long after he tells us also, *That the Soul as United with the Body is a Person too*, *Vind. p. 268. l. 28.* In opposition to both which Propositions the Animadverter holds, *That the Soul of Man is not a Person, and that*
neither

neither in its Conjunction with the Body, nor in its Separation from it. And what says our Author to this? Why in the first place he says, *He grants, That the Person of a Man, as it is used in common speech to signify a Man, must include both Soul and Body as the constituent parts of an Humane Person; but that when we enquire into the strict Notion of Personality, that must be a simple Uncompounded Thing, as In divisible as Self is, which cannot consist of parts separate from each other*, p. 45. l. 11. Whereupon with much foolish Confidence he disputes against the supposed Absurdity of Two Parts of Personality. To all which I have several Things to Answer, As first, That he ought to prove, and not *gratis* only to affirm, That the Philosophical sense of this Term [*Humane Person*] and the Popular commonly received sense of it, are not the same. Whereas I affirm they are, and challenge him to prove the contrary if he can: For otherwise it is a meer supposing the *no Curator*, and a gross *Petitio Principii*. Secondly, I must tell him, That he disputes not *ad Idem*: for that he passes from the *Concrete* to the *Abstract*: *viz.* from [*Person*] which consists of Parts, to *Personality* which does not; and then surely, when the dispute is concerning the *having*, or not *having* *Parts*, there can be no concluding in that respect from one to the other. Thirdly I tell him, that *Self* is not a simple indivisible Uncompounded Thing, but as compounded as the Man himself, and consists of Parts separable from one another, *viz.* of Soul and Body, as the Man himself does, and is as much a *Concrete* as he is. Fourthly and lastly, I must tell him, That though Personality in the *Abstract* be a simple Indivisible Term (as all other *Abstracts* are) and so cannot

actually consist of Parts, yet it *composes* and implies a necessary inseparable Relation to the Essential parts of the *Concrete*; and in this respect, parts are and may be ascribed to it, *viz.* by way of *Connotation*, though not by way of *Physical Composition*. And therefore that Question of his, *viz.* *Will the Animal-writer venture to make the Body part of the Personality of a Man?* is very easily answered, *viz.* That by actual, real, and *Physical Composition* it is not so, but by *Essential Connotation* of, and *Relation* to, the Body, as to part of the *Concrete*, it is so. That is to say, *Personality* implies a Body as an *Essential Part* of a Person, though not of the *Personality* it self. And so both his silly Objection and his sillier Scoff of a *compounded Personality*, page 48. and of the Bodies being a part of this *Personality*, page 47. are at an end.

But his Absurdity in asserting a *Beast* to be a *Person* will never be so, but stands as firm as ever. For whereas he says, *Defence* p. 46. l. 6. *That he gave notice of the Impropriety of the Expression, and used it only by way of Allusion and Accommodation*, Let the Reader but consult his *Mind* p. 262. and he will find every Tittle of this an Impudent falshood. For he speaks not there so much as one Syllable of the *Impropriety* of it; nor does he pretend to use it by way of *Allusion*, but as a Real and a Proper Instance of the Nature of a *Person*, dogmatically asserting a *brute* to be a *Person* as much as a *Suppositum*; and this without the help or Qualification of either [a *so say*, or a *so speak*], With such a shameless front can this Man deny a Thing, as soon as ever he has affirmed it: And yet before the Denyal of it is well out of his mouth, he offers with still a greater Impudence to justify it; affirming

p. 47. That Beasts may be said to have reason in a certain measure and degree, and moreover proves their Rationality from their Self-Consciousness. So that we see here, of what Virtue this Self-Consciousness is, that it can extend even to Beasts themselves, and make them Rational. For having said That a Beast is Self-Conscious, p. 46. l. 21. he adds, *That wheresoever there is a Conscious Life there is some degree of Reason.* And is not this, think we, a blessed Assertion, both in Philosophy and Divinity? For according to what he has here asserted, a Beast may be properly defined *Animal Rationale*; And, which is more, a Beast is not a different Species from a Man; for Rationality is the Specifick difference of a Man. And if a Beast has Reason to a certain degree (as he affirms it has) then the difference between a Man and a Beast (the grinning race it self not excepted) is only Gradual, and consequently neither is nor can be Specifick. I shall say no more upon this subject, but leave the whole World to consider what this Man is, and what fit Propositions these are to be Licensed by Authority. However I would have the Reader observe, that this poor Creature who explodes *Paris in Personality* (which his Adversary, in a strict and proper Sence, never did, nor does assert) yet admits and holds Degrees in Personality, p. 46. l. 22. For, says he, wheresoever there is a Conscious Life, there must be some Degree of Reason; and that *entitles them [viz. Beasts] to as much share in Personality as they have in Reason.* But let me tell this utter stranger to all Philosophy, That as there is no such Thing as a *plus* and *minus* in substance, so neither is there in *substantial modes*, of which Personality is one, and the Principal one too. But he goes on and

and tells us, *That no Man will pretend, that an humane Body, though united to a Reasonable Soul, has any Reason or Sense either,* p. 46. l. 27. And yet this very Man says, *Vind. p. 269. l. 18, 19. That the Body is conscious to all the Commands of the Will.* Which how it can be without any thing of Sense belonging to it, I must profess surpasses all the *Sage*, that I am Master of, to conceive; and I cannot but declare withal, That if a Thing may be *Conscious*, and yet have no *sense* at all in it, I shall have a worse and a meaner opinion of *Self-Consciousness* than ever I had before. But these and the like wonderful Things I suppose our Author will tell us, that he speaks only by way of *Allusion*; which, next to his *meaning* is the surest refuge he has (when he is baffled) to fly to.

And so from hence he comes to this Hypothetical Decision of the Point, *viz. That if Personality belongs only to a Reasonable Nature, it is certain, that the Soul makes or constitutes the Person,* p. 46. l. 31. Which is an Extraordinary Consequence indeed; nevertheless I deny it as utterly false. For in Men neither is the Soul all that is contained in a *Reasonable Nature*, nor a *Reasonable Nature* all that is contained in a *Person*: And therefore, as the Soul cannot adequately constitute a *Reasonable Nature*, so much less can it adequately constitute a *Person*. A *Reasonable* or rather an *Intelligent Nature*, may be either simple as the *Divine* and *Angelical*, or *Compound* as the *humane Nature* is, which essentially consists of *Soul* and *Body*, (as the whole World agrees) and since it does so, I deny that the *Soul* can adequately make or constitute either a *Reasonable Nature*, or *Person* (which includes in it the *Nature* and something besides) any

any more than one Essential Part of the said Nature or Person can do the joint office of Two. And whereas he adds, *That the Soul* (as he may so speak) *is the Centre of Personality*, I must tell him, that I own the Soul to be the Principal constituent Part of the Person, but as for the other Notion, I know no more of the *Centre of Personality* than I do of the *Continuity of Sensation*. Which word, as it is perfectly new, and not used before, so it is very absurdly applied here; for I demand of him, how that can be called the *Centre of Personality* which diffuses it self through the whole Person even to the utmost extremity of its Subistence; and consequently reaches as far as the Personality of the said Person does or can; Nay, and (to use his own Cant) as far as the *conscious life extends*? For certainly it must needs be a pleasant thing to imagine a *Centre* reaching as far as That, which must be drawn to such a considerable distance from it one way, as well as terminate in it Another. But if, after all this, our Author means by these words the *Centre of Non-sense*, I assure him his Writings are of a Compass large enough to pass for the *Circumference*.

But let us see some more of his monstrous Assertions. *The Body*, says he, *is part of the Man, and so part of the Person, but it does not make the Person, but is taken into the Person by a Vital Union*, p. 47. l. 7. To this I answer, That for the Body to be *actually* a part of the Person, and yet, while it is so, not to go to the making of the Person, as a Part to the making of the whole, is a direct Contradiction. And whereas he talks, of its *being taken into the Person by a Vital Union*: Let me tell him, That there is no such Thing as a *Vital Union*.

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nion in Created Beings, which is not also a *Composition*, that is to say, A Concurrence of Parts to the Constitution of the whole; And let him shew me in *Created Natures* one Instance of such an Union as is not also a *Composition*, if he can. So that all *Composition*, as such, is an Union of Parts, and all *Vital Union* of Parts a *Composition*; and the Body is as essential, though not so noble a Part of the Person as the Soul it self. For the Person of a Man supposes and includes in it the whole humane Nature, and the humane Nature includes in it the Essential parts of humane Nature, which are Soul and Body. But he tells us further, *That since all Life, Reason and Sensation are only in the Soul, the whole Personality must be in the Soul also, though the Soul when United to the Body is not the whole Person*, p. 47. l. 22. To which I answer, That the *whole Person*, and the *whole Personality*, adequately connote one Another, and belong to one and the same *suppositum*; and that otherwise there would be no *Commensuration* between the *Abstract* and the *Concrete*, but there would be an essential part of the *Concrete*, to which the *Abstract* could not extend or belong; which would be a gross absurdity. But besides, I deny the Thing supposed by him, *viz. That all Life, Reason and Sensation are only in the Soul*. For though they may be in the Soul as the *Subiectum proximum & Principium Quo*, that is, as immediately proceeding from it, and subjected in it, yet they are properly in the whole compound, *viz. the whole Man or Person*, as the *Subiectum ultimum, and Principium Quod*; and as that which receives the whole Denomination from what belongs immediately to any Part of it. For it is the whole Man or Person, who is properly said to be a living, Reasonable

Reasonable, Sensible Creature, though it be by Virtue of his Soul, as the *Principium Quo*, that he is so.

After this comes another Absurdity, where he tells us, p. 43. l. 2. *That an Hypothetical Union is the swallowing up of a Natural Personality in its Union with a superior Person.* Which if it be so, Then, say I, where is the Hypothetical Union of Christ's Person with the humane Nature? for the humane Nature which was united to his Divine Person, had no Personality of its own to be swallowed up: for Christ assumed it without any Subsistence or Personality belonging to it; which it neither has, nor ever had; and consequently could never be said to be lost or swallowed up by this Union; So that we have a new sort of Heresie started; *viz.* That as *Eusebius* heretofore affirmed Christ's *Humane Nature* to have been swallowed up by His *Divine*; so this Author holds an *Humane Personality* to have belong'd to this *Humane Nature*, which in like manner is swallowed up by the *Superior Person* of the *AdyG*. But where these vile Heterodoxies will stop, God only knows: For I cannot see, but this *Inventor* may freely and uncontrollably vent as many of them as he pleases; and no doubt he has a great many more such in Reserve, and will in due time produce them.

But the Animadverter had argued against the Personality of the Soul in Conjunction with the Body, thus; *If the Soul, in the Composition of a Man's Person, were an entire Person it self; and, as such, concurred with the Body towards the Constitution of the Man, then the Man would be an Imperfect Accidental, and not a Perfect Natural Compound.* He would be that which

Philosophy calls Unum per Accidens, that is, a Thing made up of such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One, Animadversl. p. 75. And what says he to this? Why, he tells us, That the Soul and the Body are vitally united, and that the Animadverter's own beloved Philosophy never calls Things vitally united Unum per Accidens. To which I answer, That no Created Person ever was or could be vitally united to any Being distinct from it self: And therefore since it is certain, That the Soul is vitally united to the Body, it is impossible that the Soul should be a Person. For this beloved Philosophy teaches me, That in Created Beings there can be no Vital Union but between Parts; and consequently, that since there is a Vital Union between Soul and Body, this Soul and Body must be united as concurrent Parts of the same Compound; And this, by this Author's Favour must utterly destroy his senseless Notion of the Personality of the Soul; since that which is a Part cannot be a Suppositum, or completely subsisting Nature, and whatsoever is not so, can never be a Person. So that the Animadverter's Argument stands good, viz. That in created Beings an Entire Person united to a Body would make an Unum per Accidens; and consequently that a Vital Union between them would be impossible: Yet nevertheless, since it is certain, that there is actually such a Vital Union between Soul and Body, it is upon the same account also as certain, That the Soul (which must be one of the Terms of that Union, and by consequence a Part) cannot be a Person. So that all this is but a meer Petitio Principii: first to suppose the Soul a Person, which is the principal Thing in Dispute; and then to say, that its being vitally united to the Body, keeps it from making a Man

a *Man* That, which we call *Unum per Accident.* Whereas it is affirmed and argued against him, That this very *Vital Union* of the *Soul* with the *Body* overthrows the *Soul's Personality*, as a Thing which this *Union* is utterly inconsistent with. In short, the *Soul's* being a *Person* (if it were so) can never prove it vitally united to the *Body*, but its being vitally so united, irrefragably proves it to be no *Person*.

But he is now for confounding the *Animadverter* with *Two Questions*, but still in pursuit of the same Point. First, Whether the *Eternal Aoy* before the *Incarnation* were a *Compleat Being*? which is readily answered in the Affirmative, That he was. Secondly, Whether the *Humane Nature* assumed by him were a *Compleat* or *Incompleat Being*? I answer, That though it were a *Perfect Nature*, yet since it was without a proper *Natural Subsistence* of its own, it was upon that account an *Incompleat Being*. But then I add, that this was a *Pechliar*, and a *Supernatural Case*; there being no other particular *Humane Nature* in the *World* without its particular proper *Subsistence* but this alone, which subsists wholly by a borrowed Subsistence, as being assumed into that of the *Aoy*. But now what is all this to the *Union* between the *Soul* and *Body*, which are vitally united as essential Parts of the whole *Humane Person*? But the *Person* of the *Aoy* is not vitally united to the *Humane Nature* as to a *Part* of it. And though (as I noted before) it be impossible for a *Finite Person* to be vitally united to any other *Being* distinct from it self, yet an *Infinite Person* (as we see in the *Person* of our *Saviour*) may be united to another distinct *Being* or *Nature*. For this is neither a *Composition*, nor yet a

Natural Union. But to this our Author very Learnedly excepts, and affirms the *Union* between the Person of Christ and his Humane Nature to be a *Natural Union*; and gives this as a Reason for it, *Because it is a Union of Natures, and that an Union of Natures is a Natural Union by whatsoever Power it is done, p. 49.* In answer to which, though I might say, That This is not properly (at least not immediately) an *Union of Natures*, but of the *Divine Person of Christ* to the *Humane Nature*; which by and through the Person comes to be united to the *Divine Nature*; yet, to let that pass, I absolutely deny both his Propositions, *viz.* That the *Union between the Person of Christ and his Humane Nature is a Natural Union.* And that all *Union of Natures must be a Natural Union, by what Power soever it is wrought.* Both which are absolutely false. Forasmuch as a *Natural Union* is only that which is wrought by a *Natural Cause* or Principle; acting according to the Ordinary Course and Measures of Nature; which an *Union between Two Natures* so vastly disproportioned as a *Finite* and an *Infinite*, can never be effected by: For will this Man affirm, That GOD, by the ordinary Exercise of that Power, by which He carries on the daily Production of Things in the World, (and which is properly called *Nature*) united the *Divine Person of the Logos*, and the *Humane Nature* together? If this be not a *Supernatural Effect*, (and consequently no *Natural Union*) let this Man assign me any one that ever was or can be reputed such. And therefore let him take notice for the future, That it is not the bare *Terms* or *Extreams* of an *Union*, as that it is between Two Natures, that can make it *Natural*; But an Agent acting, and joining

ing those Natures together, according to the *Ordinary Course of Nature*, which must make it formally so; and which can never be wrought by any Agent so working, where one of the Natures to be united is *Finite*, and the other *Infinite*. But (as I said before) what is all this to this present Argument, which has nothing to do with the *Hypostatick Union*, but only with that way or kind of Union, by which *Created Beings* are united together? And will this Man argue from one sort of Union to another, between which there is no *Cognition* at all? Wherefore let the Charge not only of Boldness, but Prophane-ness too rest upon him, who dares make the common way of Natural Unions, the measure of a Supernatural; and that such a one as exceeds all the Miracles that Omnipotence it self ever yet wrought in the World.

But now (as he tells us) he is for *quitting the School-Terms*, (which he never understood) and for speaking so as all may understand him. And here the first Oracle thus delivered by him is this; viz. *That the Soul may be a Compleat and Perfect Person, but not a Perfect Man*, p. 49. l. 28. To which I answer, That a perfect Man is essentially a *Compound Nature* or Being; And that an *Humane Person* is essentially so too; And that therefore the *Soul* being as essentially a simple *Uncompounded Being*, can neither be a *Perfect Man*, nor a *Perfect Person*. But this is such a Proposition, that I shall say no more of it, but leave it wholly to the Reader's Admiration. Nevertheless, to disencumber him from such Stuff, as this Man's Ignorance is still throwing in his way, I think fit here to note the Difference between a *Perfect* and a *Compleat Being*.

ing. Now a Thing is said to be *Perfect* in respect of its *Essence*, as wanting nothing that is *Essential* to it. But it is called *Complete* in respect of its *Subsistence*, as subsisting so by it self, as to be neither a *Part*, nor *Adjunct* of another Thing. Accordingly the first of these is the *Perfection* of a *Man* considered barely as a *Man*, as an *Animal Rationale*, compounded of *Soul* and *Body*. But the other is the *Perfection* of a *Person*, or of a *Man*, considered not only as a *Rational Nature*, but as a *Rational Nature completely subsisting*. From whence it follows, That neither does the *Perfection* of a *Man*, nor the *Perfection* of a *Person*, depend upon the *Perfections* or *Operations* belonging to him; as being neither *Essential* to him as a *Man*, or as a *Person*; and consequently though they be never so defective, yet he who has the *Essence* or *Essentials* of a *Man*, is a *Perfect Man*; and he who has this *Essence* or *Nature* of a *Man*, completed with the *Proper Subsistence* of the same, is a *Perfect Person*.

But our Author is for explaining this matter to us further by an Instance: Let us (says he) consider a *Soul vitally United to a Body, with Organs so indisposed for Sensation, that a Man can neither see, nor hear, nor taste, nor smell, but only just lives and breaths, you will not say this is a perfect Man, p. 30. l. 8.* Yes, good Sir, I both will and do say so. For he who has the perfect *Essence* of a *Man*, is a perfect *Man*, whether *Halt*, or *Blind*, or *Deaf*, and as defective in the *Actual Exercise* of his faculties as of his *Limbs*. But you will say, do not all these great defects render a *Man* more *Imperfect* than he would be otherwise? Yes, as to his *State* or *Condition* they do, but not as to his *Nature*

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or *Essence*: And therefore this Author may take notice, That there is a twofold Perfection belonging to a Man, the first *Essential*, which we have been hitherto speaking of, and properly consists in that perfection of Nature, or *Essence*; without which he could not be a Man; The other is *Extra-essential*, and in respect of the former *Accidental*, and may (as we have noted) be called a perfection of *State or Condition*; and consists properly in an Integrity of Parts, and a right disposition of the Faculties, enabling a Man to exert all the Operations belonging to him. And I do here, according to all the Principles of Philosophy, and the concurrent sense of Philosophers affirm, that notwithstanding an Universal Failure of all those Accidental Perfections, a Man is as perfectly a Man by virtue of his bare *Essence*, and as perfectly a Person by virtue of his *Complete Subsistence*, as if he had them all in their highest Pitch. But our Author goes on; If (says he) a *Complete Person* may not be a *Complete and perfect Man*, then the *Formal Reason of Personality*, and the *Natural Perfection of a Man*, are Two Things, p. 50. l. 15. I grant they are so; But utterly deny, That a *Complete Person* can be otherwise than a *Perfect Man*; though there may be a *Perfect Man* who is not a *Person*. For every *Person* includes in it a *Nature Rationalis*, (which makes a *Perfect Man*) and, besides that, a *Complete Subsistence* of the same, which makes the *Person*; and whereas he says, That the whole *Personality* must be in the Soul, if a Man be a *perfect Man*, who is united to a Body which is worse than none, p. 50. l. 20. I must tell him, first, That there is no such Thing as a Man's being united to a Body: for though the Soul is united to a Body, yet the Man is not, but

but contains both *Body* and *Soul* united to one Another. And I must tell him further, *That the Soul's being united to a Body which is worse than none*, does not make that *Body* less an *Essential Part* of the *Man* and of the *Person*, than if it were the most accomplish'd *Body* in the *World*. In the mean time I must desire the *Reader* to take Notice of the *Intolerable Absurdity* of this *Author's* affirming a *Man* to be united to a *Body*, and that *his own Body* too: For, at this rate, the *Man* must be one *Term* of the *Union*, and his *Body* the other. But still he goes boldly on, and tells us, p. 51. l. 2, 3. *That the Soul is the Person, and the Body only the Instrument or Organ of it.* In answer to which, I must tell him, *That not the Soul, but the whole Compositum is the Person*, and that the *Body* is not the *Instrument* of the *Soul*, as of the *Principal Agent*, but of the whole *Compositum*; and, moreover, that the *Soul* is as much the *Instrument* of the said *Compositum*, as the *Body* is or can be: and lastly, *That Both of them are such Instruments, as are also Vital, Essential Parts of the Compound, or Person*; which makes them of a quite different Kind from *Instruments* commonly so called, which are dis-joined from the *Agent* that employs them. But he has not done yet, but tells us; *That our Bodies can be no part of our Personality, because they are in continual Flux, so that we are no more the same for a Month, or a Year, than a River is, whose Waters perpetually flow, and change their place; and yet we feel our selves to be the same Persons still, and consequently that the Personality rests wholly in the Soul*, p. 51. l. 10. To which I answer, by denying positively, *That there is such a Total Change and Flux of our Bodies, as of the Waters of a River*;

River; but that on the contrary the principal parts of the Body remain the same from first to last; only with a due *Accretion of matter*, till they come to their just Magnitude and Proportion; after which there is little or no Efflux from them at all: and let this Man of Novelty instead of Philosophy, prove it otherwise, if he can. But he is now falling to his old Trade of proving his point by *Impossible Suppositions*, and it is a mercy, that he does not plague his Reader with the Nonsense of Another *living Image*. For suppose (says he) p. 51: l. 19. *it were possible, That the Souls of John and Peter should change Bodies, &c.* I would ask the Animadverter, if he thinks that such a Change of Bodies would make any Change of their Persons? But before I answer this most wise question, I hope, that I also may have the Privilege to propound another. Suppose then, say I, that Socrates and Xantippe should change Bodies too, What would be the Effect and Consequence of such a Change? Why it would be this, First, That the Soul of Socrates vitally joined with a Female Body, would certainly make a Woman; and yet, according to this Author's Principle, (affirming, that it is the Soul, and the Soul only, which makes the Person) Socrates, with such a Change of Body, would continue the same Person, and consequently the same Socrates still; and in like manner for Xantippe; the Conjunction of her Soul, with a Body of another Sex, would certainly make the whole Compound a Man, and yet nevertheless Xantippe would continue the same Person, and the same Xantippe still; save only, I confess, that upon such an Exchange of Bodies with her Husband Socrates, she would have more right to wear the Breeches than she had before. So that this may pass for ano-

ther of his *Edpings*'s. But to leave this Man of *Questions* and *Suppositions* to his Trifling, and his Trifling to him (since they are not to be parted) I do here, in Answer to his Question, tell him in plain Terms, That if *Peter* and *John* should shift Bodies, it would make two other Numerically distinct Persons from both of them. For the Persons of *Peter* and *John* would be first dissolved, and then two new Essential Compositions, with a new *Essential* Compounding *Part* in each of them, would certainly make two New *Compositums*. But this is such Idle, Ridiculous Trash, that I am ashamed to Answer it, though he is not ashamed to write it, and value himself upon it.

In the next place, he proceeds to prove the *Personality* of the Soul in a State of Separation; and indeed, if it could have been proved to be a Person while it is united to the Body, I will readily grant it to be so after its disjunction from it. But on the contrary, if it were ever United to the Body, as an *Essential part* of the whole Compound; I positively affirm, that no disunion of it from the Body, can ever after make that which had been an *Essential part*, to become a *Suppositum*, nor consequently a *Person*. This is what I Assert; And accordingly the Animadverter's design in this dispute was to confute his Adversary's Assertion of the Personality of the Soul thus considered, by Arguing against it *ab Absurdo*, and shewing, what Paradoxes unavoidably issued from it, and therefore that it must needs be *False*, since if it were *True*, nothing but *Truth* could follow from it. And here, one of the Animadverter's Arguments proceeded thus; If the Soul in such a state be a Person, then it is either the same Person which the Man himself was, while he was living,
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and in the Body, or it is another Person, &c. To which this Author (shrewdly no doubt) replies, *Pray what is this Person (says He) which He calls the Man Himself which Lives in the Body, I hope it is not the Body which Lives in the Body, and then I know no Man nor Person that Lives in the Body, but only the Soul, p. 52. l. 20.* Thus He. But does this weak Man think that this Expression of a *Man's being in the Body* imports his being locally or properly in it, as a Thing is kept in a Case, or shut up in a Bag? I must tell Him, that to say [*A Man is in the Body, or Personally in a Body*] is a form or way of speaking, which has obtained in the World, and signifies no more than that He is in a *Bodily state* or condition. And will His *Ignorance* then Exact the Popular use of a Word or Phrase, according to the strictness of its literal signification? Do we not commonly say, That a Man is *in a Passion, in Love, in a Rage, or in Drink*, and yet in Truth, and in strictness of Speech, all these Things are in the Man, and not the Man in them? and much after the like manner, when we say *a Man is in the Body*, the True sence of it is, that the Body is in the Man, as the *part* properly is and must be in the *whole*. And as for that Expression in *St. Paul, I knew a Man in Christ fourteen Years ago, whether in the Body I cannot tell, or whether out of the Body, God knoweth, such an one caught up to the Third Heaven, &c.* Which He alleges to prove, that the Soul of *St. Paul* out of the Body, was the Person of *St. Paul*; This does not prove it at all; for his Soul might be caught up into Heaven without the Body, and Hear all this without being a Person, as well as the Souls of just Men do, which go to Heaven, and there have such like discoveries made to them, but yet are not Persons

sons for all that ; nor can this Author prove that they are. But the True meaning of the forementioned words is no more than this ; That St. Paul could not certainly tell , whether the discovery of these Wonderful Things was made to Him by the Ministry of his Bodily Senses , or whether the Revelation of them was made immediately to his Mind , without being conveyed to it through his Senses. And as this , I conceive , is all that can be gathered from hence , so is it far enough from proving , that either his Soul was then separated from his Body , or , if it were , that it was properly a *Person* during that *Separation*. But see how he disputes further upon this matter. *Does the Man* (says He) *and his Person dye ? then the Man is not Immortal ; and if the Man and his Person lives , then the Soul is the Man , and the Person , and the very same Person out of the Body , that it was in it*, p. 52. l. 29. All which as it is a Notorious Paradox , so the proof of it is no more than one pitiful Branch of the fallacy called *Ignoratio Elenchi*, which supposes a contradiction between Propositions where there is none , by pretending to argue *de eodem* , when it does not. For certain it is , That the whole Person of the Man truly and properly *dies* , as *Death* , in the proper and received Sence of the word , imports a *dissolution* , or *separation* of the Essential parts of the Person : And yet as certain also it is , That the same Person is Immortal , and *never dies* , as *Death* imports an utter destruction of the said parts. Both which Propositions are certainly and confessedly true , but in their different Sences. Where , for this Man's further Instruction , I must tell him also , That whatsoever immediately affects , or belongs to any part of the Person (especially

(especially an Essential Part) does properly and ultimately denominate the whole person; forasmuch as all Denomination rests in the *Suppositum*. Thus *Moses* (which name certainly expresses the *Person* of *Moses*) is said to have died, and been buried, *Deut.* 34. 5, 6. though it was his Body only that descended into the Grave: And the same *Moses* again is represented as living and discoursing with our Saviour, *Luke* 9. 30. at which time it is certain also, that it was only the Soul of *Moses*, that could do this. From whence I argue, that if this Man will infer the Soul of *Moses* to have been the Person of *Moses*, because he finds That, which could immediately belong only to his Soul, attributed to his whole Person, it will follow, that he may with the same Reason affirm the Body of *Moses* to have been the Person of *Moses* likewise, since that which did and could belong only to his Body, we find equally attributed to his whole Person too. This is plain consequence, and expressed in proper Terms, whether this Man understands them or no. But he goes on, and argues most invincibly thus; *If the Personality be not compounded of Soul and Body, the Soul may be the whole and same Person in the Body, and out of it,* p. 53. l. 14. Now in the name of Sense and Logick: what a Consequence is this, That because *Personality* is not compounded of Soul and Body, therefore the Person is not compounded so neither, and consequently, that the Soul may be the whole Person? For will he conclude the same of the Concrete, which he does of the Abstract? I have told him before, and tell him here again, That *Personality* being an Abstract Form has neither parts nor composition properly and Physically belonging to it; but only by Connotation, as it essentially,

essentially *connotes* and *implies* both these in its *Concrete*, which is here the *Humane Person*; and consequently, since the Soul can neither have *parts* nor *composition* in it, it is impossible that it should be that Person. I protest I am ashamed to dispute any more against such gross Absurdities; but it is my ill fate to be forced to follow this Blunderer through thick and thin.

But he is now for trying how he can fence against the Absurdities charged upon his Assertion of the *Personality* of the Soul in its Separation from the Body. For the Animadverter having proved, That if the Soul in that condition was a Person, it was essentially another Person from what the Man himself was when he was alive (forasmuch as a compound Person, and a simple uncompounded one, can never be the same) he inferred from hence, *That it would be one Person who lives well or ill in this World, viz. The Man himself while he was personally in the Body, and another Person who passes out of the Body into Heaven or Hell, there to be rewarded or punished (at least till the Resurrection) for what, that other Person had done well or ill here upon Earth.* And what does he answer to this? Why in the first place he repeats the same Cavil, that he used before, and tells us, *That to say that a Man is personally in the Body, if the Person of the Man consists of Body and Soul, is downright Nonsense, p. 53. l. 28.* To which I reply as I did before; That if it be *Nonsense*, it is such as the whole World commonly speaks, and (as I have already shewn) such as signifies no more than a Man's being personally in a Corporeal, or *Bodyly Estate*; and let this Man of Confidence instead of Sense shew, either that all Mankind speaks in this Absurdly, or intends any other thing by it than what I have

have said. But whereas he speaks of the *Personal Presence of the Man in the Body and the Absurdity of it*, p. 53. l. 1. It is purely his own Expression: for the Animadverter neither uses it, nor has any Thing to do with it. For though he speaks of [*a Man's being in the Body, and personally in the Body*] because it is a way of speaking commonly used, and thereby Authorized, yet he finds no such Expression used as [*a Man's Personal Presence in the Body, or his being personally present in the Body*] and therefore he neither speaks so, nor is responsible for such a way of Speech, whether it be defensible or no. So that this Man may take his *personal presence* (as he calls it) back again to himself, for it is a contemptible thing, and none, that I know of, regard it. But in the next place he pretends to return the charge of the same, or the like Absurdity upon the Animadverter himself, thus: *If (says he) the Man be a Person, and the Soul no Person, then the Person sins, and that which is no Person suffers. And, if a Man be a whole Person, and the Soul only a part of the Person, then the whole sins, and a part suffers for the whole. And let him choose (says he) which is most agreeable to the Principles of Reason and Divinity*, p. 54. l. 21. To which I answer first, That though a *Part* suffers for what it did in the *whole*, yet it does not suffer for the *whole*. And secondly, That for a *Part* which bore its share in the Sin, while it was joined with the *Body*, to bear its proportion of the Punishment while it is disjoined from it, carries with it nothing incongruous either to the Principles of Reason or Divinity. If indeed the *Soul* in its separation from the *Body* should suffer the whole punishment due for the sins of the whole Person, the Case would be very different. But

I hope this Author (as Confident and Heterodox as he is) will not affirm, that the Soul in its separate Estate bears the whole punishment due to the Sinner; or that God inflicts it, till the Soul and Body meet, and are reunited together at the Resurrection. But that one Person should suffer for what was done by another Person, I am sure is not resolvable into the stated Course, or Rule of God's dispensing Rewards, and Punishments.

But he now lays about him at an higher rate: *Does this profound Philosopher (says He) think indeed that the Body either sins or suffers?* p. 54. l. 24. My reply to which shall be neither by an Absolute affirmation or negation, but by Distinction. And here, that must be repeated and applyed which was mentioned before, *viz.* that we must distinguish between the Principal and Proper Agent, or the *Principium Quod*, and between the Instrumental Principle, or *Principium Quo*, by which that Agent is properly said to Act; Likewise between the *Subiectum Quod*, which is also called the Ultimate Subject, and the subject of Denomination, and between the *Subiectum Quo*, or *Subiectum proximum*, which is the immediate subject of Inhesion. Accordingly I answer, That, as from the *Principium Quod*, or Prime Agent, the sinful Act proceeds from the whole Person or *Suppositum*; but as from the immediate Producing Principle, or *Principium Quo*, the said Act proceeds from the Soul. In like manner, as the *Subiectum Quod*, or Ultimate Subject of denomination, the whole Man or Person suffers; but as the *Subiectum Quo*, or immediate Recipient of the Impression, it is the Body that suffers: So that by Reason of this Subordination of the *Principium*

piam Quo; to the *Principium Quod*, and the *Subiectum Quo* to the *Subiectum Quod*, the Soul is not properly denominated the Sinner, but the whole person who sins in and by his Soul; nor the Body the Sufferer, but the whole Man who suffers in and through both his Body and Soul too. And this is the true Answer to this his silly Objection, and to that other too, *viz. That Vice and Vertue are seated only in the Soul*, p. 54. l. 3c. For we affirm them to be seated only in the Soul as in the *Subiectum Quo*, or immediate subject of Inhesion, but in the whole Person as the Ultimate and Proper Subject of Denomination. By which it is manifest, that this Author's Ignorance of these Terms, or his inability to apply them, has betrayed him into all these wretched Paradoxes about the *Personality* of the Soul. But whereas in the next place he says, *That as the Body may be made the Instrument of Vertue or Vice, so it may be the instrument of Rewards or Punishments*, p. 54. l. 27. Could there well be a grosser Blunder than to call that the *Instrument* of Rewards and Punishments, which is properly the *subject* of them? For an *Instrument* is properly an inferior sort of efficient cause, acting in the vertue and strength of the Principal; but a *Subject* is not so. And the Principal Cause of Rewards and Punishments is God himself; and if there be any Instrument or Instrumental Cause of the same, it is properly that *by which*, and not that *upon which* he bestows the One and inflicts the Other.

The next Thing he carps at is the Animadverter's way of concluding his Argument. *It is worth observing* (says he) p. 55. l. 1. *how notably he winds up his Argument* (and possibly the Animadverter may not be quite so well skilled in the Art of winding, as this Man

is in that of *turning*.) Nevertheless, as he lays it before us, so let us consider it. *If it be intolerably Absurd (as no doubt it is) said the Animadverter, That the Soul in the other World should not be responsible for what the Man himself in Person had done in this, &c.* To this replies our Author, *What then? One would then expect the Conclusion should be, That the Soul is the Man himself in Person, p. 55. l. 5.* No; stay a little, good Sir, you are not to form the Animadverter's Argument for him (for fear you should cast it into a Syllogism consisting only of Two Terms as you have done for the *Socinians*, p. 82.) but if the Animadverter had designed to give the Principal Inference from the Thing it self there spoken of, the Consequence of the forementioned Hypothetick should have been this, *Then it is equally absurd to affirm the Soul in the other World to be another Numerically distinct Person from what the Man himself had been in This.* This, Sir, would and should have then been the Consequence. But since the Animadverter had sufficiently shewn this before; and moreover, since this Author had so often and so insolently exploded all the Terms used by the Ancients in their Discourses, about the *Trinity*, as good for nothing but to confound Men's Notions of it, he thought fit by way of over-plus to his Argument, to return the Reproach upon him, by shewing that he treated of Things in such false and such misapplied Terms, that they must of Necessity throw all Discourse and reasoning about them into Paradox and Confusion. In a word, the Animadverter had no intent here to shew the immediate Logical Consequence of the Thing laid down in that Hypothetick Proposition; as being evident to the first apprehensions of all Mankind, and having
withal

withal been effectually proved by what went before, viz. *That one Person could, not be responsible for what had been done by another*; But his sole Purpose was to shew by the present Instance the Intolerable Inconvenience of this Man's way of discoursing of Things in words quite contrary to the sence which the whole World took them in. For surely none before him (if he had but one grain of Philosophy) ever affirmed *The Soul to be the Person of the Man*. And therefore whereas he represents the Animadverter in this matter like one who runs out at the back door to avoid paying the Reckoning: Let him not fear it; for I assure him that he shall be effectually reckon'd with, before I have done with him, and Paid home too. In the mean time I would not have him despise Back doors too much, considering what singular use they have been of, in Conventicles, and possibly may be again.

But the Animadverter had argued further against him upon the same subject, thus. *That the Soul's thus changing its state forwards and backwards, from one manner of subsistence to another, looks very odd and unnatural. As that from an Incomplete state in the Body, it should pass to a Personal and Complete State out of the Body (which state is yet preternatural to it) and then fall back into an incomplete state again by its reunion to the body at the Resurrection*; (which yet, one would think, should rather improve our Principal Parts in all respects, not merely relating to the Animal Life; as the bare subsistence of them, I am sure, does not.) These things, I say, seem very uncouth and improbable, and such as ought not, without manifest necessity, to be allowed of: which here does not appear; since all this Inconvenience may be avoided, by holding, *That the Soul continues but a Part of the whole Person and no more in all its conditions*, Animadv. p. 77. And

now, what has this Defender here to except against? Why; as if he were upon a Tryal of skill in Ribaldry, or railing Prizes with his old Parishioners of *Billing-gate*; He says, *It is all mere Gypfy Cant* (For it seems, none but *Conventicle-Cant* will down with Him) p. 46. l. 13. But for that, by his favour, the Animadverter will be judged by Philosophers and Divines, and not by him who is neither. All that the Animadverter thinks fit to say at present is this. That to subsist as a *Part* is an *incomplete state*; and to subsist as a *Person* (which this Author holds the Soul to be out of the Body) is a *complete state*. Again, that for the Soul to subsist *in the body* is a state *Natural* to it, and to subsist out of the Body is *Preternatural*. And accordingly the Animadverter affirms, That to make the Soul first subsist as a *part*, viz. while it is in the Body, and then as a *Person* in its separation from the Body; and then lastly, as a *Part* again in its Reunion to the Body, at the Resurrection, is absurd and Preposterous. And if this Man of scorn cannot understand this, I shall not concern my self to instruct him. Only I think fit to state the sense of the word *Natural*, as it is used by the Animadverter. Now it may be taken either in a strict and proper sense, Only for that which is done by a Natural Agent or Principle, according to the stated ordinary course and measure of Nature; Or secondly, it may be taken in a large and less proper sense for that which *agrees and suits with Nature*, and any way improves or advances it by adding to it some accidental or extra-essential perfection. And this sense the Animadverter here does not use the word [*Natural*] in, but speaks of it only in its first, proper, and Philosophical sense; which quite blows off all this Man's Cobweb Arguments and Objections taken from those

Advantages.

Advantages of *Grace, Happiness and Glory*, which may attend the Soul after its dislodgment from the Body. So that when he flourishes with these vaunting Questions, p. 59. l. 15. *Is not the Perfection of our Graces the perfection of humane Nature?* I answer, Yes; The *Accidental* perfection of our Nature it is, but not the *Essential*. And again, *Is not the Perfection of Nature a Natural Perfection?* I answer, Not always; but only when it is wrought by a Natural Principle, and that in a Natural way. For God is to be considered both as *Author Natura*, and as *Author Gratia*; And Divines always look upon these considerations of him as so very different, that what God is said to do under one of the said Capacities, he is reckoned not to do under the other. What he does as *Author Natura*, is properly *Natural*, and what he does as *Author Gratia*, is supernatural. And if this Author will abide by this Assertion, *That whatsoever perfects Nature is a Natural Perfection*, then Grace and Glory are and must be *natural Perfections*, and God never bestows any thing *supernatural* upon the Souls of Men, either in this World, or the next. Which would be a blessed assertion indeed, but much fitter to proceed from an arrant Heathen, or an Atheist, than a Dignitary of the Church of *England*. In the mean time, I do again affirm to this Man, That all the Gifts of Grace and Glory that God bestows upon the Soul in its state of separation from the Body, make it not a *Person*, nor any other than an *Incompletely subsisting Being* still. For being essentially but a *Part* (whether in the Body, or out of the Body) it is essentially *incomplete*, and consequently must be so for ever. And this assertion the Animadverter has considered too well to be either
shamed.

shamed or huffed out of it. But to pass from the *Incomplete* Subsistence of the Soul to the *Naturalness*, or *Praternaturalness* of its Estate, which quite differ from the former; Those words of this Author, p. 55. l. 28. for the boldness and absurdity of them are very Remarkable. *How* (says He) *does the Soul's subsisting in the Body, or out of the Body, change the Soul's manner of subsisting any more than the Body changes its manner of subsisting when it is naked and when clothed?* A very learned Question indeed, as most of his are. To which I answer. That though the Soul, as to its *Incomplete state*, changes not its manner of Subsisting, as being always but a *part* and no more in any Condition, yet as to the *Naturalness* or *Praternaturalness* of its state it does change the manner of its Subsistence, and greatly too. And would any Man living, but himself, affirm it to be as natural for the Soul to subsist in the Body, or out of the Body, as it is for the Body to be clothed or unclothed, when the Body is vitally united to the Soul, and in the very Nature of it designed to concur with the Soul, as an essential part towards the constitution of the whole Man, whereas his Cloaths are neither united to, nor part of, nor any way essential to his Body? What Senseless Paradoxes are these? But he tells us in the last line but one, *That the Soul owes not its subsistence to the Body.* And what though it does not? it owes the *Natural manner of its subsisting* to its being in the Body, for all that. And as for his saying in the next line, *That the Soul can neither subsist more nor less in or out of the Body, and that he knows no degrees of Subsistence in the Soul.* All this is meer Impertinence, since none affirms the contrary; For *Natural*

natural and Preternatural import not here different degrees, but different sorts or conditions of Subsistence, and are founded upon different states of the Soul, viz. Its conjunction with, or its disjunction from the Body. But he goes on and tells us, p. 36. l. 30. That the Souls of good Men out of the Body are more happy than in the Body, and therefore not in a Preternatural state, which can never be a more happy state. Which is no more than a fallacy of the Accident. Forasmuch as it is perfectly accidental to a Natural or Preternatural State, that either of them are Happy or not Happy. For if the Soul be out of the Body, let it be never so happy upon other Accounts, it is still out of that estate which it was Naturally designed to, and therefore in a state Preternatural. But he adds, p. 37. l. 9. That the Natural progress of the Soul in this lapsed estate, is from a less perfect to a more perfect, and from thence to the most perfect state of the Soul. All which is true indeed of the moral perfection of the Soul, but not of the Natural; and proves, that it is the duty of the Soul, and very agreeable to the Nature of it, to make a progress in its moral accomplishments, but by no means necessary or essential to it to proceed from a less to a more perfect Natural state. For the Soul knows no Natural state but in its vital Union to a Natural Body: which from first to last is equally Perfect and the same.

But this Man is not to be stopped in his Heterodoxies. And therefore, whereas the Animadverter had all along asserted, That the Soul in a state of separation from the Body is but a part of the Person still, by reason of its essential Relation to the Compound. He here very insultingly as well as Ignorantly asks,

asks, *What is this compound, and where is this whole Man, which the Soul in its separate estate is related to?* p. 57. l. 27, & 30. To which I answer, That it is *that compound*, and *that whole Man* of which the Soul was once actually a Part, and of which it shall be a Part again at the Resurrection. But can it then be part of a Compound which is not actually in being? Yes, by an Essential Relation to it, it may be, and is so; though by an Actual Conjunction with the other part of it, it cannot. But to shew the captiousness of this Question, *Where is that Man, and where is that compound which the Soul, while separate, must relate to as a Part, since it is certain, that it can be no Part of the Body?* I say, to shew the silly Sophistry of this Question, Let us see it in this obvious Instance: Suppose a Fowl or Beast divided into its several parts, I now ask concerning each of these parts, where, and what That is, which it is a Part of? For it cannot be a Part of any of the other parts, nor yet (according to this Author) of the *whole Beast*, for that ceases, and there is no such Thing as an *whole Beast* after the supposed Division. Nevertheless it is certain, that it is still a Part, and relates to that Beast as a Part of it: From which it is evident, that it must be understood of the *whole Beast*, *that was*, though at present the *whole of it* be actually dissolved: And so in like manner the Soul in its state of Separation still retains the Relation of a Part to the whole Man, *viz.* the whole Man *that was*, though he does not now actually exist. So that all such Questions are merely Sophistical, and proceed *à sensu diviso ad sensum compositum*. But he has another Question to confound the Animadverter with, p. 57. l. 31. *Does he mean* (says He) *That*
it

it is essential to the Soul to live in an earthly Body? No, Sir, But he both means and says, That it is essential to the Soul *to relate* to the Body, as a Concurrent part naturally designed for the Constitution of the whole Man; and consequently, that it cannot live out of the Body, but still in the capacity of a *Part*. Which makes it essentially an *Incomplete Being*; as its being actually disjoined from the Body, puts it into a *Preternatural state* besides. Well, but the Animadverter says also, *That the Soul has a Natural Aptitude to live in the Body*. To which this Author replies, *So has it a Natural Aptitude to live out of the Body too*, p. 58. l. 15. But this, by his good leave, I deny; and affirm, that it has only a *non-Repugnancy* to live out of the Body; but a *Natural aptitude* which carries in it a positive Inclination or disposition to live out of it, it has not; but on the contrary, a very strong one, both to continue in the Body, and (as most judge) when separated from it to return to it. But, says our Author, *This no Man can know*, p. 58. l. 21. I answer, That the mighty aversion which the Soul has to part from the Body, is a sufficient proof of the former, and a Rational Presumption of the latter. But says He again, *Does not St. Paul desire to be absent from the Body, and present with the Lord?* p. 58. l. 26. I answer, That this desire does not prove the Absence of *St. Paul's Soul* from the Body a *more Natural state* to it, though it might upon a *supernatural Account*, (and by reason of that corruption *accidentally* adhering to a bodily estate,) be a more blessed one, and more desirable; as neither was this Desire it self a *Natural Desire*, but such an one as proceeded from a *Supernatural Principle of Grace*; as is evident from hence, that where there is one, who

(with *St. Paul*) desires this, there are Millions who desire the quite contrary: which questionless is a surer Indication of the Bent and Tendency of Nature; than *St. Paul's* Particular *wish or desire* could be. But to give this Author an Instance which may shew him his Ignorance in the midst of his Confidence: Let us suppose a Diamond, or some other precious Stone placed in a King's Diadem, Certainly it could not be placed more gloriously: But for all that, I ask His Profoundness, whether this Diamond has not a more *Natural place* in its proper *Centre* (as low as it is) than in the Royal Diadem? And for the proof of this, let it be but unfix'd from its place there, and then we shall see whether it would not fall from its former glorious situation, as low as possibly it could. So that this very instance duly apply'd, were there no other answer to his Impertinent Objections, would be sufficient. For Nature is one thing, and the Accidental State and condition of a Thing is quite another. But the Paradoxes vented by this Author upon this Subject are Innumerable.

And now after all that he has said, and that so confidently, and without any Reserve, he has the face to run counter to himself so far as to ask, p. 60. l. 6. *Whether he any where affirms the Soul, while united to the Body to be the whole Person?* To which I answer, That if the *Person* be the *whole Person* (as it is and must be) he has affirmed it over and over, and there is hardly a Page where he treats of this subject in which he does not affirm it, either expressly, or by evident and direct consequence. Particularly *Kind.* p. 268. l. 28. *The Soul* (says he) *is the Person*: and *Defence* p. 51. l. 2. *The Soul is the Person, and the Body only the Instrument.*

ment. And again, p. 60. l. 26. he affirms, *that the Soul, whether in the Body or out of the Body, is the same Person still; and that its separation from the Body makes no more change in the Person, than a Man's putting on or off his Cloaths does in the Man.* But if the Soul in the Body is not the whole Person, and out of the Body it is so, I hope that is a Change with a Witness: Nor does he only affirm it, while united to the Body to be the Person, but he also denies it to be any Part of the Person, p. 61. l. 3. and the Body likewise to be any Part of the Person, p. 60. l. 23. And surely if the Soul be so the Person, as neither to be part of the Person it self, nor yet admit the Body to be any part of it, then by immediate and irresistible Consequence, *The Soul* (according to this Man) is and must be (even when united to the Body) the whole Person. Add to this, that he affirms the Soul thus united to be the only Seat of Personality, p. 60. l. 7. And if this Man will deny that to be the whole Person, in which the whole Personality is, he is rather to be exploded than disputed with.

But most remarkable are those wretched Assertions of his, by which he directly, and inevitably makes the constitution of every Man living to consist in an *Hypostatick Union* and Incarnation. For the proving of which, I shall first give this Account of an *Hypostatick Union*, viz. That it is that whereby a Person, or completely subsisting Intelligent Being assumes another Being or Nature into the Unity of its own Subsistence; so that by virtue thereof the Person assuming, and the Nature assumed, are both but one Person, yet so, that the Nature assumed is not Part of the said Person. This I affirm to be an *Hypostatick Union*, and

I gather it both from what Scripture, and Reason discoursing upon Scripture, teaches us concerning the Oeconomy of Christ's Person, which (according to the Unanimous Judgment of all Divines hitherto) is the only Instance of an *Hypostatick Union* in the World.

But now let us see what a Parallel this Heady Venturous Man (to say no worse) makes between this, and the Union of an humane Soul and Body in these following Propositions.

The Eternal *Logos* is a Person.

The Eternal *Logos* assumes the humane Nature into the Unity of the same Person.

The Eternal *Logos* is vitally united to the humane Nature assumed by it.

The Eternal *Logos* and the humane Nature thus assumed by it, and united to it, are but one and the same Person.

The Eternal *Logos* and the humane Nature assumed by it, are so *One* Person, that the Nature assumed is no part of the said Person.

The Humane Soul is a Person.

The Humane Soul receives the Body into the Unity of the same Person, p. 60. l. 22.

The Humane Soul, as a Person, is vitally United to the Body, p. 60. l. 21.

The Body being United to the Soul (which is the Person) becomes together with the Soul, one and the same Person, p. 60. l. 19.

The Soul and the Body United to the Soul, as to the Person, so become one Person, that the Body is yet no part of the Person, p. 60. l. 23.

I know there are some disparities (as to Finite and Infinite, Eternal and not Eternal, &c.) between the respective Subjects of the Union here represented, but as to the Union it self, and the Kind of it, I freely refer it to the Learned Reader to judge, whether those Conditions which Divines peculiarly assign and ascribe to that *Supernatural Hypostatick Union*, be not here ascribed, by this Author, to the Natural Union between Soul and Body. And indeed what other Kind of Union can it be? For the constitution of an human Person, must be either by such an Union as this, or by an Essential concurrence of Parts compounding it. But this (though maintained by all the World besides) this Author utterly explodes as absurd, p. 48. l. 10. And the truth is, if neither the Soul be a part of the Person, nor the Body be a part of the Person (as he denies both of them to be) how can the Person be Such by an Essential composition, where there are no Essential Parts to make the Composition? Or what can be the Essential Parts, if the Body and Soul are not so? Nay, and as a further proof of what he holds in this matter, in the 268, 269, 270, 271, pages of his *Vindication*, he explains the Union between the second Person of the *Trinity* and the humane Nature, and the Union between an humane Soul and Body, by one Another; and that in many more particulars than that mentioned in the *Athanasian Creed*.

But in the next place, touching the *Incarnation* of the Soul in the Body (which I likewise charge this Author's Opinion with, as the direct result of it) besides, that it must necessarily follow from such an *Hypostatick Union* of the Soul with the Body, as has been described, he himself (to give him his due) in plain and express Terms, owns so much by telling us, *That the Soul*

Soul is an Embodied Person, p. 66. l. 26. and that is manifestly only another word for an *Incaruate Person*: For the Eternal *Logos*, I am sure, may be truly said to be an *Embodied Person*, by his Incarnation. So that the Parallel we see still holds.

From all which new *Cartesian* Divinity therefore it does and must follow; That so many Men as there are in the World, so many *Hypostatick Unions* and *Incaruations* there are also; and that a Man is properly constituted a Man by an *Hypostatick Union* of the Soul with the Body, and by an *Embodiment* or *Incaruation* of it in the Body. So that hereafter, if any one would express or define an humane Person properly and exactly, he must not say, That it is an Intelligent Being compounded of Soul and Body, and completely subsisting (for that is the Gibberish of the Schools) but he must say, That an humane Person is a *Soul Incarnate*. For our Oracle has declared it so, and therefore in that we ought to rest. And now has not this Author, think we, shewn himself an *Ευρηκα*-Man indeed? For was there ever a more glorious *Ευρηκα*, either in Philosophy or Theology than this of a new *Hypostatick Union* and *Incaruation*? Which having been so happily discovered, and so authentically vouched, possibly when the Alterers of our Liturgy shall fall to work again, to alter what they cannot mend, it may be brought into our *Creed* too.

But after all, there are Three Questions proposed in the *Animadversions*, p. 83, 84. mentioned indeed here, but not replied to. And since they are not, I do here Challenge this Author to answer them; and I do it with more Scorn and Triumph, than the *Animadverter* (as he pretends) at first propounded them. The design

design of which Questions was to shew, that according to this Author's Assertions, *The Soul in every Man and the Man himself, are and must be Two distinct Persons*, and they have shewn it with that force and clearness, that they stand not only unanswered, but against him unanswerable. And therefore to direct his laughter to its Right object, I leave him and his Friend (some old *Conventicler*, I suppose) to laugh at one another; and to take notice withal, That nothing in Nature is more to be laughed at, than he who laughs at an Argument because he cannot answer it.

I have now examined this Man's discourse about the *Personality* of the Soul, and must profess, that I never met with so many vile Heterodoxies in so small a compass before. And what offence they will give to the Pious and Orthodox, and what advantage to Hereticks and Atheists, I doubt not but the complaints of one, and the scoffs of the other, will in a short time declare. At present I shall only venture to say thus much, that if this Audacious Innovator and Abuser of our Excellent Religion, shall after all these scandalous Paradoxes escape the *censure* of the Church, the Church must not expect to escape the *censure* of the World. In the mean time I know no security that our Religion has against such Invaders and Invasions but this; That though they get Ten thousand *Impri-matur's* to introduce their New Christianity amongst us, yet (thanks be to God) there is no such Thing as *Licensing Heresy* into Truth, or *Nonsense* into Sense.

And so I now pass from hence to his pretended Answer to some part of the fourth Chapter of the *Animadversions*. But before I enter upon it; it may be pleasant

pleasant to observe how at the Close of the preceding Dispute, he begs his *Friend's Pardon* for his long Excursion upon this Subject, p. 61. l. 14. whereas before, at his Entrance upon the same, he had declared, *That he would only make some short Reflections upon it*, p. 44. l. 26. And now, how short Reflections can pass for a long Excursion, or a long Excursion be truly called short Reflections, I must confess I do not understand. But catch this Man out of a Self-Contradiction, and you may as well expect to catch him out of himself.

But let us see what he says to the *Animadverter's* Fourth Chapter: Why, he says, *That it is an Answer to it self*, (though, I hope, not in this Author's way, by contradicting it self): but how does this appear? Why, because (as he tells us) *it undertakes to prove, That Self-Consciousness is not the Formal Reason of Personality in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity. Nor* (says he) *does the Dean say it is. No? Does he not say it? when it has been proved over and over to his Face from his own Words, That he positively affirms Self-Consciousness to be That, wherein their Personal Unity, and Distinction from all others does essentially consist, Vindic. pag. 74. And to be That which makes* (I say makes) *Each of the Divine Persons to be One in himself, and Distinct from all others, pag. 68. Vind. And having affirmed the Three Divine Persons to be Three Spirits, does he not say, That the Self-Unity of a Spirit can be nothing else but Self-Consciousness? Vindic. pag. 48. Again, Does he not affirm, That the Nature of a Spirit consists in an Internal Self-Sensation, which he uses only as another Word for Self-Consciousness? Defensæ, p. 7. Nay, and does he*

he not repeat the same in several places of both his Books, as we have from several passages, cited out of them, before demonstrated? And now, what, I pray, does the Animadverter, or any one else pretend the *formal Reason* of a Thing to be but that which *makes* it originally and essentially one with it self, and distinct from all other Things; or (in other Terms) that wherein the said Unity and distinction does consist? Well: but having thus seen what this Author has unsaid, let us see what it is that he does say: Why he tells us, *That the Question is only this, Whether Three Self-Consciousnesses do not prove Three Persons, each of which is Self-Conscious, to be really distinct from one Another?* p. 61. 128. In answer to which, I do earnestly desire the observing Reader to note, First, how shamelessly he falsifies in this matter, contradicting his own most positive and frequently repeated Assertions; and then how utterly he changes the whole question. For the Question has been all along (as appears from what has been so faithfully quoted and set down) *Not, what proves the Divine Persons to be thus distinct, but what makes them so.* And will this Man say, *That the proving* of a Thing to be thus and thus, and *the making* it to be so, are the same? And besides, supposing that *Self-Consciousness* may prove the Divine Persons distinct, yet it can prove them so onely as a consequent *Note* or *Sign*, not as the original *Cause* or *Reason* of that Distinction; or as an *effect* proves its *cause*, not as a *cause* proves its *effect*. For the Person is originally distinguished by its *personal Subsistence*, which Subsistence is not owing to any Act or Principle of *Self-Consciousness*, as shall be fully proved against him in the Vindication of the fourth Argument. In the

mean time I do here refer it to every Man of sense to judge, whether by this utter change of the Question this Author does not plainly give up the whole Thing here in dispute between him and his Adversary. And accordingly we shall see how by the help of this and the like wretched evasions, he endeavors to sink away from the Animadverter's

Arg. 1.

First Argument, which is this, *No personal Act can be the formal Reason of Personality in the Person whose Act it is. But Self-Consciousness is a Personal Act, and therefore cannot be the formal Reason of Personality.* This is the Argument, and what is the Defender's, or rather the Dean's Answer to it? Why he tells us, *That neither did he consider Self-Consciousness as a Personal Act, nor assign it as the formal Reason of Personality.* To the first of which I answer, that it is as manifest and barefaced a falsehood as any that he has uttered; and that if *Knowledge, Self-Conscious feeling, or sensation be Acts, and Things are to be understood by words, then Self-Consciousness, which he has constantly expressed by the forementioned words, is as truly, really, and properly an Act, and nothing else, as Knowledge, feeling or sensation are, or can be said to be Acts.* And as for the other part of his Answer, *viz. That he did not assign Self-Consciousness for the Formal Reason of Personality;* We have superabundantly proved, that he has plainly and fully asserted the thing, and we must pardon the poor Untaught Man, for being Ignorant of the word. Nevertheless he adds, *That if we consider Self-Consciousness as a Personal Act, though it cannot make the Person, yet it distinguishes one Person from another.* p. 62. l. 21. To which I answer, That nothing but that which makes the Person can originally distinguish the Person,

Person, and consequently that *Self-Consciousness* distinguishes one Person from another only by a *secondary* or *consequent* Distinction, and for that Reason can no more originally *distinguish* than it can *make* the Person. As for instance, a Man's Bodily Stature and Dimensions, with a Concurrence of all other Accidents belonging to him, do really distinguish him from other Men: but for all that, they do not *originally distinguish him*; for it is only his individual Numerical Nature which does, or can do that. But it is worth observing, how this Ignorant Man pursues his point, *viz.* that *Self-Consciousness* is that which gives personal Unity and distinction: For (says he) *by this actual Self-Consciousness every Person feels himself to be himself, and not to be another, p. 62. l. 23.* And is not this, think we, a Demonstration? Yes, no doubt it is so of the Ignorance of him, who thinks that it can prove any Thing else but the Weakness of Him who uses it. For I appeal to the whole World to judge, what a Consequence this is, *viz.* That because every Person feels himself by *Self-Consciousness* to be himself, and not to be another, therefore this *Self-Consciousness* is that which distinguishes him from all others. For can a Person's perceiving his own Distinction, properly make, or give him this Distinction? Upon the whole matter I must declare, that I cannot think any one, who looks upon this as serious Arguing, worth arguing against. And whereas he says, that this *first Argument* of the Animadverter *has been sufficiently exposed already*, I shall securely venture it upon the Bottom upon which it stands, without any fear of its being *exposed* any more than *answered*, especially by one who never yet exposed any Thing or Person but himself. And so I pass to the Animadverter's

Arg. 2.

Second Argument, Which proceeds thus. Nothing in the Nature of it absolute and irrelative, can be the Formal Reason of Personality in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. But Self-Consciousness is a Thing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative, and therefore it cannot be the Reason of Personality in any of the said Persons.

In reply to which Argument, thus fairly, formally, and Syllogistically proposed, why does not this Author (as in all Regular Disputations it ought, and uses to be done) apply an answer, either by denying one of the Two Propositions, or by distinguishing one or more of the Terms? but this not being to be done without Logick, our Author must be so far excused. And therefore he very prudently wraps himself up in such a Cloud of Insignificant words, as may enable him to escape his Adversary without encountering him.

For one of these two things he must of Necessity disprove, *viz.* Either first, That the Divine Persons and Personalities are perfectly and wholly Relative. Or Secondly, That *Self-Consciousness* is a Thing wholly absolute and Irrelative. As to the first of which he himself elsewhere acknowledges and affirms; *That the Three Divine Persons are Three Relative Subsistends.*

And let me tell him further, That they are so entirely Relative, that their very *Subsistence* is *Referring*, and their *Referring* not only consequent upon, and super-venient to their *Subsistence* (as it is in Created Persons) but one and the same with it; so that by vertue thereof they are indifferently termed by all Schoolmen and Divines, either *Relative Subsistences*, or *Subsisting Relations*. The Concrete and the Abstract Terms in the

Divine

Divine Persons being, by reason of the peculiar condition of their Personality, as well as the Absolute Transcendent Simplicity of the Divine Nature, only different ways of expressing the same Thing. And therefore whereas this Author says, p. 63. l. 8. *Does that which makes John a Person make him a Father?* I answer, No; but affirm also, That, that which makes the first Person in the Trinity a Person makes him a Father, and convertibly, that that which makes him a Father, (and that only) makes him also a Person. And the Reason of the Difference here, is not, (as this Ignorant Man alleges) *because every humane Person has an Absolute Nature belonging to him as the subject of the Relation*; for each of the Divine Persons has an *Absolute Nature distinctly belonging to him* (though not a distinct Absolute Nature.) But the Difference lies in this. That an humane Person has not only an *Absolute Nature* to be the *Remote subject* of the Relation, but also an *Absolute Personality* as the *Immediate subject* of the same, by virtue whereof the Person of John continues after the *Relation of a Father* ceases. But in the Trinity every Person and Personality is wholly *Relative*, forasmuch as, the very Subsistence of each of them is so. So that the Eternal Father is and subsists as a Father by having a Son, and not by *knowing himself to be a Father*; and by Communicating his Essence to Another, not by an Act passed upon and wholly Terminated in his own Person. No; this is postulate to the former, as all other Personal Acts whatsoever, are and must be. And therefore the God-head or Divine Nature which is absolute, is not (as this Man precariously pretends) originally distinguished by Three Self-Consciousnesses, p. 63. l. 24. But by.

by Three *original Relative properties*, viz. the *Innascibility* and *Paternity* of the first Person, which make one Personal Property, and the Two distinct *Originations* of the other Two Persons, whereby they are both mutually distinguished from, and opposed to one Another, as all *Relatives* are. But this Man's offering here at an Explication of these Divine Relations, by that exploded Figment of a *Man* and *his living Image*, p. 63. l. 21. is an unsufferable Profaneness as well as an arrant *Petitio Principii*. For will he pretend to explain a Thing in it self obscure by another that is more obscure, and (which is worse) impossible besides? Let him for the future learn, that no Man who understands what arguing is, ought to bring that as a *medium*, either of Explication, or Probation, which he knows to be doubtful, or has just cause to suspect that his Adversary may reject as Absurd and Unreasonable.

But in the next place to shew, whether *Self-Consciousness* be a Thing in the Nature of it perfectly Absolute and Irrelative, and consequently unable to give such a Subsistence and Personality to the Three Divine Persons as shall be wholly Relative, There needs only a Repetition of what is said to this purpose in the *Animadversions*, and which this Author has very discreetly said not so much as one word to, viz. "That *Self-Consciousness* is a Thing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative, as being that Act, by which each Person intimately knows, and is conscious to himself of his own Being, Acts, Motions, and every Thing personally belonging to him; so that as such, it terminates within, and looks no further than that one Person, whom it is an entire survey and
"compre-

“comprehension of. And as it is an Absolute and Ir-
 “relative Term, so it may be conceived distinctly
 “and fully, without conceiving or implying the con-
 “ception of any Thing or Person besides. And now,
 “what *Relation* does, or can such an Act of *Self-Consci-*
 “*ousness* imply in it? It is indeed on the contrary a direct
 “contradiction to all that is *Relative*. For it encloses the
 “Person wholly within himself; neither pointing nor
 “looking further, nor referring to any one else, *Anim.*
 p. 99. All which is so very plain and full, that I defy this
 Author, or any Man alive to prove, either that this
 is not a True account of *Self-Consciousness*, as to the
 Absolute and *Irrelative* Nature of it, or if it be, that
 it can give a Subsistence purely *Relative* to the Person
 which it shall belong to.

But to make short work with this Man of words
 without Sense. There are in every Relation these
 Things to be considered. The *subject* of the Relation
 both Remote and Immediate, the *foundation* of the
 Relation, the *Correlate* or *Term* of the Relation; and
 lastly, the *Relation* it self. Accordingly to give an In-
 stance of this in the Paternal Relation of the First Per-
 son of the Blessed Trinity; The *Remote subject* of it
 is the Divine Nature, the *Immediate subject* is the Per-
 son of the Father, the *foundation* of it is that Eternal
 Act by which the Father communicates his Nature to
 the Son, and the *correlate* or *Term* of the Relation is
 the Son, and lastly, the *Relation* it self is that mutual
 respect (resulting from the forementioned Act) which
 the Father and the Son reciprocally bear to one Ano-
 ther. And here, I confess, that in the Divine Rela-
 tions there is a real Identity between the *subject*, the
foundation, and the *relation* it self, contrary to what it

is

is in Created Persons, in whom they are really distinguished. Upon the whole matter then, let this Man in the present Instance of the Eternal Person of the Father shew, that *Self-Consciousness* is either the *Subject*, the *foundation*, the *correlate* or *Term* of the Relation, or lastly, the *Relation it self*: And then let him make it the *formal Reason* of a *Relative Personality*, in that or in any other Person of the *Trinity*, if he can; And if he cannot, I think a little less Confidence, with a little more Knowledge, would do well.

But in the last place, quitting all that he had so *peremptorily* contended for before, He tells us in plain Terms, *p. 64. l. 5.* *That if each of the Divine Persons have a Self-Consciousness of its own, this distinguishes the Divine Persons, and proves them to be really Distinct; which is all that the Dean desires.* Now what Mr. Dean desires (more than what Deans generally do) I cannot tell, but what he has declared, is this, *viz.* *That Self-Consciousness makes each of the Divine Persons to be one in himself, and distinct from all others; and is that wherein the said Unity and Distinction properly and formally does consist.* And now, for *Self-Consciousness* to be the *Cause* and *Reason* of all this, and for it only to prove this, I must tell him in the Name of Sence and Logick are quite different things. And the first of them (as appears from the fore-alleged passages) he has asserted hitherto, and the latter he fallaciously sneaks into now. But to the same repeated assertion, I must still give the same Answer, *viz.* *That Self-Consciousness can distinguish the Divine Persons only by a Secondary Distinction, not by a Primary and Original; since nothing can originally distinguish (as I have shewn) but that which also Constitutes: For still Phi-*
 losophy

losophy will have one and the same Principle, both *Constitutive* and *Distinctive* too. So that this is manifestly and fairly another delivering up and quitting of the Point, which he had all along in his Vindication asserted and disputed for. For there he had asserted, that *Self-Consciousness* gave *Original Self-Unity and Distinction* to each of the Divine Persons, and here he declares himself content if we allow *Self-Consciousness* but to *prove the same*. Though we have told him, that this is wholly another Case: and it has been inculcated over and over; But (it seems) there is no forcing it into his Pate any more than pouring a *Portle* into a *Pint*. And so I proceed to examine what he says to the Animadverter's

Third Argument, which proceeds thus. *If Self-Con-* Arg. 3.
sciousness be the formal Reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons, then there is no Repugnancy in the Nature and Reason of the Thing it self, but that there might be three thousand Persons in the Deity as well as Three. Which consequence appears from this, That neither is there any Repugnancy that there might be so many *Self-Consciousnesses*, or *Self-Conscious Minds* or *Spirits* for the *Deity* to be communicated to, nor any repugnancy proved in the Nature of the *Deity* it self, that it should be so communicated. This is the sum of the Argument, and what is this Defender's Reply to it? Why he first tells us, *That had the Dean said, That Self-Consciousness [made] the Trinity, this had been a Notable Argument, p. 64. l. 14.* And will he grant This? Then I shall prove, That he did say it, and that as fully as words could express it in his *Vindication*, p. 68. l. 4. Where he has this Passage, *As the Self-Consciousness of every Person to it self [makes] them*
Y Three

Three distinct Persons, so the mutual Consciousness of all the Three Divine Persons makes them all but one Infinite God. Now I ask this Self-Contradictor first, whether any words can be more plain and expressive than these? And in the next place, whether they are not his own? If he doubts it, let him turn to the place alleged. And if they are his own, then I hope, That, that which [makes] the Divine Persons Three distinct Persons [makes] the Trinity also: Unless the Three distinct Persons are one Thing, and the Trinity Another. So that this Argument effectually concludes against this Shameless Man, even by his own Concession. But he adds in the next place of the same page, That he hopes however, that Self-Consciousness may distinguish the Three Persons, p. 64. l. 16. To which it has been answered again and again, that it can distinguish them only secondarily, and consequentially not primarily and originally. But I am weary of these Repetitions, though he is not ashamed to outdo BASSO himself in Tautology. And therefore whereas he says further, That Self-Consciousness proves the Distinction, though it does not limit the Number of the Persons, p. 64. l. 23. I deny, that it can originally distinguish them without limiting the Number of them also. For, as I have proved, nothing can originally distinguish the Persons but that which makes them Persons: And that which makes them Persons, by the very same, makes them Three Persons; it being as essential to them to be Three, as to be Persons. And therefore to that Question of his, Does the formal Reason of Personality make or limit the Number of Persons? l. 33. 1612. I answer, That in Persons wholly Relative, as the Divine Persons are, it does and must do so. For the further clearing of which, it must

must be observed, That the Animadverter in the Present Argument considered the Divine Nature as wholly abstracted from all Personality belonging to it, and so in it self (as upon such an Abstraction it must needs be) only *communicable* and *Determinable*; and consequently such, as cannot be supposed to *communicate* or *determine* it self; but to receive this Communication and Determination from the Personalities, considered as *actually* joined with it. The number of which Personalities must be taken from such a Peculiarity of their condition, as shall make one certain Number of them necessary and no other; And that wherein this peculiarity of condition does consist, is the *Relative opposition* of the said Persons to one another; by virtue whereof they are necessarily *Three* and no more. For as there are *Two* and but *Two* such Oppositions in this Divine Oeconomy, *viz.* one between *Generation* and *Filiation*, and the other between *Spiration* and *Procession*, accordingly there are *Three* and but *Three* Personalities founded upon the said Oppositions: as is clearly shewn in the eight Chapter of the *Anim.* p. 244. But on the other side, since there is nothing in the Nature of *Self-Consciousness* to determine it to any certain Number of *Self-Consciousnesses*, it must follow that neither can any certain Number of Personalities be derived from thence. In short, if the Divine Nature or Essence thus Abstractedly taken on the one hand, cannot be supposed to *communicate* or *determine* it self, and the *Personalities* on the other, which alone should and can *determine* it, are of that *Condition*; as not to imply any certain Number in themselves, but are Indifferent to any that can be assigned, then it is impossible for the said Personalities

to determine the Divine Nature to Three Personal Subsistences and no more. And this I account a full and sufficient proof, that the fixed Ternary Number of the Divine Persons can never be stated upon *Self-Consciousness*; but (so far as the Influence of that reaches) may be multiplied into any Number whatsoever. But says our Author, *That which naturally distinguishes Three Persons from each other, would distinguish Three Thousand if there were so many; but does not prove that there may be so many, p. 64. l. 11.* To which I answer, that the Distinction all along insisted upon hitherto, is not such an One as supposes or follows; but such an one as *Constitutes* or *makes* the Person; and therefore it is Ridiculous to argue, *That supposing there were so many Persons, they might all be distinguished by so many Self-Consciousnesses.* For that is not the Point here, but whether there be any Thing in the *nature of Self-Consciousness*; rendering it incapable of such a multiplication or no; and if there be not, then it is certain, that supposing there might be so many *Self-Consciousnesses*, there might and would be also so many Persons: For as much as that which originally and principally distinguishes any thing must of necessity constitute it too. But he goes on and tells us, *That though there may be no Repugnancy to such a multiplication on the part of Self-Consciousness, yet on the Part of the Divine Nature there may, and therefore that the Argument does not conclude, l. 15. 16.* To which I answer, that the Divine Nature, as this Author considers it *actually determined by its respective Personalities*, must needs have a Repugnancy to any other, or greater multiplication of the same; But as the Animadverter here considers it entirely *abstracted* from all Personal Determination,

termination, I affirm, that it is impossible to prove a Repugnancy in it so considered, to subsist in 3000. *Self-Conscious Spirits* any more than in *Three*: And therefore I would have this Author take notice, That the Animadverter was not concerned to conclude, *That absolutely there might be so many Persons in the Godhead*; but, That so far as this Man's Hypothesis reached, and for ought that could be determined from thence about the Number of the Divine Persons, this might be so; and withal that nothing yet appeared on the Part of the Divine Nature so *Abstracted* to prove, that it could not be so. And as this was the utmost that the Animadverter undertook by this Argument, so it was sufficient for him to prove thereby, the Absurdity of this Author's *New Hypothesis* compared with the old received one of the Church; which makes it utterly impossible that there should be any more than *Three Persons* in the Godhead: and that from the peculiar Condition of the Persons themselves necessarily determining them to the fixed number of *three* and no more; which this Man's Hypothesis of *Three Personal Self-Consciousnesses* from the very Nature of the Thing (as we have shewn) can never do. And this was the sum of the Animadverter's Argument, which this Man, with such a Magisterial Ignorance, pronounces a meer *Non sequitur*: if we may take his word for a *sequitur* or *non sequitur*, who has more Logick a great deal, to distinguish good money from bad, than a true Consequence from a false. And so we are come at length to see upon what Terms the Animadverter's Fourth Argument stands with this Defender.

Fourth Argument. If *Three distinct Self-Consciousnesses* Arg. 4.

nesses formally constitute Three distinct Personalities, then Three distinct Self-Complacencies will constitute Three distinct Personalities too. But our Author, I suppose will not allow of the latter, and therefore neither ought he to assert the former. This is the Animadverter's Fourth Argument upon the head of *Self-Consciousness*, with reference to the Divine Persons; and he first declared, That he produced and looked upon it only as an *Argument ad Hominem*: There being as much Reason to stare the formal constitution of a Person upon one, as upon the other; though in Truth upon Neither. For all that could or can be alleged for *Self-Consciousness* upon this Account, is, that it is Essential to each of the Divine Persons, and inseparable from them; And so much I affirm, is alleageable for *Self-Complacency*. Besides, that if this Author pleads no more for *Self-Consciousness*, than that it barely distinguishes the Divine Persons from one Another (as in this whole Defence (by way of Subterfuge) he pretends to no more, and that also without proving it their *Principal Distinction*) I challenge him to prove, that *Self-Complacency* does not distinguish the said Persons from one Another as much as *Self-Consciousness* does or can do. To which we may add, that *Self-Complacency* is the nobler Act of the Two, and a step beyond the former; and for that Reason the fittest to give the perfectest state of Being which is Personality; if Personality could depend upon, or be derived from any personal Act; as the Animadverter has all along contended that it cannot.

But, says our Author, the Animadverter proceeds all along upon a Mistake, *viz.* That by *Self-Consciousness* he understands the Acts of *Self-Consciousness*, p. 66. the end, whereas

whereas our Author understands only the *Principle of it*. To which I answer, (as I have done several times before); *First*, That by *Self-Consciousness* (which this very Man over and over expresses by *Self-Feeling* or *Sensation*) nothing can properly be signified but an *Act*; and that we may as well say, That *Seeing*, *Hearing*, *Tasting* and *Smelling* signify the *Principle* of these Respective *Acts*, and not the *Acts* themselves, as that this *Self-conscious Feeling* and *Sensation* do so. And this I shall immoveably insist upon, as the genuine proper Signification of the Term, without the least Regard had to this Man's *Meaning*; which in no Disputation ought to supersede or take place of the Proper, universally Received Sense of his *Words*. For his *Meaning* is to himself, his *Words* to the World. Nevertheless since (like one beaten off from his hold) he flies from the *Act* to the *Principle*, I do here, in the *second Place*, deny also, That the *Principle of Self-Consciousness* does or can constitute the *Person*, or give Personal *Unity* or *Distinction* to it, (which I reckon to be all but the same Thing.) Forasmuch as the first and Original Principle of all *Acts* is the Nature and Essence of the *Thing* to which the said *Acts* belong. But then the bare Essence or Nature of a thing, whether *Create* or *Uncreate* can never of it self make or constitute that Thing a *Person*, but the Determination of the said Nature by its proper and complex Subsistence, must do that. Accordingly in the Subject here before us, The *Principle of Self-Consciousness* is no other than the *Divine Nature* as it is an Infinite Omniscient Mind; which absolutely considered, both as to its Being, and *Actings* being the same in all the *Three Divine Persons*, can never

ver constitute them *Persons* nor originally distinguish
 them. And if there be any Distinction in this Infi-
 nite Omniscient Mind, either as to the *Manner* of
 its *Subsisting* or *Acting* (for in that must lie all the
 Distinction that it is capable of) it must be from the
Personal Properties determining and distinguishing
 both: and consequently since this Omniscient Principle
 and its *Actings* receive all their Distinction antece-
 dently from the said *Personal Properties* or *Persona-*
lities, it is impossible that these *Properties* or *Persona-*
lities should receive their Distinction from them. In
 short, the bare *Principle of Self-Consciousness* is the
Divine Intellect, or the *Divine Nature*, as Omniscient,
 which of it self neither is the *Person*, nor constitutes
 the *Person*; and the *Actual Exercise* of this Prin-
 ciple belongs to the *Person* himself, who alone
 can be properly said to *Act*, and therefore must be
 a *Person* antecedently to his *Acting*, (all *Personal Acts*
 proceeding from a *Suppositum*;) from both which it
 follows, That *Self-Consciousness*, neither in the *Actual*
Exercise, nor yet in the *Principle thereof*, does or can
 constitute the *Divine Persons*, or be the proper *Formal*
Reason of their *Personal Being*, *Unity*, and *Distinction*.
 And whereas he tells us again, That every *Act*
 of *Self-Consciousness* proves a distinct *Person*, pag. 66.
 lin. 6, 7. This is an old Story, and so often repeat-
 ed, that it is almost come to the Cuckow's Note: but
 he has been frequently told in Answer to it, and must
 be so told again; That the Question is not, *What*
proves a Person distinct, but what makes it so; and that,
 not by any sort of *Distinction*, but only by a *primary*
and Original. And this is that, which I shall abide
 by, and am resolved to hold him to; notwithstanding

ing. all his Wrigglings, and Turnings to get rid of it.

But it is now high time to remark upon some more of his Absurd, Untheological, and indeed Scandalous Assertions. Which are these Three, as we find them, p. 67. l. 10. viz. That there are no *Modes in the Divine Nature*; nor secondly any *Affections in it*; nor thirdly, that it admits of any *Priority*, so much as in our conceptions of it.

To which I answer,

1. That if there are no *Modes in the Divine Nature*, there are no *Persons* in it neither: For a *Person* is nothing else but the Godhead determined by a peculiar, Incommunicable *Mode of Subsistence*. To the

Second I answer, That these prime and transcendental *Affections of Being*, viz. *Unity, Verity, and Bonity*, do and must of necessity belong to the Divine Nature, if we own it for a Real Being: as I hope this Man does; though I am not sure of it. And then

Thirdly, If no *Priority of conception* is to be allowed in our Discourses about the Divine Nature (as being incapable of any) we can never discourse of it as of a *Being*, which has *Attributes* belonging to it, or *Immanent Acts* flowing from it, and resting in it: For there is no conceiving of the former but *per modum Subjecti & Adjuncti*, nor of the latter but *per modum Principii & Actionis*, in both of which there is necessarily implied a *Priority and Posteriority of conception*. And I shall say no more of this Man here, but that in these Assertions he opposes himself to all the Orthodox Divines in Christendom.

But that is the less to be wondered at, if we consider also the Profaneness of some of his expressions

here. For the Animadverter having urged, *That Self-Complacency might be as well alleged for the Reason of the Divine Personality as Self-Condemnation*; This Man Blasphemously replies, p. 63. l. 29. *Yes, and he might as well have added Self-displeasure, and Self-condemnation, and as many more such Selves as he could think of.* Now, had the discourse here been of Men, that is, of weak sinful Mortals, he might well enough have mentioned such kind of Selves, as *Self-displeasure* and *Self-Condemnation* and the like, provided that he omitted not the Prime Self of all, and most peculiarly his own, which is *Self-contradiction*. But when the discourse here is wholly of the *Three Sacred Persons of the Trinity*, each and every one of which is *God blessed for ever*, for him to affirm *Self-Condemnation* every whit as applicable to them as *Self-Complacency*, when *Self-Condemnation* on the one hand must suppose Sin or Folly as the ground of it, and *Self-Complacency* on the other is as essential to, and inseparable from all and each of the Divine Persons, as any other Divine Perfection can be, this (let me tell him) is downright *Blasphemy*. And therefore in requital of that scurrilous Character of an *Impious Blamester*, (which he has so insolently reproached the Animadverter with,) I must and do here return upon him the just Charge of an *Impious Blasphemer*, and that upon more accounts than this one; relating him withal, that had he lived in the former Times of our Church, his Gown would have been stripped off his back for his detestable Blasphemies and Heresies, and some other place found out for him to perch in than the top of St. Paul's, where at present he is placed like a Church Weather-Cock, (as he is) notable for nothing so much, as *standing high and turning*

round. And now if he likes not this kind of Treatment, let him thank his own Virulence for it, in passing such base Reflections upon one (among many more) who, he might be sure, would *repay* him, and certainly will, though he has not yet cleared the *Debt*.

And thus having shewn that the Animadverter's Arguments against *Self-Consciousness* are not to be shook by any of this Author's Fictitious Cavils, we will now pass to the Examination of what he opposes to the Arguments brought by the Animadverter against his *Mutual Consciousness* also. Of which the

First is this, *No Act of Knowledge can be the formal Reason of its Unity of Nature in the Persons of the blessed Trinity.* But *no Act of mutual Consciousness is but an Act of Knowledge, &c.* And what answer does he give to this? Why the old one, *viz. That he no where asserts, That mutual Consciousness is the formal Reason of that Unity, but only that the Three Persons who are thus mutually conscious to each other, must be essentially One,* p. 68. l. 4. To this he has been fully answered, That though he uses not the Term, yet he asserts the Thing. And whether he does not so here, let the Reader judge by that passage in the very Defence, p. 66. l. 23. *As Self-Consciousness (says he) makes a Person one with itself, so a Natural mutual Consciousness makes Three Persons naturally one as it is possible for Three to be one.* And how far it does this, he tells us in his Pindication, p. 68. vii. *That the mutual Consciousness of all the Three Divine Persons makes them all but one Infinite God.* And this I hope is touching more than only to assert, *That Three Persons mutually conscious to each other, must be essentially one* (which none denies, provided that by Person he means not Three distinct Minds) for, the

words cited expressly say, *That this mutual Consciousness makes all the Three Persons to be essentially one God: And whatsoever [makes] them so, is the formal Reason of their being so.* And therefore this Man would do well to take notice for the future, That whensoever he asserts the *Definition of a formal Reason*, or of any Thing else, he does by the very same assertion, assert the *Definition* too; whether he owns it or no. But because he is here making use of his old Subterfuge again (as I think he will never have done with it) by pretending, That when he argues from *Self-Consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness*, he means not the *Act* but the *Principle* of each; whether that forlorn pretence is to be allowed of, the Reader is left to judge yet further, from the following Considerations. As

First, From the Account which this Author himself gives of the Terms *Self-Consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness*, in the Book wherein he first made use of them, and built his whole Hypothesis upon them, viz. his *Indication*, &c. From every page of which, where the said words are mentioned, it may be made out as clear as the Light, that he neither understands, nor uses them in any other sense, but as they import the respective Acts of each of them. As first, p. 48. l. the last but one, where he tells us, *That the Self-Unity of a Spirit can be nothing else but Self-Consciousness*, he explains the same by *its being conscious to its own Thoughts, Reasonings, Passions, which no other finite Spirit is conscious to, but is self.* Which expressions neither do, nor can signify any thing else but the Acts of *Self-Consciousness*. And again, p. 49. l. 2. *This* (says he) *makes a finite Spirit numerically one, that every Spi-*

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rit feels its own thoughts and passions, but is not conscious to the thoughts and passions of another Spirit. And again, p. 49. l. 7. If three created Spirits were so united as to be conscious to each others thoughts and passions, I cannot see any Reason why we might not say, that three such Persons were Numerically one, &c. Now what can any mortal Man make of all this but Actual Consciousness? And what does his Metaphor of feeling mean; but something which is as much an Act of the Mind, as that in the proper sense of it, is of the Body? So p. 50. l. 11. We know (says he) the Unity of a Spirit reaches as far as its Self-Consciousness does, for that is one Spirit which knows and feels its self and its own thoughts and motions, &c. In like manner, for the Allusion, he quotes out of St. Austin, l. 19; *ibid.* Which (he says) represents this much better by that Consciousness which is between those distinct faculties in us, of Memory, Understanding, and Will. And what is that? Why the very Acts of these faculties, which (as he says) know and feel whatsoever is in each other, *viz.* We remember what we understand and will; likewise, We understand what we remember and will; and lastly, We will, what we remember and understand. All which, I suppose, are Acts of those respective faculties, and not the faculties themselves. And yet this he translates to the Trinity, l. 23; *ibid.* If (says he) we can suppose three Infinite Minds and Persons thus conscious of whatsoever is in each other, &c. that is to say by Acts of Consciousness, as the forementioned faculties know and feel what is in each other: (for otherwise that Particle [thus] is insignificant, and means nothing at all.) And he speaks it out fully and plainly, p. 52. l. 2. in these words, This Intimate Union and Inbeing, when we speak

of

of an essential Union of pure and infinite Minds, is a mutual Consciousness. And what is that? Why, it follows, It is (says he) as I may so speak, an inward Sensation of each other, so know and feel each other as they know and feel themselves. And yet more plainly (if possible) Father, Son and Holy Ghost (says he) are one by an Internal Consciousness, p. 56. l. 3. And then he explains the same in this manner, If I may so speak (says he) because we want proper words to express it, they feel each other in themselves, know the same Things by feeling each others Knowledge, and will and love what by feeling what each other loves and wills, just as every Man feels his own thoughts, knowledge, will, and passions.

It were useless to transcribe all the Passages in his *Vindicta*, which are to the same Purpose, and the Reader may find five hundred more, if he has a mind to it. But because a Person so eminent for contradicting and forgetting himself, may perhaps have forgot what he had said in his *Vindicta*, let us see what he says in this very Defence, where he asserts the same Thing in the same words, with reference to three Persons, p. 37. at the end. If that (says he) be not distinct separate Minds which is conscious only to its self, which feels all that is in it self, and nothing else; and these be not distinct separate Minds, each of which is thus conscious to its self, &c. And with respect to the Unity in Trinity, p. 2. He expressly tells us, They be Divine persons the Unity of the Three Persons in mutual Consciousness, and then tells us what that is, viz. That they have a conscious Sensation of each other in themselves, as they have of themselves. And what, I ask, is having a conscious Sensation, but actual Consciousness? And again, Can they be one before they are mutually conscious? and before they know

know themselves to be one, and that even in the order of conceiving it? p. 74. l. 16, 17, 18. And now what is all this to the *Principle of Consciousness*? I have found it a tedious task to transcribe so much of his stuff, only to make a confident shifting Caviller see his own words, while he will not own them. But by what has been quoted, it appears irrefragably, That by *Self-Consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness*, and that both with respect to Spirits *finite* and *infinite*, this Author could understand nothing but the *Acts* of them, if these Terms [*conscious*, *to be conscious*, *sensation*, *knowing*, *feeling*] do properly import *Acts*. And I defy the whole World, and this Author himself, to make any other Rational sense of them. Upon the whole matter therefore, I desire the judicious Reader to consider with me these following Particulars.

1. That this Author, throughout his whole *Introduction*, wherein he first laid down and vented his new Hypothesis of *Self-Consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness*, and *Three Infinite Minds*, never so much as once mentions [*The Principle*] of either of those Acts, even where he yet most professedly undertakes to explain the said Terms; in excuse of which it will be in vain for him to take shelter in [*so speaks*, and *so says*] and to pretend, that *we want words to express* the meaning of these Notions; for surely the word [*Principle*] was as obvious and easy to be thought on, when he wrote his *Introduction*, as it could be since, in the writing this *Defense* of it.

2. That as he made no mention of it in that former Book, so neither does he mention it in this *Defense*; where, in like manner, he *delivers* and *explains* his,

his Doctrine about the said Terms and Notions, but only when he finds himself pressed by his Adversary; and then he flies to it as a shift, started on purpose, that he may seem to say something to an Argument, which he cannot answer.

3. That, when he mentions this [Principle] of *Consciousness* upon this occasion, he never expresses what it is, or what he means by it; when yet he lays all the stress he can upon it, to keep off a baffle; and when withal it is far from being so clear and certain, but that it may be stated more ways than one.

Fourthly and lastly, That if instead of *Self-Consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness* the Term [Principle of *Self-Consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness*] were substituted throughout the Writings of this Author, it would so utterly pervert them, that it would be impossible to make so much as common sense of most of those Passages wherein it should occur.

All which particulars I desire the Learned Reader to lay together, and, when he has thoroughly weighed them, to believe, if he can, that by *Self-Consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness*, this Author understood only the [Principle] of these Acts, but not the Acts themselves. And thus much for what this Man could in reason be presumed to mean by these Terms. But then in the

Second place. The Reader is desired to take notice also, That the word *Consciousness* (as determined by the constant and universal use of it) will not bear this signification. And accordingly, I do challenge this confident Man, to produce me so much as one English Writer (before this New Philosophy came to be created of in our own Tongue) who ever used the
word

word *Consciousness* (of whatsoever sort it was) to signify any Thing but the bare *Act* of the said *Consciousness*. And whereas, to support his Arbitrary distinction he would pretend a parallel Case, between the Term [*Consciousness*] and the Term [*Reason*] and thereupon conclude, that because [*Reason*] is sometimes used to signify the *Rational Principle* or *Power*, and sometimes also the *Act* of Reasoning, therefore [*Consciousness*] may be so used too, p. 67. l. 27. I answer, That there is no Parity in the Case; For as much as there has been frequent and common use (which ought to fix the sense of words) for such a double signification of the word [*Reason*], but none at all for two significations of the word [*Consciousness*]. And therefore let me tell him further, that since [*Consciousness*] always imports the *Act*, it cannot answer as a Parallel to the Term [*Reason*], as *Reason* is indifferent to signify either the *Act* or *Principle*, but as it is limited to the *Act*, and so signifies only *Ratiocination*. And accordingly as *Ratiocination* can never signify the *Principle* by which we Reason, so neither can *Consciousness* signify the *Principle* by which we are conscious to our selves of any Thing. So that his allegation of the [*Principle*] either of *Self-Consciousness* as the Reason of Personal Unity and distinction, or of *mutual Consciousness*, as the Reason of the essential Unity of the Divine Persons, which he had expressly before stated upon the respective *Acts* of each, is nothing else but a Ridiculous shift, and the affixing a sense to a word which it never had before, and which this Man's puny Authority is far from being sufficient to give it now. I have now evinced, and that I hope to the full

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satisfaction of the Judicious Reader, that this Author neither did nor could, by the Terms *Self-Consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness*, understand the *Principles* of these *Acts*, but only the *Acts* themselves; till he was forced to use the word *Principle*, to elude (if he could) his Adversarie's Argument. Nor, in the next place; That the words themselves can (according to their constantly received sence) bear any such signification: After which, That I may leave him no further subterfuge, I will now argue the same from the reason of the Thing it self; and to that end, (supposing for the present) that he might, and did all along, mean the *Principle* and not the *Act*, I will prove, that neither can the *Principle of mutual Consciousness be the formal Reason of the Essential Unity of the Divine Persons*; nor (in other words) That, *[wherein]* the Unity of their Nature does consist, or *[whereby]* they are *Naturally and Essentially one God*; Both which this Author has expressly and in *Terminis*, more than once asserted; though his skill reached not to the Philosophical Term made use of by the Animadverter; who yet for his own part can indifferently make use of all *these Three Expressions*, as equally for his purpose.

And here I must premise some things, which (though they have been sufficiently shewn already, yet in dealing with such an Everlasting Tautologift) must be repeated again, *viz.*

First, That the formal Reason of a Thing, and the Thing whereof it is the formal Reason, do so essentially cohere, and coexist in Nature, and so imply one Another, that there is no conceiving of one, without the conception of the other. So that in the natural way

way of our conceiving of any Two objects, where either of them may be conceived of, without the other, the Union of those Two can be the formal Reason of the other.

Secondly, That the Essential Unity of the Divine Persons is not a Specificall, but a Numerical Unity of Nature; and consequently, that the common nature does not make the said Individual Nature to the said Persons, is that which renders them naturally and essentially one God.

Which two considerations being thus laid down, I deny the Principle of natural Consciousness to be the formal Reason of the Unity of the Divine Persons, in the same Individual Essence or Nature: and that for these following Reasons.

1. If the Divine Essence as it subsists in, and is common to the Three Divine Persons, must, according to the Natural order of conceiving Things, be conceived of, as one in it self, before it can be conceived of, as the Principle of any Act, (and particularly that of natural Consciousness) when its being the Principle of that or any other Act in the Divine Persons, cannot be the formal Reason of Unity of Essence in the said Persons. But the former is true, and therefore the latter must be so too. The consequence is evident from this, That the formal Reason of a Thing cannot be conceived of as Posterior to that of which it is the formal Reason. And the Truth of the Assumption is as clear, because Unity in order of Nature is the first affection or Attribute of the Divine Essence, (whether as considered in it self, or as subsisting in the Three Persons,) and therefore must be conceived of antecedently

dently to any other *particular Perfection or Attribute* belonging to the same, and consequently may be conceived of without it too: which makes it impossible for any such Perfection or Attribute to, be the *formal Reason* of this Unity. Accordingly, since there is the same order of Priority and Posteriority between such of the Divine Attributes as immediately affect and relate to the Divine *Essence or Being*, and such as immediately import and relate to some Divine *Act*, which there is between *Being* and *Action* themselves; and since *willful Unity* is the *first* and principal of the former sort, and the *Divine Intellect* (which is the proper immediate Principle of all Acts of *Consciousness* in the Divine Persons) is only an Attribute or Perfection of the *second sort*, it is impossible that the said Principle of *mutual Consciousness* should be the *formal Reason* of the Essential Unity of the Divine Persons, nor that wherein the said Unity of *Essence properly consists*.

2. The *Formal Reason*, that the Three Divine Persons are essentially one God, is the *Community* of One and the same *Individual Divine Nature* to the said Three Persons. But a Principle of *mutual Consciousness* is not a *community of the same Individual Nature* to the Three Divine Persons. And therefore such a Principle is not the *formal Reason* that the said Three Persons are essentially one God. The *Major* is proved thus. Because we cannot conceive such a *community of the same Individual Divine Nature* as the Three Persons, without conceiving a *Numerical Unity* of the said Nature in the said Persons, nor vice versa, can we conceive the latter without the former. The *Minor* is proved thus. No *particular perfection*

of the Divine Nature is properly and formally a Community of the Divine Nature, considered under all its perfections; But the community of the Divine Nature to the three Persons, is a community of the Divine Nature so considered. And a Principle of mutual Consciousness, is but a Particular Perfection of the Divine Nature, viz. the Divine Intellect; which is the Divine Nature as formally determined to one particular sort of Acts and Objects; and therefore this Principle of mutual Consciousness is not formally the Community of the Divine Nature to all the Three Persons.

3. If the Principle of mutual Consciousness in the Divine Persons must be multiplied according to the Number of the said Persons, then it is impossible that this Principle should give a Numerical Unity of Essence to those Persons. But according to this Author's Hypothesis, the Principle of mutual Consciousness is and must be multiplied according to the Number of the Divine Persons; and therefore the said Principle can never be the formal Reason of a Numerical Essential Unity in them. The consequence is evident. For three Numerically distinct Principles can never (as such) formally give Numerical Unity to any Thing; and much less to the most transcendently simple and uncompounded of all Beings; as the Divine Nature in the three Persons confessedly is. And then, as for the Assumption, viz. That according to this Author's Hypothesis, the Principle of mutual Consciousness must be multiplied according to the Number of the Divine Persons, this also is as evident. Because he asserts the three Divine Persons to be three distinct Infinite Minds, which are Three distinct Essences; And since they are so, I affirm, that the Principle of Action in every Mind or Essence,

Essence, is and must be as distinct, as the Mind or Essence which it belongs to, and which it is comprehended in. And therefore since these three Numerically distinct Minds must have each of them a Numerically distinct Principle of mutual Consciousness, it is impossible, that these three distinct Principles should either have a Numerical Unity themselves, or give a Numerical Unity of Essence to the said Three Infinite Minds, or to the Divine Persons, which this Author holds to be Three such Minds.

4. If a Principle of mutual Consciousness may make Three Infinite Minds essentially one Infinite Mind, then it may also make Three Infinite Intelligent Persons essentially one Infinite Intelligent Person. But this latter is impossible, and therefore the former must needs be so too. Nevertheless, the consequence is evident, because, according to this Author [*Infinite Mind*] and [*Infinite Intelligent Person*] are Terms perfectly equivalent, p. 32. h. 23. and consequently, whatsoever is affirmed or denied of the one, must be equally affirmed or denied of the other; so that if it be truly affirmed, that Three distinct Infinite Minds, may by a Principle of mutual Consciousness, become essentially one Infinite Mind, it may be as truly affirmed, that three Infinite Intelligent Persons may become one Infinite Intelligent Person; since there is a Perfect equivalence in these Two Predications. As for the Assumption, That it is impossible for Three Infinite Intelligent Persons to be one Infinite Intelligent Person, This is so Self-evident, that, I suppose, neither my Reader nor my Adversary, unless a Quibbler, will expect any further proof of it.

These are my Reasons, upon which I conclude, that
this

this new *απορύητος* of a Principle of mutual Conscience, cannot formally give a Numerical Unity of Essence to the Three Divine Persons: And I doubt not, but this Defender, who is such an utter stranger to all Metaphysical Knowledge, will call these Arguments as he does others in p. 2. l. 20. of this Defence, *Thin, airy Weapons* (though by his favour, they may be never the less *piercing* for that) but I would have him know, That Arguments drawn from, and founded upon the general Reason and notions of Things, are as strong and conclusive, as any that are taken from any particular material objects incurring into the sense. And as for the Divine Nature in the Divine Persons. (the only subject now before us) since it is a Being absolutely and entirely simple, and (as the Schools call it) *Simptissimè simplex*, I affirm, that there is no ground of Reason to discourse of it Philosophically upon, but the *Natural* order and *distinction* of our conceptions of it, founded upon the several *Modes, Acts, and Objects* belonging to it; And this Man who explodes all *primus* and *posterius*, in the conceptions which our Reason forms of the Deity, is extremely Ridiculous, and yet withal affirms *Three absolute distinct beings* (as *three Minds* are) in one Numerical Absolute, and most simple being, is (if possible) infinitely more so. And therefore, without adding any thing further, I leave the Reader to make himself merry with that silly swaggering Conclusion, which he closes his wretched, trifling, dodging answer to the Animadverter's Argument with. Thus (says he) *All his Arguments vanish like smoke, rise in a dark Cloud, but immediately disperse and are seen no more till they return as such vapours use to do, in Thunder and lightning, or some Threatning*

Threatning storm, p. 87. at the end. But was there ever such a *Rhodomontade* in words, so *Big with Nothing*, and without one grain of sense at the Bottom of them? For is this the way to expose an Adversarie's Argument to contempt; first to represent it as *vanishing into smok and vapour*, and afterwards *returning in storm and thunder*? But it shews, that his *Rhetorick* keeps pace with his *Logick*, and that whether he would *describe*, or *prove* a Thing, it is much at the same rate. In the mean time the Reader may take this for an Observation, that will never fail him, *viz.* That this Author is never so high upon the Huff, and Rant, as when he is lowest (nay and knows himself lowest) in Point of Reason. And so I pass to the Vindication of the

Arg. 2.

Second Argument, Which is this. *If Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons be the Cause, Reason, or Principle of mutual Consciousness in the said Persons, then their mutual Consciousness is not the cause or principle of the Unity of their Nature, but the former is true, and therefore the latter is so too.* This is the Argument, and a plainer and clearer there cannot well be. To which our Author answers thus, *That the Divine Persons may be thus essentially one by mutual Consciousness, or mutual Consciousness may be essential to this Unity, though they could not be thus actually conscious to each other, unless they were thus united, as to have and to feel each other in themselves*, Def. p. 68. l. 22. Which Enigmatical, obscure, and confused stuff, if the Reader understands, it is well; for I profess that I do not. But so far as the Term [*Essential*] made use of here, may seem to make any Thing for his Purpose, I answer, That *mutual Consciousness* is *Essential* to the Unity of the

the Divine Nature in the Three Persons, not as that, wherein this Unity *does consist*, but as that which is *essentially consequent* upon it, and *inseparable* from it. So that there is an *Homonymy* in the Term [Essential] as either importing that *Essential Principle*, wherein the Nature or Essence of a Thing is placed, or some thing *necessarily resulting* from it; in which latter sense alone *mutual Consciousness* is *essential* to the Unity of the Divine Nature. And whereas he says, *That if by Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons the Animadverter means the ομοῖος, That, he says, is indeed a Necessary foundation of this mutual Consciousness, but not the immediate Cause of it; For that, the Fathers, he pretends, were sensible, that this ομοῖος could not of it self make this Essential Unity; and therefore added the πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς* (which he affirms to be that very mutual Consciousness here maintained by him) *to perfect it.* p. 68. l. 27. In which words there are several very vile Heterodoxyes. For first, I affirm, That the ομοῖος adequately, perfectly, and sufficiently makes the *Unity and Identity* of the Divine Nature in the Divine Persons: and that (as I have already shewn) not meerly from the force of the word it self, but from the peculiar condition of the *ἑνία* which it was applyed to; which being *Infinite* could not possibly be otherwise than *numerically one* and the *same*; and consequently that the ομοῖος or agreement of the Divine Persons in such an *ἑνία* could be no other than a *Numerical Unity and Identity* of Nature belonging to them upon that account. And therefore I deny, That the Fathers ever reckoned the ομοῖος insufficient of it self to make this Unity, and challenge him to prove they did: And I deny further, that they ever alleged the πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς as an

addition to the *ἐκείνου* to perfect this Unity, but as an Explication and Illustration of it: and I add moreover, That the Fathers never accounted this *ὑπερ-συν-ῆσις* either to be *mutual Consciousness*, or to consist in it: but to be the *mutual Inexistence*, or *Indwelling* of the Divine Persons in each other, founded upon, and resulting from their *ἐκείνου*; *mutual Inexistence* being no more *mutual Consciousness*, than bare *Existence* can be said to be *Knowledge*: and lastly, I affirm, that the *μία νήρυς θεολογική* ascribed to the Three Divine Persons (to which this Author may add his *μία γνῶσις* too, if he pleases) is not the *ὑπερσυνῆσις* it self, but a *consequent*, or effect of it; for as much as they are not therefore *in one another* because they mutually *know one another*, but they thus know one another, because by the essential Identity of their Nature, they mutually are and exist in one Another. All which having been so fully proved in the seventh Chapter of *Animadv.* p. 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206. and the ninth Chapter, p. 295. 6, 7, 8, 9. and 300, 301. to allege it again, is in effect but *dictum dicere*, which though it is the constant practice, or rather Trade of this Author, is the scorn of the Animadverter. But to go on, the Animadverter having said (as is here alleged) *That Unity of Nature is the Cause and Principle of mutual Consciousness* (which being an Essential Property equally belonging to all Three Persons, must issue and result from the Divine Nature, and so can have no Antecedent Causal Influence upon the same Nature. Our Author, in answer to this, tells us, *That mutual Consciousness belongs not immediately to Nature but to Persons*, p. 69. l. 20. And I dare say, he tells us the best he knows. But in reply to it I must tell him again, That it belongs immediately

ately to both, but upon a different account, *viz.* to Nature, as the immediately producing Principle of the Act; and to the Person as to the immediate proper subject of Denomination from the Act. But he adds, *That he for his part will not Philosophize upon Antecedent causal Influences in the Divine Nature*, p. 69. l. 24. Nor does any one else, in the strict, proper, and Philosophical sense of these Terms, pretend to do so, but only by accommodating them to help us with the better Method and Distinction to conceive and discourse of so high a Subject, as the Divine Nature is. And therefore it was not for nothing, That he passed over the Nine preliminary Considerations, at the beginning of the fourth Chapter of the *Animadversions*, without so much as touching upon them: For they would have corrected his Ignorance, and taught him how these words are to be understood and used about the Divine Nature and Persons. But his Modesty adds, *That it contents him to know, what is Essential, not Absolutely to the Unity of the Divine Nature, but to the Unity in Trinity*, p. 69. l. 29. And will this Man say, *That any Thing can be essential to the Unity of the one, which is not as essential to the Unity of the other?* For though we frequently use the word *Union of Persons*, yet strictly speaking, it is improper: since it is not an *Union* (which is but another word for *Union*) but an *Unity of Persons in Nature*, or an *Unity of Nature in the Persons*, which is the proper expression; and therefore we neither say *an Union in Trinity*, nor a *Trinity in Union*, but always apply the word *Unity* to both. But our Author closes this Paragraph with these words, p. 69. at the end. *That if mutual Consciousness be essential to this Unity of Nature, so that the Three*

Persons are thus united, and cannot be one without it, he will contend no further. And so far I think he does discreetly; but too late. For whether he will contend further or no, his Adversary both does and will; for as much as this Author has asserted a great deal more than what this Concession amounts to, and if he does not prove all that he has asserted, he is a baffled Person. For he has positively asserted (as we have shewn from his own words) that *mutual Consciousness makes the Three Divine Persons to be Naturally one*, p. 66. Def. 26. and to be essentially one God, Vincl. p. 68. l. 6. And this, by his favour, is quite another thing, from only asserting, that *mutual Consciousness is essential to that Unity of Nature which is in the Three Persons*. For that it may be, as it is an essential consequent of the said Unity of Nature, and no more; As also from asserting (as he here does, p. 69. l. the last) That the three Divine Persons cannot be one without it. For surely that which is only a *Conditio sine quâ non*, and without which the said Divine Persons cannot be one in Nature, and that which formally makes them so, or wherein their Unity does consist, are wholly different Things. And therefore since it is manifest, that this Man has no Logick, I heartily wish that he had some shame. In the mean time, he is for shewing (as well as he can) how the Animadverter mistakes the whole matter in these words, quoted from him, Anim. p. 108. l. 14. "The Divine Nature or Essence being one and the same in all the Three Persons, there is upon this account one and the same knowledge in them also; And they are not one in Nature, by virtue of their mutual Consciousness, but they are therefore mutually conscious, because the Perfect Unity and Identity of
 " their

"their Nature makes them so. Thus the Animad-
 verter: and where is now the mistake? why our Au-
 thor tells us, *That Three Persons who have the same Na-
 ture may know the same Things without feeling one ano-
 ther's thoughts and knowledge in themselves*, p. 70. l. 22.
 To which I answer first, That the foundation of this
 reply is, That there is such a thing as *Feeling* in God
 distinct from *knowledge*; which is the height of non-
 sense and Absurdity; as shall be declared before we
 pass from this head of *mutual Consciousness*. Secondly
 I utterly deny, *That Persons who have the same Divine
 Nature can know the same Things*, I mean all the same
Things (for that only here can be insisted upon)
*without knowing each other's thoughts and knowledge in
 themselves*: For as much as whatsoever each of these
 Divine Persons knows, he does and must know by an
 Infinite Act of Knowledge, comprehending both him-
 self and the other Two Persons; and all that is Know-
 able in the World besides; and how each of the Di-
 vine Persons can know all this without *mutually
 knowing* one another, I desire this Man to shew.
 But he argues further, *That if by one and the same know-
 ledge the Animadverter means that the knowledge of the
 Divine Nature in the Three Persons is but one Individual
 Act, as the knowledge of one single Person is, this destroys
 the Distinction of Persons: which cannot be distinct with-
 out distinct personal Acts, as mutual knowledge is; and
 destroys mutual Consciousness, for there is no place for mu-
 tual Consciousness, or mutual Knowledge, where there is
 but one single Act of Knowledge*, p. 70. l. 24. In answer
 to which I observe these Two Notable Instances of
 his Great Ignorance. First, His supposing and taking
 for granted the very Thing in dispute between him
 and:

and his Adversary, *viz.* That the Distinction of the Divine Persons depends upon certain Distinct Acts of Knowledge, as the cause or antecedent Reason of that Distinction; whereas his Adversary on the contrary affirms all Distinction of Divine Knowledge (as well as all Diversification of the Divine Nature it self) to be from the *Distinction*, or *distinct Subsistence* of the Divine Persons, as the Prime and original Reason of it. And whereas this Author says again, *That the Divine Persons cannot be distinct without Distinct Personal Acts, as mutual knowledge is*, it is true, That they cannot be without them, as Inseparably consequent upon their Personal Distinction, but not as constituent of it. Secondly, The other Instance of his Ignorance here, is his affirming, *that there can be no place for mutual Consciousness or Knowledge, where there is but one single or Individual Act of Knowledge.* Which I utterly deny as false; and in order to the proving it so. I do here observe, That there is but one single Act of Knowledge in all the Three Divine Persons; that is to say, *single* as to the Substance of the Act, though diversified by the several *modifications* which it receives from the Persons whom it proceeds from; and from the several *respects* it bears to the several *objects*, it terminates upon. Which different modifications and respects do by no means infer diverse or distinct Acts of Knowledge, but only variously modify, determine, and distinguish one and the same Act. Accordingly, in the present Case, I do here affirm to this Author, That *mutual Consciousness* is nothing else but one and the same Act of Divine Knowledge, differently modified, as it proceeds severally, and after a different manner from Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,

as

as the Persons *knowing*, and jointly terminated in them all as the *objects known*; as on the other side *Self-Consciousness* is no more than this one and the same Act of Knowledge, as it issues only from one of the Persons, and terminates upon the same too. Though I confess, if the Three Divine Persons were *Three distinct Minds or Spirits*, *mutual Consciousness* could not be *one Act* only, but must be *Three*. This I hold concerning the Divine Knowledge, and the respective distinctions of it, and I leave this Author to try his best skill in Divinity and Philosophy to confute it. In the mean time he gives us one Absurdity more out of his inexhaustible stock, *viz.* That the *μία ψυχου βουλῆ μακρο*, ascribed by the Fathers to the Three Divine Persons, is *that very mutual Consciousness which the Deans mean*. For these are his words, p. 7. and the seven first lines: so that according to him an Act of *Volition*, and an Act of *Consciousness* or *Knowledge*, are *formally* and *properly* one and the same Act. In the last place, as to his affirming, *That Three distinct Subsistences of the same Individual nature, are by mutual Consciousness essentially one*, p. 71. l. 9. I answer, That if he means hereby, That they are by *mutual Consciousness* made essentially one, as by the Cause or Antecedent Reason of that Unity, I deny it; But if he means, That they are thereby *proved* essentially one, as by an essential consequent of the said Unity, I grant it. But this will do him but little service. For his Hypothesis requires more. And so leaving this second Argument in its full force against him. I proceed to the

Third Argument, which is this. — “To affirm mutual Consciousness to be the cause of the Union of
“ the

"the Three Divine Persons in the same Nature, is to
 "confound the Union and Communion of the said
 "Persons together: which confusion ought by no
 "means to be allowed. To which he answers, *That*
to affirm, that the Three Divine Persons are essentially
one by mutual Consciousness, is not to affirm, that mutual
Consciousness is the cause of their Union, p. 71. l. 18. But
 on the contrary, I affirm, That if [for one Thing to
 be so, or so, by another] does and must signify causally:
 then to say, *That Things or Persons are one by mutual*
Consciousness, and yet that mutual Consciousness is not the
cause or antecedent Reason of their being one, is a direct
 contradiction in the Terms. And it is hard to ima-
 gine, how a Man in his Sences can think otherwise.
 In the next place, he passes impertinently from the
 Union of the Divine Persons to their mutual Indwel-
 ling in each other (which are very different Things)
 affirming withal, That this *mutual Indwelling* is their
mutual Consciousness; though this has been, and still
 is, peremptorily denied him, and the Reader, for the
 Confutation of it, referred to the Two forecited
 Chapters of the Animadversions; which this Author
 neither does nor can say one word in answer to. Well;
 but how does he prove *The mutual Inexistence, or In-*
dwelling of the Divine Persons, to be mutual Consci-
ousness? Why; because (forsooth) *they are in one ano-*
ther as Minds, not as Bodies, p. 71. l. 30. But here, be-
 sides that we deny his very supposition, viz. That the
Three Divine Persons are Three Minds, we deny also,
 That Three distinct Minds can be made Identically
 one in Nature by any *Consciousness or mutual Consci-*
ousness whatsoever; and in the Divine Persons (who
 are neither Minds nor Bodies) it is the *Unity and*
Identity

Identity of their *Essence*, by which alone they are mutually in one another, as the sole proper Reason of their being so. For there neither is nor can be such a Thing as a *πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς* of distinct Minds, Essences, or Natures in one another. But he tells us, *That in the Divine Persons Union and Communion are one and the same Thing*, p. 72. l. 15. But if he means that they are *formally*, and in all respects the same, I deny it; affirming withal, that they are as much *distinguished* as the very Divine Essence and Personalities themselves are; and consequently, that the Union of the Persons consists in their Identification in one and the same Essence or Nature, and their Communion consists in those mutual Acts towards each other, respectively issuing from and belonging to them by virtue of their Personal Properties. But the *Animadverter* (he tells us) *falsely represents both the Communion of the Divine Persons with each other, and their mutual Consciousness too, in these words cited from him, p. 72 l. 27. viz. "That* "all Acts of several Persons upon each other (as all "that are mutual must be) are properly Acts of Com-
 "munion, by which the said Persons have an Inter-
 "course among themselves, as acting interchangeably
 "upon one another. To which words of the Animad-
 verter this Author replies first, *That this may be true in Persons separate, but that Persons only distinct and not separate, do not Act upon one Another; for that such acting must* (as he says) *signify an External Impression made by one Person upon another*, p. 72. at the end, and p. 73. at the beginning: But will this Man here abide by this false and prophane assertion? For do not the Divine Persons mutually *know* and mutually *love* one another? and do not these Acts of Know-

ledge and Love both mutually proceed from them, and mutually terminate in them too? Or will he say that those Acts pass mutually between them by an *External Impression* upon each other? Or lastly, That the Divine Persons are any more than only *distinct*? Certainly such Propositions as this Audacious man vents, the Church of England was never accustomed to hear or endure before. But in the next place, after he had said that the Animadverter's Assertion might hold true in *Persons separate*, but not in *Persons only distinct*, which we have confuted; He says also, p. 72. at the end, That it holds true of all other mutual Acts, excepting *mutual Consciousness*; which is a fullsome and ridiculous *begging of the Question* by presuming an Exception where he should first prove it, and is as arrant a *Petito Principii* as ever appeared in Argumentation. And I challenge him to prove how the Exception holds in *mutual Consciousness* more than in *mutual Complacency*; though indeed in neither. But he is now for calling the Animadverter to an account for that unwary and improper expression (as he represents it) That all Acts of several Persons upon one another are Acts of Communion, which (says he in the Gravel-lane Dialect) makes Boys in a state of Communion with each other at boxing; and a match at scolding (for it seems he cannot yet rid his head of *Billinggate*) another state of Communion. To which my answer in the first place is, That I am sorry to find his *breeding* got so far into his Religion, as to dare to mingle such sacred matters with such dirty and prophane Comparisons. In the next place, I would have him know, that the Animadverter abides by what he has said, and accordingly would have this Man learn, that

words

words in discourse, though never so general and indefinite, are yet to be limited and determined in their sense by the *subject* professedly treated of. And this in the present Case was such an Act only as *supposed* Persons in a state of Agreement, and proceeded from them, and passed between them, considered only as *such*. And I must tell him further, That though the common use of the World has restrained the sense of the word *Communion* and *Communication*, *ad benigniorem partem*, yet the literal sense of it imports no more than a bare Interchange of Acts or Offices, whether Friendly or hostile; and there may be as real and as proper a *Communication* of ill Turns as of good; and sometimes of ill for good, as this Author very well knows. But as for those words which he concludes this his Criticism with, *That had the Dean been pleased to have returned mutual Acts, he and the Animadverter might have been long since in a very strict Communion with each other*, p. 73. l. 16. I shall only return him this one short word, That though all this may be perfect Riddle to the Reader, yet I understand him very well, and could easily give him such an answer, as should make him *understand himself* too.

But to let the Reader see that he is as foul a Disputant as he can be a Speaker (and a fouler upon both accounts the World never had) with a Frontless Impudence he declares here, p. 73. l. 23. *That the Animadverter grants all that he says, about the Notion of a Trinity in Unity*: And in Particular, *That every Individual Person has a Self-Consciousness of its own, and every such Self-Conscious Person is thereby one with it self, and distinguished from all other Persons*, In answer to

which shameless Unconscionable Falshood, I do here, in the Face of the World, challenge the Author of it to prove, *That the Animadverter grants any one thing that is peculiar to his Hypothesis; and particularly to shew that place in the whole Book of the Animadversions, in which the Animadverter owns, That a Self-Conscious Person, is by vertue of it's Self-Consciousness one with it self, and primarily distinguished from all other Persons, (which is the only distinction here spoken of.)* I say, I do again and again challenge this Man to prove this; and promise withal, That if he can do it, I will forfeit to him *more than ever he was born to*; and if he cannot, I humbly appeal to the most rigid, if but Impartial, Reader, whether I have not all the cause in the World to proclaim him to all Mankind, for a downright Lyar, Slanderer, and Falsificator. And as hard as these words may sound, less than this, upon such an occasion, I neither can nor will say. But we will see what other holes he can pick in the Animadverter's Coat. And here he first taxes him, p. 74. l. 1, 2. for the Improper use of the Term [*Union of Nature*] telling him, *That the Dean (forsooth) would have said Unity of Nature* (as the same Dean not only would have said, but has said, *That a Beast is a Person*, with several other such choice Proprieties, as *Chrysomo* instead of *Chrisme*, and *Paraphrases* instead of *Periphrasis*, and above an hundred *Solecisms* to boot.) But I must here declare to this great Master of proper speaking, forsooth, (as appears from the whole Tenth Chapter of the *Animadversions*) That had the Animadverter, in the place cited by him, used the Term [*Union*] instead of [*Unity*] (which upon this subject are often promiscuously made use of) surely this Man

Man had been the most unfit Person in the World to reflect upon him for it; who has stated the *Divine Nature* in the Three Persons so, as to leave no *numerical real Unity* in it at all; but only an *Union* instead thereof. For three Distinct Infinite *Minds* (asserted by this Author) being Three distinct *Natures* or *Essences*, neither have nor can have any such *Unity* in them; but being United only by *mutual Consciousness*, are capable of no more than a *Conjunction* or *Union* thereby; and that a very slender one too, and far from that *Essential Unity* which belongs to the Divine Persons. But after all, I would have His *Critical Ignorance* know, that the Animadverter, by [the *Union of Nature*] here mentioned, understands (as he may very well and properly do) no other than [an *Union in respect of Nature*]; so that it is really an *Union of Persons* Connoting the *Nature*, as the *Term*, which they are United in: And accordingly the Animadverter in defiance of this Man's long silly Parenthesis (which, it had been more for his Credit to have spared than put in) still owns, and abides by the Expression. But our Critick has not done yet. But whereas the Animadverter, speaking of the Divine Persons, had used these words, *Their Essence and Personality*, he here cries out (like one Big, and bringing forth nothing) *What? but one Personality as well as but one Essence in Three*, p. 74. l. 11. But may it please your Ignorance, good Sir, the Animadverter here spoke of *Personality*, not with any respect to number of Particulars, but to the common *Nature* and notion of the Thing, and consequently might, without the least impropriety, use the *Term Personality*, without any Epithete of Plurality. For suppose,
that

that in a discourse of the general Nature of Celestial Bodies, one should speak of the *Sun* and of the *motion of the Heavens* together; would this Philosopher of *Goatham* presently cry out, *What but one motion of the Heavens as well as but one Sun?* And to give an Instance in Divine matters, when the Prophet *Ezek.* 36. 26. tells the *Israelites*, *that God would give them [a new heart]*; would this wise Man, of the forenamed Society, cry out here, *What?* but *One new heart* amongst so many thousand Men? For certain it is, that strictly speaking, the heart here mentioned (which could be nothing else but a pious and gracious disposition of Mind, inclining them to obey God) was to be multiplied, according to the number of Individuals, which it was to be given to. But such as understand the force of words, and the way of using them, know that there is a kind of *Grammatica Philosophica*, by which we may judge when a single word ought to signify *singularly*, and when *indefinitely* and including all the Particulars that it may be applied to. But this, I confess, is *Gibberish* and a *Riddle* (as all sense and learning is) to one who has neither *Grammar* nor *Philosophy*. And so having answered his impertinent Cavils, I come to give an answer to his equally impertinent Questions; with such great huff proposed by him, p. 74. l. 17. As first, *Can they, viz. the Divine Persons be one before they are mutually conscious, even in the order of conceiving it?* I answer, That in order of conception they not only *may*, but necessarily *must*; and that as necessarily, as it is impossible to conceive of knowledge without conceiving of Entity or Being as the subject of it, and for that cause (in the Natural order of conceiving, or apprehending Things) *before it*. The second

cond Question is, *Can the Divine Persons be one before they are in one another?* I answer, That in Priority of Time they cannot; but that in order of Nature they may and must be so conceived: For to be in one Another is but a subsequent circumstance of Being, and consequently must presuppose the Being it self, whereof it is the Circumstance, as in Nature preceding it. His third Question is, *Can there be any other mutual in-being of Minds but by mutual Consciousness?* I Answer, First, That the Divine Persons are not minds. Secondly, That there is no such Thing as a mutual in-being of Minds in one another: And thirdly and lastly, That the Divine Persons are not properly and originally in one another by mutual Consciousness, but by an Identity of Essence, Nature, or Substance, common to all Three.

But I shall now apply my self particularly to answer his noisome extravagant Ignorance, in reproaching (even to the degree of Insultation) all use or admission of Priority and Posteriority of Conception in apprehending or discoursing of the Divine Nature. And in order to this, I shall lay before the Reader some of his expressions concerning it; as p. 73. l. 20. *After all this huffing and swaggering (says he) This notable dispute issues in a meer Metaphysical subtilty about the natural order of our conceptions of Things.* But, by his favour, they are not meer conceptions and no more; but conceptions founded in the Nature and Reason of the Thing which they are imployed about, as it exerts different Acts, respects different objects, and sustains different Relations and Considerations thereupon. But he goes on. *What confounded work (says he) does this make with the pure simple uncompounded Eternal Nature*
of

of God, so to prove a Priority or Posteriority of Being, or Causality in the Divine Nature from the order of our Conceptions? p. 74. l. 22. But can this Man make it appear, That any Philosopher and Divine does this? No; they do not pretend to prove a Priority or Posteriority of Being, or Causality in the Divine Nature from the order of our Conceptions, for they professedly disavow it; But they say and affirm, that there can be no discoursing of the Divine Nature, by any Humane Reason, but by such an order of Priority and Posteriority in our Conceptions of it. This, Sir, is their affirmation, and the other is your Lye. For neither do Philosophers nor Divines ascribe these Things to God *formally*, but only *Virtually* and *Eminently*, viz. That God as a pure simple Act or Being, performs all those Acts immediately by one simple efficiency or exertion of himself, Which a finite Being cannot do but by several Acts; Powers, Faculties, and (sometimes) Parts enabling it to operate and produce Things. No Man, I say, ascribes these things to the Divine Nature, in the strict and Philosophical sense of the Terms, but by way of *Analogy* to what reason observes in the Creature, and that also founded upon God's own condescension to describe and represent himself to us in this manner. And what the Animadverter says in the fifth Preliminary of his fourth Chapter, is sufficient to blow off all these senseless Cavils, viz. "That when the Terms, Cause, formal Reason, Constituent, or Productive Principle and the like are used about the Divine Nature and Persons, they are not to be understood as applicable to them in the strict and proper signification of the said Terms, but only by way of *Analogy*; as really meaning

"meaning no more than a causal or necessary Depen-
 "dence of one Notion, or *Conceptus objectivus* upon
 "Another; so that it is impossible for the Mind to
 "conceive distinctly of the one, but as depending up-
 "on, or proceeding from the other. In answer to
 all which, I defy this Man to speak Three words of
 fence, if he can. And whereas he Ignorantly says,
That all such Conceptions are false; p. 74. l. 33. I must
 tell him on the contrary, That where nothing is af-
 firmed, or denied (as in bare conceptions nothing is)
 there can be no Falshood. It is a common Rule and
 Maxim in Philosophy, and not to be overborn by this
 weak man's little Objections, That *Abstrahentium non*
est mendacium. For to consider one thing without
 another, (though it neither is nor can be without the
 other) is no Falshood. And the chief thing by
 which we form several distinct Conceptions of the
Divine Nature, is this Abstraction; by which the
 Mind first considers one *Conceptus Objectivus* without
 the other, and then considers, and compares both to-
 gether, according to the respect they may have to
 each other, and the Natural Order which that places
 them in. But I shall try what Metal that Confi-
 dence is made of, which thus explodes all Priority and
 Posteriority in our Conceptions of God by these fol-
 lowing Questions. As, first, I demand of this man,
 Whether he does not own a Necessity of our forming
 several Inadequate Conceptions of God, and that we
 have no other way of conceiving of him? This, I am
 sure, he has asserted several times, and if he had not,
 the whole World does: and therefore in the next
 place I ask him, Whether many of these *Inadequate*
Conceptions do not imply a necessary and essential de-

pendance of one upon the other? and if so, Whether it be possible for the *Mind of Man* to form a Conception of one thing depending upon another but *secundum Primum & Posterius*? Again, I demand of him, Whether we can consider God as an *Intelligent Being* and *Agent*, endued with *Understanding*, *Will*, and *Power*, (as he in Scripture represents himself, and as we must conceive of him, if we conceive and discourse of him at all) without conceiving of him as *willing* a thing before he *does* it, and as *understanding* it before he *wills* it? And again, I demand of him, Whether the *Divine Nature* and *Persons* considered all together are not one pure, simple, uncompounded *Act* or *Being*? I am sure all Orthodox Divines affirm it. And yet, I demand of this man, Whether he or any one alive can conceive of the *Father* as *begotting*, and of the *Son* as *begotten*, and of the *Holy Ghost* as proceeding from both, without a *Priority* and *Posteriority* in the conceptions we form of them? And lastly, to instance in his own whimsical Notion of *Self-consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness*, I challenge him to prove it possible for the *Mind of Man* to conceive how the *Divine Persons* can be *mutually conscious* to one-another, but subsequently to each Person's being first *conscious* to *himself*; forasmuch as their several *Self-consciousnesses* are properly the *Object* of their *mutual Consciousness*, and so in order of Nature cannot but be before it. Nay, and to go further, Does not this very man, in stating his *Self-consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness* distinguish between the *Act* and the *Principle*? Which, tho' it be but a meer Shift, (as has been shewn) is yet a good Argument against himself: For can any one conceive of a *Principle*, but as *Prior* to the *Act*? In fine,

fine, I challenge this equally Insolent and Heterodox man, to satisfy the World about him, by a clear and positive Answer to these two Questions, 1st, Whether all Divines, Schoolmen, and Philosophers (excepting perhaps such as *Commodus Vorstius*, and *Crellius*, in their Books *de Atributis Dei*) do not in treating of the Divine Nature unanimously acknowledge and affirm, That God is a *Pure, Simple, Uncompounded Act, Essence, or Being*? And, 2^{dly}, Whether, notwithstanding this acknowledgment and affirmation, they do not universally treat of God in Terms necessarily importing and requiring a *Priority* and *Posteriority* of Conception? But why do I dispute against such foolish Paradoxes, which all the Schools in *Christendome* would hiss, or rather spit at the Author of them for? But this poor ambitious *Animatulum Gloria* has been always affecting to signalize his little Self by the Character of holding what the whole World besides denies, and of denying what it holds.

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And now, in the close of this Argument, p. 75. l. 20. we have him again flying off from his first Hypothesis; in which he had with so much earnestness affirmed *Self-consciousness* to be that which made the Divine Persons originally distinct both from one another and all other things besides, and *mutual Consciousness* to be that which made them naturally and essentially one. I say, we have him quite falling down from their making, to their bare supposing, inferring, and proving them to be so. Which (as the whole World must needs see) is wholly another thing, and absolutely quits and gives up the first assertion; but that by his good leave, shall not serve his Turn: For (as he has been several times told) he shall be still

held to it, and justly accounted a baffled Person, if he does not make it good. For in all Philosophy, and even in common sense, *making* is one thing, and *proving* is another. And therefore, whereas he says in the last place, *viz. p. 75. lin. 30. That to dispute about the Cause of Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness, is to dispute about the naked Essences or Essential Properties of Things, which the Deity rejected from the Beginning, as without the compass of Human Knowledge.* There are in these words several things to be remark'd upon. As, first, I must tell him, That the Dispute here is not directly about the *Cause of Self-consciousness or mutual Consciousness*: but whether *Self-consciousness* it self be the Cause or formal Reason of Personality, Personal Unity and Distinction? and *mutual Consciousness* be the formal Cause or Reason of the Essential Unity and Identity of the Divine Persons in one and the same Nature? And in the next place supposing that the *Dispute* here were about the *Cause of Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness*, yet I deny, that to dispute of them under the Notion of a *Cause* or an *Effect*, is to dispute about the *naked Essences or Essential Properties of Things*. Forasmuch as we may consider and dispute about the *Essences and Properties of Things*, without any consideration of their *Causality* at all: and on the other side we may know a thing to be actually a *Cause*, and dispute of it as such, tho' we cannot tell what the *Essence* of the said thing is. We do not indeed know (that is, by an immediate inspection of the Things themselves) what the *Essences or Forms of Things* are: but we know that in every Thing the *Essence or Form of it* is the Cause or Principle of all the *Acts* proceeding

proceeding from it and belonging to it, and consequently that no *Act* so proceeding from the said Thing can be the *Essence* or *Form* of it. But *2dly*, and lastly, in reply to his saying, *That the Dean from the beginning rejected all Disputes about the Essences and Essential Properties of Things, as without the compass of Human Knowledge.* I do here refer the Reader to the 9th and 10th Pages of the First Chapter of the *Animadversions*, to see there how horribly he contradicts himself upon this Subject. For there it is proved against him, out of page 7. of his *Vindic. lin. 20.* *That he says that the Essences of Things cannot be known, but only their Properties and Qualities.* Which surely inferrs, that then *their Properties may be known.* And again, *That as for the Essential Properties, Operations, and Powers of Matter, sence, experience and observation will tell us what they are. Vindicat. p. 8. line 15.* Which Passages I would have him reconcile to what he has said here, *viz. That the Essential Properties of Things are without the compass of Human Knowledge; which how they can be, and yet Sence, Experience, and Observation be able to give us such an account of them, as to tell us what they are, I must confess I cannot comprehend.* And whereas again he excludes here the *Essences of Things* (which I averr to be only another word for the *Natures* of them) from the compass of *Human Knowledge*; does not this very man, in this his Defence, p. 7. lin. 11, tell us, *That the Nature of a Spirit consists in Internal Vital Sensation?* And now, after that he has given us this account of the *Nature* of a Spirit, and told us wherein it does consist, will he tell us, *That he looks upon the Natures of Things as out of the compass of Human Knowledge?*

I shall say no more of him at present, but humbly beg the Reader seriously to reflect upon the Temper and Confidence of this man. And so I dismiss him for an everlasting shameless Self-contradictor as he is; and pass to the examination of what he brings against the Animadverter's

Arg. 4.

Fourth and Last Argument, which proceeds equally against *mutual Consciousness* and *Self-consciousness* too, and is founded upon that Rule of Philosophy; *That Entities or Beings ought not to be multiply'd nor new Notions to be admitted, where the old received ones are sufficient, and that therefore the Terms and Notions of mutual Consciousness and Self-consciousness in the present Subject ought to be rejected, not only as New and Suspicious, but as wholly needless and superfluous: so far as nothing can be signified by them, which is not fully and clearly signified by that one plain word and known attribute, the Divine Omniscience.* To which the Defender replies in this flouting Expostulation, p. 76. lin. 4. *Pray what hurt have these seemingly innocent words done?* I answer, Too much a great deal (if we may believe his own words) to suffer them to pass for so much as *seemingly innocent.* For, p. 8. lin. 19. of this Defence, he tells us, *That these were the words which directly led him to the Assertion of Three Infinite Minds; which is direct Tritheism: and not only so, but forced him also to the trouble of a long senseless Apology to persuade the World, that by Minds he did not mean Minds: as we shall more particularly shew in the discussion of his Answers to the Animadverter's Arguments upon that Subject.* In the mean time he answers further, *That admitting that all that is imported by Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness* may

may be fully signified by the Divine Omniscience, yet why (says he) may not that one comprehensive Attribute very properly receive different Names, according to its different Objects, as the several Arts and Sciences do? To which I answer his Ignorance, That neither do several Arts nor Sciences, nor yet several kinds of Action, receive their denomination from any of their particular Objects, but only from their adequate and general Object formally consider'd, that is, as apprehensible after such a certain way. As for instance; Natural Philosophy is so denominated, not from this or that Natural Body, but from *Natural Body* generally and universally consider'd; and that only in order to the Knowledge of the Nature, Properties, and Affections thereof. And so likewise in *Natural Acts*, such as those of *Seeing* and *Hearing*, and the like; every particular different colour which is seen does not give a diverse denomination to the Act that perceives it, since it affects it only after the same general way; nor does every different Sound or Tune diversly denominate each particular Act of Hearing, which takes them in; but they have all one general denomination from one adequate Object so consider'd as before express'd; which to *Seeing* is *omne visibile, quatenus visibile*; and to *Hearing*, *omne audibile, quatenus audibile*. And in like manner the adequate Object of Omniscience is *omne scibile, quatenus scibile*; and the Three Divine Persons, as this Omniscience terminates upon them, are as properly and truly Three particular Objects of it, as any Three created Finite Beings may be. And it would make very odd work (in good earnest) to distinguish the Divine Omniscience by as many different Names as it has particular different Objects,

Objects, (which yet this man here most absurdly contends for); for according to this his Assertion, Omniscience, as it terminates upon an Angel, must have one Name, as upon a Man another, and as upon a Beast or a Fowl, another. And as God is said, upon the Account of his Omniscience, *to know and number the Stars, and to call them all by their Names, Psal. 147. 4.* his Omniscience being terminated distinctly upon every one of them, must by consequence have as many different denominations as there are Stars in the Firmament. And therefore let this ignorant man know for the future, that the Divine Knowledge is denominated only from its adequate Object, which comprehends all that is knowable, and that only under this consideration, as *knowable*: And if he can prove [Self] and [Others] (as he speaks) not to come within the compass of that Object, then we will allow, that the Knowledge distinctly terminated upon [Self] and [Others] ought to receive from thence different denominations. But till then, he and his Party may (to my knowledge) find much sifter Objects to apply their *Self-consciousness* and *mutual Consciousness* to, than the Divine Persons.

But as if he had not sufficiently disturb'd the Church with his Heretical Novelties already, he is now for starting another as great as any of the rest. For the *World* (it seems) has been hitherto under a Mistake, which he will now graciously correct by informing us, That there is in Almighty God a certain Thing specifically different from his Divine Knowledge, call'd *Intellectual Sensation*, p. 77. lin. 22. *And that he, who does not know the difference between these, is as unfit*

to meddle in this Controversie as a blind man to dispute of Colours. And accordingly he tells us, *That though Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness may in some respect be call'd Knowledge, yet in truth they are of a quite different kind from it. For that Self-consciousness is that Intellectual Sensation by which each Person feels his own Thoughts, Knowledge, Volitions, &c. and that the mutual Consciousness of the Three Persons is not their Knowledge of each other, but their mutual Sensation and feeling each other in themselves.* So that this *Esopus* Man has here given us a piece of New Philosophy and Divinity, which the World knew nothing of before. But a Notion so odd, as well as New, must not pass without Examination; and in order to that, I shall advance this Proposition in direct contradiction to the Defender, *viz. That there is no such Thing in the Divine Nature as Spiritual Sensation distinct from spiritual Knowledge or Intellection.* And in opposition to the contrary assertion, I offer these following considerations.

1. The Universal Authority of all Philosophers and Divines, both Schoolmen and others, who have treated Scholastically of the Divine Nature and Attributes, Unanimously acknowledging and asserting, That there are no other Immanent Acts in God but Acts of Intellection and Volition (which are absolutely necessary to the conceiving of God, as of an Intelligent Being) and consequently, that there is no such Thing as an Act of Sensation in God distinct from These.

2. That God is entirely and adequately comprehensible by himself these two ways: 1. By a Representation of the entire Idea of all his own Divine Perfections to himself, which is done by *Intellection*. And,

2. By way of Love of and complacency in these his

Infinite Perfections thus represented to him, which is done by *Volition*; and consequently there can be no such Third way Necessary to comprehend himself by, as this Author here calls *Spiritual Sensation*. 3. That if there be such an Act in the Divine nature as *Sensation* distinct from Intellection and Volition, then there is such a Thing also in the Divine Nature as a *Vis*, or *Potentia Sensitiva*, different and distinct from the *Vis Intellectiva*, and *Volitiva*, in the same. For since in the Case of *mutual and Self-Consciousness* this Author has asserted in the said Nature, a Power or Principle of *Consciousness* distinct from the Acts thereof, and has affirmed likewise *Consciousness* and *Self-sensation* to be the same Thing, he must for the same Reason necessarily assign also a Principle or Power of *Sensation* distinct from the Acts of *Sensation*. That is to say, a certain new thing called a *Spiritual Sensitive Power* in God, which is neither *Intellective*, nor *Volitive*, and yet absolutely necessary for the said Acts of *Spiritual Sensation* to issue from. But now for any one to assert the Addition of such a New Power to the Divine Nature, is a thing in it self so uncouth and unphilosophical, and contrary to the common sense of all the learned Men in the World, that there needs not one word to be argued against it. And as for this Author, I desire him to reconcile this new power in God with that zealous Harangue, p. 74, 75. made by him for the Actuality and Simplicity of the Deity, even to the Explosion of all Priority and Posteriority of our conceptions about it. But 47. If there be such a Thing as *Sensation*, and a *Vis sensitiva* in God, distinct from the *Vis Intellectiva*, and *Volitiva*; let this Man assign a solid Reason, if he can, why there are not *four Persons* in the Godhead. For
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(since, as the Schools affirm, *Totus Deus fecundus est*, there being no Act in God but what is productive of some thing,) what should hinder, but that as the Father communicates the Divine Essence, *per Intellectum*, and so begets a Son, and both Father and Son communicate their Divine Essence, *per voluntatem*, and so breathe forth the Holy Ghost; so all Three should produce a fourth Person in the Godhead, by communicating their Divine Essence by this way of *Internal Sensation*? I will not, I declare, presume to assert any Thing in such a Case, but shall leave it to the Learned and Judicious to judge of the whole matter. But I am sure it must press hard upon this New Invention.

And now after all, that we have here argued upon this point, I demand of this Man, upon what ground he asserts in God such a Thing as *Spiritual Sensation distinct in kind from Divine Knowledge*? (for it is his way to advance the most Heterodox Propositions, without the least offer of a proof of them) why; I defy all Mankind to find out any other ground of this assertion, besides the Thing it self asserted by him, *viz.* That each of the Divine Persons intimately feels himself to be what he is, and not another; and that *feeling* and *knowing* are quite different Things. This is all that he says, or pretends to say. In answer to which, I demand of him, whether he allows the Necessity of this Representation of *Feeling*, as *contra-distinct* in God to *Knowing*; (this being the sole ground of his assertion) from *Scripture* or *Reason*, or the proper *signification* of the word it self requiring it? If from *Scripture*, let it be produced, and we submit. If from *Reason*, let some Argument from the Nature of the Thing be produced, proving that there is some

Apprehensive Act in God of a quite different kind from Knowledge : but no such Argument ever yet appeared. And much less, in the Third and last place, can the genuine signification of the word *feeling* infer this. For does the word *feeling*, in the proper use of it, signify any thing *Spiritual* ? or can it be properly applied to God, if it does not ? No ; it is certain, that it properly signifies no such Thing, but on the contrary only a Corporeal Act requiring a Corporeal subject to lodge it in. So that (as has been observed before) *Spiritual feeling* is an arrant contradiction in *Adjecto*. And therefore the Truth is, *Feeling* can be no otherwise applied to Spiritual Beings, and especially to God himself than by a Trope and Metaphor ; and as *seeing, hearing and smelling* are applied to him : and we may as well ascribe to God a Self-Conscious *seeing*, a Self-Conscious *hearing*, and a Self-Conscious *smelling*, and all distinct from his Knowledge, as a Self-Conscious *Feeling*. God in Scripture is said to *see* and to *hear*, to express to us the Clearness and Quickness of his Knowledge, and in like manner may be said to *feel*, to express the Intimacy of his knowledge to the object known, there being no Act of sense, in which there is so near an application of the object to the faculty, as in *feeling*. So that this whole new assertion is founded upon nothing but meer Trope and Metaphor, translating Terms from their proper sensible signification to a figurative and spiritual ; which nothing but an absolute necessity, from the very Nature of Things can ever justify. And now I desire all Professors of Divinity to consider the confidence of this Man, and whither it may tend ; who, by drawing words from their proper signification to a Tropical

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(and this of his own head) shall presume to found a New Notion about the Divine Nature and Actings.. For let him prove any other ground for this Notion of *Spiritual sensation or feeling*, distinct from Knowledge in God, if he can. And therefore, since this is wholly a new Invention of his own, and not hitherto proved by any Argument, but his own bare word affirming it, I do here require him to produce his Arguments for it: for (it being a Proposition wholly new) it is incumbent upon the *Proposer* of it, first to prove it, and not upon his Adversary (maintaining the contrary *Thesis*, in actual and long possession) to disprove it; but only to expect and answer his Arguments as they shall be offered. I have, I confess, produced some Reasons against it already; but it was more than what the Rules of Disputation obliged me to. And therefore, I do here again call upon this Man to produce his Arguments for his new Assertion, declaring withal, That I here undertake to maintain this Thesis against him, *viz. That there is no such thing as Spiritual Sensation in God distinct from his Knowledge.* This, I say, I declare my self ready to defend against him as publickly as he has asserted the contrary Affirmative: And accordingly, in the Face of the World, I challenge him to the Dispute, and do otherwise declare him a disturber of the Church, and a perverter of our Religion by Paradoxes which he is not able to speak one word in the Defence of.

In the next place we have him making his last effort to keep up his sinking Cause and Credit with a downright Falsification, and an utter Change of the whole Question, hitherto in dispute between him and his Adversary: and that in these following words,

p. 78. l. 9. That he hopes, that if the Animadverter will try his Skill again, he should hear no more of his formal Reasons of Personality and Union, but that he will be pleas'd to speak to the True Point, viz. Whether a Self-conscious person be not one with himself, and distinguish'd from all other persons; and whether he does not feel himself to be thus one, and thus distinguish'd by Self-consciousness; and whether Three Divine Persons, who are thus mutually conscious to each other,

The state of the Question concerning Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness, with reference to the Divine Persons, changed and falsified by the Defender from what it is, as deliver'd by Dr. Sherlock, in his *Vindication*, &c.

be not naturally and essentially United into One God? And all other Disputes are certainly beside the Question. And if so, then I am sure his whole Vindication, and a great part of his very Defense of it are so too. But has this man's Confidence so totally swallow'd up his Conscience, that he dares offer so notorious a Passhood to the World in print? I do here solemnly averr, That what he has now set down as the True State of the Question between him and the Animadverter, is as far from it, as the bare Consequence of any thing is or can be from being the Cause of it. And that this may be made as clear to the Reader as the Day, he is desir'd to take notice, that the Animadverter wrote against this man's new Hypothesis about the Trinity, as he found it deliver'd in his Book entituled, *A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Blessed Trinity*, &c. and consequently, that the true state of the Question must be drawn from thence. And this has been fully and fairly done already in those several Propositions quoted and set down by me in my entrance upon the examination of his Answers to the Animadverter's Arguments; where the Reader will

will find the true and whole state of the Question laid before him in this man's own words; which tho' it be abundantly enough to shew his insufferable Falsification, yet to shew it more fully still, (if possible) and to save the Reader the trouble of casting his Eye backward and forward, I will here set down both what he says in this his *Defense*, and what he first asserted in his *Vindication*, together; that so, by comparing what he *retracts*, or rather *falsifies*, here, with what he had so positively affirm'd there, the Reader may impartially judge, whether such a one upon such a Subject can be fit either to dispute, or to be disputed with. And this shall be done in the following Particulars. As,

First, This Author, in his *Defense*, declares, *That the Question is only this; Whether Three Self-consciousnesses do not prove Three Self-conscious Persons to be really distinct from each other.* *Defense*, p. 61. l. 28. But in his *Vindication* he affirms, *That the Self-consciousness of every Person to itself makes them Three distinct Persons.* *Vind.* p. 63. And will any man alive here grant, or any Logick, but this Man's, allow, That, for Self-consciousness only to prove the Three Divine Persons really distinct, as he says in the *Defense*, and to make them so, as he says expressly in the *Vindication*, is the same thing? Or that, Whether you put the Question concerning the one, or concerning the other, it is one and the same Question still?

Secondly, In the same *Defense* he declares again, *That if each of the Three Persons have a Self-consciousness of their own, this distinguishes the Persons, and proves them really distinct; which is all that he desires.* *Def.* p. 64. at the beginning. But his *Vindication*, I must tell him,

him, speaks much higher, viz. *That the Self-Unity of a Spirit* (which he reckons each of the Divine Persons to be) *is nothing else but Self-Consciousness*, *Vind. p. 48.* And again, *The Essential Unity of a Spirit consists in Self-Consciousness, and it is nothing else that makes a Spirit one, and distinguishes it from all others*, *Vind. p. 74.* Now to be *That*, which only proves the *Three Persons Distinct*, and to be *That*, wherein their *Unity and Distinction* consists, and which originally distinguishes them from all others, are Things extremely Different; For as much as that may prove them Distinct, and secondarily distinguish them too, which neither originally distinguishes them, nor is that in which their original Unity and Distinction does consist.

3. He tells us in this Defense also, That the Dean no where asserts, *That mutual Consciousness is the formal Reason of the Essential Unity of the Three Persons, but that Three Persons who are thus mutually Conscious to each other, must be essentially one*, *Def. p. 68. l. 5.* In answer to which, he has been often told, That whatsoever makes or constitutes a Thing essentially one, or is that wherein its Essential Unity does consist, is the formal Reason of the said Unity. And as touching this, he affirms in this very Defense, p. 66. *That mutual Consciousness makes all Three Persons as much one, as Three can be one.* And likewise in his Vindication, *That mutual Consciousness makes all Three Persons Numerically one Divine Essence, or one God*, p. 84. And again, *That the Three Persons are Essentially one God by a mutual Consciousness*, p. 88. Now this surely implies a great deal more, Than that *Three Persons thus mutually Conscious are Essentially one.* For to say, That *Three mutually Conscious Persons are essentially one*, and that they are
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thus one by [or by reason of] their mutual Consciousness are Two quite different Propositions; even as different as these, viz. *That every Learned Man is Rational*, and, *That his being learned is that [by which] he is rational*: which latter is utterly false.

4. He goes on, and tells us again, *That if mutual Consciousness be essential to this Unity, so that Three Persons are thus United (that is, are one in point of Knowledge, and cannot be one without it) he will contend no further with any Man about it*, Defense p. 69. at the latter end. But whether he will or no, his *Vindication* will contend with him; in which he has asserted much more than this amounts to, (as the immediate forecited passages demonstrate) viz. *That mutual Consciousness [makes] the Three Persons essentially one God, and is That [by which] They are one, and [in which] their essential Unity consists*. And this I must tell him runs much higher than to say only, *That mutual Consciousness is essential to their Unity*: for it may be so only as a consequent essentially following it, and not as a Principle essentially constituent of it, and wherein it does consist. But in the

5th and last place, He declares himself more fully and roundly than before. If (says he) *Self-Consciousness necessarily results from and infers and proves a distinction of Persons, and mutual Consciousness supposes, results from, infers and proves the Unity of the Divine Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, it will satisfy the Dean without Disputing the formal Reason of Personality and Union*, Def. p. 75. l. 20. To which I answer; that I am not at all concerned what will satisfy the Dean, now that He is driven to the

Wall, but what the Dean has asserted before. And for this; as to the Point of Self-Consciousness in the first place, he having several times, in his *Vindication*, asserted each of the Divine Persons to be an Infinite Spirit, tells us, p. 74. *Vind.* That the Essential Unity of a Spirit [consists] in Self-Consciousness: and that it is nothing else, which makes a Spirit one, and distinguishes it from all others. And, That the Self-Consciousness of every one of the Divine Persons so it self [makes] them Three distinct Persons, *Vind.* p. 68. l. 5. And then, for mutual Consciousness, he tells us, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one by an Internal Consciousness, as every Man is one with himself, *Vind.* p. 56. l. 6. And, that the Three Persons are essentially one God [by] a mutual Consciousness, p. 88. 31. &c. And here, in this very Defense he tells us, That the Dean places the Unity of the Divine Persons in their mutual Consciousness; *Defense* p. 32. l. 9. And now (to sum up what he has said on both sides) Whether, for Self-Consciousness to be That in which the Personal Unity of a Spirit does [consist]; and which [makes] a Spirit or Person one with it self, and distinguishes it from all others; and [makes] Father, Son, and Holy Ghost Three distinct Persons: And likewise for mutual Consciousness to be That, which [makes] all the Three Persons to be essentially one God: and to be That [by which] they are so, and [in which] their Unity is placed, be no more than to suppose, prove, infer, and result from Both these, viz. their Personal and their Essential Unity respectively; that is to say, whether the formal Antecedent Reason of these be only the consequent of them, is left to every one of common sense to judge.

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But I shall trouble the Reader with no more of these Passages (tho' several more might be alledg'd) not doubting but that by this time he thoroughly sees, that the true state of the Question, and Point

in dispute is this, *viz. Whether Self-consciousness be that which [makes] each of the Divine Persons properly a Person, that is to say, personally one with himself, and distinct from all others, or (in other words) be that [by which] each Person*

The true state of the Question concerning *Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness*, with reference to the Divine Persons, taken from Dr. Sherlock's own words in his *Vindication*, &c.

is so, and *in which* his being so does consist? And likewise whether mutual Consciousness makes the Three Persons essentially one; or be that [by which] formally they are thus one, or [in which] their essential Unity does consist? This I aver to be the true and plain state of the Question, as it is held in the Affirmative by Dr. Sherlock throughout his whole *Vindication* on the one side, and as it is opposed by the Animadverter on the other: and consequently, that every one of those five fore-cited Passages is on the Vindicator's part a direct concession and giving up of the Point in controversy between them.

And I must hereupon seriously and solemnly profess, That the only Difficulty which I have yet met with in this Disputation, has been to make a proud, shameless man own his own Words, and abide by his own plain, positive, and repeated Assertions. Though I must tell him, That none is or can be more baffled than he who in his Defence is brought to deny what before he had affirmed. And thus we have here (as the Book calls it self) a Defence of Dr. Sherlock's Notion of the Trinity, if Dr. Sherlock's denying his Words be defending his Opinion.

But our Author comes now at length to clear himself of the Imputation of *Tritheism*, and here he says, *Defense* p. 78. line last. *That he heartily thanks the Animadverter for being so civil to him as not to charge him with Tritheism as his Opinion, but as the consequence of his Principles.* And great reason, I own, he has to thank him for so undeserved a Civility; though the Truth is, the Animadverter rather judged it a piece of Charity while he was disputing with one, who was still contradicting himself, to take him (as long as he could) by the better end of the contradiction. Nevertheless, if the Defender will be pleased to consult the Preface to the Animadversions, p. 16. l. 7. 2d Edition, he will find that how favourably soever the Animadverter may be thought to express himself in some other places, he speaks his thoughts more home and fully in that. For there he affirms, that his Adversarie's opinion does not only *infer* but also *imply Tritheism*; and this surely is as much more than the other, as an *Equipollent* is more than a *Consequent*. And whatsoever the Animadverter might think of this Author then, yet since his reading this *Defense* (in which there is Ten times more *Tritheism* than was in his first Book) and especially after that peremptory and prophane Affirmation, *Def. p. 8. l. 28. viz. That unless we admit the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Minds, there is not only an end of the Dean's Notion, but (he fears) of the Trinity too.* After this, I say, the Animadverter declares, That he does not only look upon his Opinion as downright *Tritheism*, but likewise accounts the Author himself as arrant a *Tritheist* to all intents and purposes, as *Peraticus Euphrates* (the beginner of the old Sect of the *Perata*)

or *Johannes Philoponus*, or as even *Valentinus Gentilis* himself, or any other of the *Tritheistick* Name & Tribe whatsoever; and that without any other difference, that he knows of, between this Author and *Valentinus Gentilis*, save only that *Valentinus* by his *Tritheism* got what he *deserv'd*, and this man with his *Tritheism* has got what he does not *deserve*.

But let us see how he defends himself; and that in the first place is by plainly confessing, *That to affirm the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Infinite Minds, is an unusual way of speaking*, Def. p. 79. and elsewhere, *That it is an inconvenient way of speaking*, p. 81. l. 33. and likewise *an improper way*, p. 84. l. 24. And that, it may be, no body so expressly used these Terms before himself, p. 81. l. 18. All this, I say, he confesses; and therefore I desire the Reader to compare it with this Man's professed Design; which was (having first proclaim'd himself an *Eupnuæ*-man, and flouted at all the Fathers, as neither able to conceive rightly, nor express themselves properly about the Trinity) to offer a plain, an easy, and much more intelligible account of this great Article, than the Christian Church was ever yet acquainted with. And now must all this be done by Terms *unusual, inconvenient, and improper, and never used expressly upon this Subject* (but by Hereticks) before? Is this, I say, the way of giving the *most intelligible account* of this Mystery, that was ever yet given of it; and that by throwing aside the Account which the whole Christian World has hitherto acquiesced in, to make room for it? If the Church will suffer Heresie and Impudence thus to ride and impose upon her, she may; but little, I am sure, is it for her Credit, that

TRITHEISM

that such things should be endured in Her Communion, and much less warranted by Her Authority, and encourag'd by her Preferments; when (as was shewn in the Preface to the Animadversions, p. 7.) the bare use of any *καίνοφωρια* in these high points, was with such rigour condemn'd by the Sixth General Council, and the users of it so severely proceeded against.

Well, but if by this man's own Confession his Words are so unjustifiable, how then does he think to bring himself off? Why, by the help of his old Friend *his Meaning*, that constant Plea and Refuge of a Baffled Person. But still, I say, what have we to do with this man's *Meaning* and *Intentions* against his plain, clear, and unquestionable Words used at least Forty times over? For, are Men's Words to be understood by their *Meaning*, or their *Meaning* by their Words? It is a pleasant thing certainly, that when Mr. Dean has brought himself into a Plunge by his Indefensible Expressions, Mr. *Meaning* must be call'd in to lift him out, and wipe him clean again, with his *Intentions*; and that he can find nothing else to defend himself with, but that *Comical Salvo* of the Renowned *Hugh Peters*, *Give me that word again*. But I would have this man know, that when the Church heretofore found any one Heretical in his Words, She never own'd or suppos'd him Orthodox in his *Meaning*. And accordingly I must here declare further, That I will not be over-rul'd or baulk'd in any Argument against him, by *what he means*, or *what he intends*; but having encounter'd and driven him off from his *own* plain, positive, express Words, (and that according to the Sence in which

which all Mankind understands them) I shall leave his precarious forlorn *meaning* to shift for it self.

Nevertheless, that we may not be too hard upon this [*Man of meaning*] let us see what his *meaning* here is: for possibly matters may be managed so, that even *this meaning* it self may need another *meaning* to rescue and set it right. He tells us therefore p. 80, 81. of this Defence, *That by Three Infinite Minds he means Three Infinite Intelligent Persons*; affirming moreover, p. 80. l. 13. *That a mind is an Intelligent Person, and every Intelligent Person a mind.* Both which Propositions, if [*mind*] be Universally taken in the first (as, by the whole tenour of his Discourse here, it must be) are manifestly false. For a Man is an *Intelligent Person*, and not a *mind*, and the Soul of Man on the other side is a *mind*, but not a *Person*, and the Divine Nature or Essence likewise absolutely considered is a *mind*, but not a *Person*, and consequently neither of them can be said to be an *Intelligent Person*. But let us see whether *Infinite mind* and *Intelligent Person*, do or can properly and logically import the same Thing, which I utterly deny, and that for these Reasons.

1. Because [*Mind*] signifies an *Absolute Being*; nothing *relative* belonging to the *Definition* of it; nor was it ever used by Writers but in an *Absolute*, *Irrelative* sense; so that we have here both *Signification* and *Definition*, together with *Universal Use* for the *Absoluteness* of the Term [*mind*]. But the Term [*Person*] applied to the Divine Persons, is always *Relative*, and does and must signify *Relatively*.

2. Because the Term [*Infinite mind*] is adequately predicated of God, and we properly say, that God is an

an *Infinite Mind*: But the Term *Infinite Intelligent Person* cannot be so predicated of God; for if there be Three such *Intelligent Persons* in the Godhead, we can no more, by a proper and Natural Predication, say, that *God is an Intelligent Person*, than we can say, *That God is the Father*.

3. Because if [*Infinite mind*] and [*infinite Intelligent Person*] be Terms equipollent and importing the same Thing; Then, since this Author elsewhere affirms, that *Three Infinite minds may be one Infinite mind*, it will follow (as we observed before) that *Three Infinite Intelligent Persons may be also one Infinite Intelligent Person*: for as much as in Terms Equipollent, the same Things may, and must be equally affirmed and denied of both of them. And this Consequence will affect this Author throughout this whole Dispute.

From all which I conclude, That an *Infinite mind* is not formally and properly an *Infinite Intelligent Person*, nor Equipollent to it, and since it is not so, I conclude further, That unless it may be allowed to any particular Member of the Catholick Church (and a private one too) to draw off a word from its proper Signification, Definition, and Universally received use, and that in a Principal Article of Faith; and to fasten an arbitrary sense of his own upon it, quite different from all These (as a *Relative* sense is from an *Absolute*) then it cannot be allowed to this Author to interpret *Three Infinite Minds by Three Infinite Intelligent Persons in the Article of the Trinity*. For at this Rate there can be nothing certain in any Article or Proposition of the Christian Faith, as settled by Councils, and received by the Church. But to shew how far this Man of Confidence, without shame, can stretch his
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Interpreting faculty, let this Notable Instance suffice. For having affirmed over and over, in his *Vindication*, and particularly, p. 66. *That not to acknowledge the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits, was Heresy and Non-sense*; Here, in his *Defense*, p. 81. l. 20. He tells us, *That his meaning there was, That to assert, Three distinct Divine Persons, who are not Three distinct Infinite Intelligent Persons, was Heresy and Nonsense*. And Nonsense no doubt it is with a vengeance. But in answer to so wretched an Evasi-
 on, I demand of this Man, whether ever he knew any Divine or Writer in the World, who owned a *Person*, and did not understand by the same an *Intelligent Person*? Nay, so far is he from having any ground for such a Pretence, that in strictness of speech, the Term [*Intelligent*] added to *Person*, is a meer Redundancy and Tautology. For as much as it is Essentially Implied in the *formal Notion* of a *Person*, which is defined *Suppositum Intelligens*: and therefore for this Man to suppose any one to assert *Three Persons*, and to deny them to be *Three Intelligent Persons*, is as much as to suppose that a Man may assert *Three Persons*, and yet deny them to be *Three Persons*. The very *supposal* of which is certainly a Degree of Non-sense next to the *asserting* it. But besides, I hope this Man is not so very Ignorant, as to affirm That [*a Mind*] and [*an Intelligent Person*] have the same signification. For suppose that it might be truly said [*That a Mind is an Intelligent Person*] that does not prove it to signify the same that [*Intelligent Person*] does; any more than because *Homo* is truly said to be *Animal*, therefore *Homo* and *Animal* are Terms perfectly Synonymous; and that by one we are still to under-

stand the other; which yet, if they properly signified the same Thing, we certainly ought to do. In a word, I refer it to the whole World to judge, Whether, if a Man may be suffered thus to interpret what he writes or says, he may not upon these Terms discourse of *Men*, and explain his meaning by *Angels*, discourse of *Trees*, and say, he means *Houses*? But such Absurd Liberty, especially in strict disputation, must not be endured. And accordingly, after all these Shiftings and struglings, he begins to despond, and plainly declares, *p. 81. l. 19. That he will not contend about the Term [Three Infinite Minds]*: By which I must tell him, that he effectually gives up the Thing in dispute; for as much as the main stress and force of the Argument rests upon the proper and received sense of the Terms. And whereas he says, *that no body before him had so expressly used these Terms [Three Infinite Minds or Spirits]* it has been already proved against him, that they were actually used, and insisted upon long before, by several Hereticks on the one Hand, and condemned by the Catholick Church on the other.

But to shew That He and his *Tritheism* are not to be parted so; but that, however (to save a broken Pate) he quits the Term *[Three Infinite Minds]* he yet holds fast the Thing signified by it, (as if the Heresy lay not in the Thing but in the word) He tells us, *p. 81. l. 29. That if the Dean [thinks] an Intelligent Person to be a Mind, and [means] no more by Three Minds than Three Intelligent Persons, let the Animadverter confute him, if he can.* Which is just, as if he should say, *If the Dean by a Cock means a Bull, let the Animadverter confute him for saying a Cock has two horns and four legs, if he can.* But to his ridiculous Plea

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I answer, First, That the Animadverter will dispute with no Man's *thoughts* or *meaning*, but with his *words*. Secondly, That the Defender here quite changes the Question. Which is not, *Whether an Intelligent Person be a Mind*: but whether *a Mind be formally and Convertibly an Intelligent Person*; which has been already both denied and disproved: And thirdly and lastly, That in the *Holy Trinity* the Animadverter admits (abating still for the forementioned Absurdity of the Tautology) *every Intelligent Person to be a Mind* but, for all that, denies *Three Infinite Intelligent Persons to be Three Minds*; For as much as they are *Intelligent* by vertue of *one Infinite Intelligent Mind* common to them all. And whereas he adds, *That if he means by Three Minds Three Intelligent Persons*, let the Animadverter try his skill to make *Trithemius* of *Three Minds*, and excuse *Three Intelligent Persons* from the same Charge. My answer is, First, That the Animadverter needs try his skill no more where he finds no more strength to try it upon. Secondly, That this Question is not to be determined by what *here* any particular Man whatsoever means by a *Mind*, contrary to the sense of the whole World concerning it, but by what the whole World means by the word [*Mind*] though never so contrary to his particular private sense thereof; which now after a baffle he alleges to defend himself by. And then lastly, For the *assertion* of charging the Assertion of *Three Infinite Minds* with *Trithemius*, but not that of *Three Infinite Intelligent Persons*. That also has been more than sufficiently proved against him already, by having shown, that *Three Infinite Minds* are *Three Infinite Absolute Beings*; and that an *Infinite Absolute Being* being convertibly the same

same with God, there can be no multiplying of such a Being without a Multiplication of Gods. But that on the other side, the Three Divine Persons, being properly Three *Relative Subsistences* of one and the same Infinite Absolute Being included in all and each of them, and a *Relative subsistence* being capable of being multiplied without a Multiplication of the said Infinite Absolute Being, it follows, That though Three Minds infer a Plurality of Gods, yet Three Persons do not so. And let this Author, with all his Noise and flouncing, disprove the Reason of this Difference between *Minds* and *Persons*, if he can: For I will undertake, that the Animadverter will not only abide by it, but also venture the issue of this whole Controversy upon it: And we shall have more use of it again presently.

In the mean time let us examine his Answer to the Animadverter's first Argument against his Three distinct Infinite Minds, which proceeds thus.

First Argument. "Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits are Three distinct Gods. But the Three Divine Persons are not Three distinct Gods: And therefore the Three Divine Persons are not Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits."

And now how does he clear himself of this Argument? Why first, by reproaching it for being proposed in *Made* and *Figure*; and I on the contrary reproach him for not answering it with the same Logical Regularity with which it was proposed. Secondly, He alleges as Parallel to this Argument, an Argument brought by the *Socinians* to prove, that there are not Three Persons in the Godhead; Which (to shew that Logic is as much an Enemy to him as he can be to Logic) he sets down thus.

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Three distinct Infinite Intelligent Persons are Three distinct Gods. But there are not Three distinct Gods; And therefore there are not Three distinct Infinite Intelligent Persons in the Godhead.

In which Syllogism we have these two Terms viz. [*Three distinct Infinite Intelligent Persons*] and [*Three distinct Gods*]. But as for the Third Term I desire this Author to shew it me; for I must confess I cannot find it. I know well enough how this *Socinian* Syllogism must be supplied and perfected; and therefore (though it is not my business to correct his Blunders but to expose them) I shall set it right for him thus.

Three distinct Infinite Intelligent Persons are Three distinct Gods, but Father, Son and Holy Ghost are not Three distinct Gods, and therefore Father, Son and Holy Ghost are not Three Infinite Intelligent Persons.

Thus I say this *Socinian* Argument ought to proceed; in which the Major Proposition, and the Conclusion, are certainly false. But how does this affect the Animadvertiser, or how does it prove his Argument, which proceeds upon a different Major Terminus, to be false too? unless this declared Enemy of Logick will have the Syllogistical form (which indeed is the same in both Arguments) to determine the truth or falshood of the Conclusion. But that we know, must be here determined by the Truth or Falshood of the matter of the Premises, or of one of them, and not by the bare form of the Syllogism. Accordingly, if this Man will prove a Parity between the Animadvertiser's Argument and that of the *Socinians*, he must prove, That the Animadvertiser's Major Proposition, [*viz. Three distinct Infinite Minds are Three distinct Gods*] is of the very same signification and import

port, and consequently of the same Falshood with that in the Socinian Syllogism, viz. [*That Three Infinite Intelligent Persons are Three Gods*]. But that is the Thing now in dispute; and the Animadverter denies it; let us therefore see how this Defender proves it. Which he endeavours to do by affirming, *That the Proof of the Animadverter's Major Proposition will serve as well for an Eternal Infinite Intelligent Person as for an Eternal Infinite Mind, viz. Thus: God (says he) and Eternal Infinite Intelligent Person are Terms as equivalent and convertible, as God, and Infinite Mind or Spirit are.* These are his words, *Def. p. 82. l. 21.* And they are false and Heretical to the Height. For will this Man after this open his mouth against Sabellius, who asserted the very same Thing, viz. *That God and infinite Intelligent Person are Terms convertible and commensurate?* But by his, and Sabellius's good leave, it is absolutely denied him, that these are Terms convertible, as not being adequately Predicable of one Another. For to say that God is an Intelligent Person; (whether we take Person determinately or indeterminately) if there be more Intelligent Persons than one in the Godhead, is (as was noted before) a Proposition as Absurd and Illogical, as to say, *That God is the Father, or That God is the Son:* the Predicate in such Propositions being of less compass than the Subject, which (where it is not larger) ought to be Commensurate to it at least. And I do particularly insist upon This, That if the Term [*Three Intelligent Persons*] be adequately and convertibly predicated of [*God*] the Term [*an Intelligent Person*] (which can signify no more than one Person) cannot be adequately predicated of God too. For in all adequate Predications;
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the subject must take in the whole compass of the Predicate, and the Predicate answer and come up to the whole compass of the Subject. What the Defender adds next is very impertinent, viz. *That the bare Terms from which the Animadverter argues, do not prove this Distinction, to wit, between one Mind, and one Infinite Intelligent Person, p. 83. l. 2.* For if by bare Terms, he means Terms stripped of their signification, such Terms, I confess, can prove Nothing but the folly of him that uses them; but therefore I must tell this Man once for all, *That the Animadverter Argues from the Terms [Infinite Intelligent Mind] and Infinite Intelligent Person* according to that Universally received sense which they actually bear at Present all the Christian World over; how or which way soever they came by it. This, I say, is that, which alone the Animadverter argues from, and insists upon. For I hope this Author would not have the Animadverter invade his Prerogative, which is to argue, not from Terms or words, but from meanings nothing relating to them. I conclude therefore from what has been said, that [God] and [Infinite Mind] are Terms every way adequate and convertible (as even this Author himself grants) and that [God] and [Infinite Intelligent Person] are not so. But he goes on, and tells us, *That it is custom only which has more reconciled us to the word [Person] than [Mind]; and that, setting aside this Dispute (viz. of the Trinity), it is the sense of all Mankind, (which he learnedly proves from its being the sense of the Gormians) That the same Thing is to be understood by [an Infinite Mind] and [an Infinite Person].* Thus He, p. 83. l. 4. But can any Thing be more absurd and Ridiculous than to talk of setting aside this.

this Dispute, viz. Concerning the Trinity, when it is the Subject of this Dispute alone which we are here concerned in? and to allege the sense of all Mankind about these Terms before there was any Revelation of a Trinity to apply them to, and this also in opposition to the Universal sense of the Christian Church concerning the same, founded upon such a Previous Revelation? Those indeed who in Ancient Times owned *one God*, but knew nothing of a Trinity, might use the Terms [*Infinite Mind*] and [*Infinite Person*] indifferently, and take the latter in as *absolute* a sense, as they did the former. But what is this to us Christians, after General Councils, and the Universal constant use of the Church, has added a *Relative signification* to the word [*Person*] as applied to this subject, but never used the words [*Mind* or *Spirit*] but (according to their Original and Universal signification) in a sense *Absolute* and *Irrelative*? And therefore admitting his Evangelist *Plato* (as he reads him, quoted by *Dr. Cudworth*) to have held *Three Infinite Minds to be one God*, it is not at all the less an Absurdity and a Contradiction to all Principles of Reason and Religion, for its being held by *Plato*; though I confess it appears more manifestly so by this Author's holding it too, whose talent lyes so remarkably this way. But he tells us, *That the Dispute, whether there be one or Three Infinite Minds or Intelligent Persons in the Godhead, is of an higher Nature than to be determined by convertible Terms*, p. 83. l. 12. which I positively deny; and affirm, that although the Thing disputed, be of never so high a Nature, yet Reason is able to determine these Two Things concerning it. First, Whether it be contrary to Reason or no? And secondly, That
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if it be so, it ought not to be reckoned as an Article of Religion. To both which I add, that to argue from *Terms convertible* is as sure a way of Ratiocination as the Mind of Man can proceed by; and consequently, that if Reason arguing this way, proves the Absurdity and Impossibility of *Three distinct Infinite Minds in one* and the same *Infinite Mind or Godhead*, we need no further Arguments to overthrow it. But as for the Author's Complement to the Animadverter, viz. *That he learnedly proves what every School-Boy knows*. The Animadverter bids me tell him, that School-Boys generally know *Greek, Latine, and Grammar*; which is more than some confident *Writers*, or rather *Copy-mongers* can pretend to. But he proceeds, and says, *that since the Animadverter has made [God] and [Infinite Mind or Spirit] only equipollent and convertible Terms, the Defender may allow him this, and still deny his Major Proposition [That therefore Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits are Three distinct Gods.]* For though *God is an Infinite Mind, and an Infinite Mind is God*, yet it does not follow, *That Three distinct Infinite Minds are Three distinct Gods, no more, than that Three Infinite Intelligent Persons are Three distinct Gods*, p. 83. l. 27. All which is profound Reasoning indeed, viz. That because in *Terms not Equipollent or Convertible* (as the *Terms [God] and [Infinite Intelligent Person]* are not) the multiplication of one Term does not multiply the other, therefore neither must it do so in *Terms perfectly Equipollent*, as *[God] and [Infinite Mind]* confessedly are.

But I shall divide my Answer to what he has here said, into Two parts, and consider, First, The force of Arguing from *Equipollents*. And secondly, Examine

mine whether the Term [*Distinct Infinite Persons*] (which puts the case as high as it can be) does as much infer *Three distinct Gods*, or *Three distinct Infinites*, as the Animadverter contends, that *Three distinct Infinite Minds* do and must. And

First, For the matter of Equipollency. Whereas this Author in the forecited place says, *That he may allow the Animadverter, That [God] and [Infinite Mind or Spirit] are equipollent and convertible, and yet deny, that therefore Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Gods*: I answer, That an Ignorant unwary Adversary may allow a great deal more than will do him good: But whatsoever this Man either grants or denies (as, for ought I see, Cross and Pile may be the Logick he proceeds by in both) I do affirm, that if [*God*] and [*Infinite Mind*] are Terms equipollent, then according to all the Principles of Reason, and Rules of Argumentation, which have hitherto obtained in the World, the multiplication of one equipollent necessarily and unavoidably infers the multiplication of the other. And the better to make this out, and to relieve his Ignorance in some measure, I would have him take notice. First, That the Reason of this mutual Inference between Terms equipollent is, because the equipollency of Terms imports a perfect formal Identity in their signification, or Thing signified by those Terms (for I speak now of equipollent Terms only, not Propositions): As for instance, *Homo*, and *Animal Rationale*, are Terms properly and formally equipollent: and then, I hope, that for one and the same thing (I say formally the same) to be multiplied, and not to be multiplied will be granted impossible. In the next place, I must tell this Author, That the Conditions of equipollent Terms are these.

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First, That they require the same Signs, *viz.* of Universality, Singularity, and Particularity. Secondly, That they require the same Predicates, whether affirmative or negative. And thirdly and lastly, That they have the very same consequents. These, I say, are the Necessary and Essential Conditions of equipollents: for supposing a failure of any of them; they cannot be so much as equipollent. Which thus premised, we are to observe further, That this Author himself allows the Terms [God] and [Infinite Mind or Spirit] to be Terms equipollent, p. 82. l. 25. From whence I infer; that if there be a plurality of *Infinite Minds*, there must be a plurality of *Gods* too: since if one should be multiplied and not the other, there could be no Identity of signification, nor consequently equipollency in the Terms; which can never take place where one equipollent Term may be truly affirmed, and the other as truly denied of any Thing, or any Thing of either of them; which is so very plain, that that fundamental ground of all discourse, *Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse*, cannot be more self-evident. And therefore let us see what this Man alleges next. If God (says he) be an *Infinite Mind*, and there be Three *Infinite Minds*, it must follow, That each of these *Infinite Minds* distinctly and by himself considered, is God; nor that these are Three distinct Gods, but one God, p. 84. l. 7. But I affirm, that it must follow not only That each of them [distinctly] is God, but that each of them is [a distinct] God: For since he grants [God] and [Infinite Mind] to be Terms equipollent, and since Terms equipollent must have the same Predicates and consequents, if the Term [Distinct] be ascribed to and predicated of [Infinite Mind] it must be predica-

red. of, and ascribed to the Term [God] as to the other equipollent; and so one must be as [distinct] as the other: and then if each *Infinite Mind* be a *distinct God* Three Infinite Minds must be Three *distinct Gods*; if there be any such thing as *consequence* in the World: In a word, *Distinction* and *Multiplication* are (according to this Author) Predicates belonging to [*Infinite Mind*], and therefore by vertue of the equipollency of the Terms they must equally belong to [God] too. But this is not all that follows from this Man's Assertions: For, as he grants here that the Terms [*Infinite Mind*] and [God] are equipollent, so he affirms, p. 82. l. 24. That [God] and [*Infinite Intelligent Person*] are Terms equipollent also; whereupon, by the Rule of equipollency, if there be [*but one God*] there can be [*but one Infinite Intelligent Person*] likewise: For as much as both equipollents must have the same *Predicates* and *consequents* belonging to them. Which certainly represents this Author's Hypothesis as the greatest Monster that ever the Tongue or Pen of Man brought forth. For first, by owning the equipollency of [God] and [*Infinite Mind*] and withal asserting *Three Infinite Minds*, he inevitably brings in *Tritheism*; and next, by asserting the equipollency of [God] and *Infinite Intelligent Person* and thereby a *Singularity* of one as well as of the other, he does as necessarily run into the contrary Heresy, which is *Sabellianism*. And so I pass from the equipollency of Terms to the second Part of my Answer, which was to examine, whether the Term [*Three distinct Infinite Persons*] does not as much infer a Plurality of Gods as the Term [*Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits*] does. Which the Defender here affirms, and the Animadverter as positively

positively denies. And both the Reason of his Denial and the Difference of the ~~Case~~ are very full and clear. And ending in This, *That Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Absolute Beings, Three Essences, Three Natures, each existing by it self, without requiring any Subject to inhere in, or to be supported by: And every such Numerical Nature or Essence, must have its Numerical distinct Attributes or Predicates so belonging to it, that one and the same Numerical Attribute cannot belong to any other Numerical distinct Nature besides, but that each Numerical Nature must have its Numerically distinct Attributes, confined wholly to it self: whereupon one and the same Numerical Infinity (which is a Natural Attribute) cannot belong to more Numerically distinct Natures than to one alone. But now on the other side, Three Divine Persons are not Three distinct Natures, Essences, or Absolute Beings, existing by themselves (as Minds or Spirits do) but Three Modifications, or Relative Subsistences, of one and the same Nature, in which they all exist together, as in their Subject, and cannot possibly exist by themselves without it, whereupon as one Numerical Nature is common to these several Subsistences, so the Numerical Infinity of the said Nature, must together with it, belong in common to the same. In short, Three distinct Minds being Three distinct Essences or Natures, existing by themselves, can never be Infinite by one Numerical Infinity, any more than by one Numerical Nature belonging in common to them. But on the contrary, Three Divine Persons, being properly Three Subsistences of one and the same Nature, may have one and the same Infinity, as well as Nature, belonging to them all. But*
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you will say, when there is mention of *Three distinct Infinite Persons* does not the Term *Distinct* being joined to the Term *Infinite* import a *distinction* and consequently a Plurality of *Infinities*, and so of Gods too? I answer, No; Because the Term *distinct* though next in place to the Term *Infinite* yet being but an *Attribute* must immediately in construction affect the Term *Persons* as the proper Subject of it and not the Term *Infinite* which is but another *Attribute* it self, and immediately affects the same Subject too. So that *Three distinct Infinite Persons* signify but as much as *Three distinct Persons* who are *Infinite*: the Term *distinct* being here exegetical of the Numeral Term *Three*; and so belonging directly to the *Persons* not to their *Infinity*. Just as if we should say *Three distinct Omniscient, or Omnipotent Persons* the Term *distinct* belongs immediately and directly to the *Persons*, and is not properly an Attribute of their *Omniscience* or *Omnipotence*. In like manner the Divine Persons are said to be *Three distinct Infinite Persons*: but how? not by three distinct *Infinities*, of which each Person has one to it self, but by one and the same Numerical *Infinity*, common to all Three. And yet I own, that even this one common Infinity belongs *distinctly* that is to say, after *a distinct manner* to each of the Divine Persons, even as the Divine Nature it self does. And this is what I insist upon as the True state of this matter, and shall add no more, but leave it to the Learned and Impartial Reader to judge of the Disparity of the Case: for nothing can prove a parallel in the Two forecited Instances, or in the consequences of them, but that which prove *Three absolute entire Beings*

Beings or Essences, and Three ~~distinct~~ ^{infinite} ~~substances~~ of one Numerical Being or Essence to be the same; and that one and the same Numerical Attribute may as well belong to Three such Absolute entire Beings or Essences, as to one Numerical Absolute Being under Three distinct Modes or Relations.

And by this we may judge of the Truth of the Defender's following words, viz. *That the Adverser was aware That the Objection of Three Gods would lie against Three Persons as well as against Three Minds* p. 85. l. 13. To which answer, that the Adverser never judged so, but yet judged it the Parr of a Disputant to answer any *seeming* Objection against the Truth defended by him, and accordingly he produced and answered this, as such an one and no better. But how did he answer it? Why, by shewing that there was this difference between them, viz. That the Notion of a Person in the Godhead essentially importing an Absolute Being under a certain Relation, afforded something for the Divine Persons to be distinguished by, and something for them to *adhere in*; but that the Notion of a Mind or Spirit, importing nothing but a bare Absolute simple Being, without any such Relation, Three Infinite Minds or Spirits could not be otherwise distinguished from one Another but by that whole Absolute Being or Nature, and consequently by a Total Distinction. This Argument the Defender repeats, adding withal, *That the sum of it amounts to no more but this, viz. That Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Gods because they are distinguished* l. 20. But will this shameless Falsificator say so? and affirm, That for several Beings or Essences to be distinguished by the whole of what they are, is no more than barely

barely to be distinguished? For are there not partial Distinctions, and modal distinctions, and accidental distinctions of somethings? and will this Ignoramus say, That Things thus distinguished are distinguished by the whole of what they are? But says he again, If notwithstanding this Distinction they are essentially and inseparably one, they are not Three distinct Gods, p. 83. l. 22. And, no doubt, they are not so, if they are essentially one; as on the contrary, they must be so, if they are not essentially one. But then can there be a grosser Absurdity in Nature than to suppose it possible for Three distinct Essences (as three distinct Minds are) to be essentially one? I must tell this Author, that it is a contradiction in the Terms. All distinction of Essences by themselves being (as the very Term imports) an Essential Distinction of the same: and for Three essentially distinct Things to be essentially one, is for them to be Three, and One, Distinct and not Distinct, in the same respect, which is absolutely impossible; and would utterly confound the Distinction and Unity of the Divine Persons, which can never be Both of the same kind. And I am confident, that there is hardly a Sophister of a Years standing in either of the Universities, but would look upon this Proposition, viz. That Three distinct Essences, or essentially distinct Minds, may yet be essentially one, as much fitter to be hissed at, than disputed against.

But, says the Defender, are not Three Infinite Intelligent Persons as much Three Absolute simple Beings and Essences as Three Minds? p. 85. l. 27. No; He has been told again and again, that they are not; and that because Three Persons are only Three distinct Relative Subsistences of one and the same Infinite Intelligent Being,

Being, or Essence included in all and each of them. Whereupon he repeats these following words out of the Animadversions, viz. "That the Divine Persons are Three Relatives, or one simple Being or Essence under Three distinct Relations, and consequently differ from one another, not wholly, and by all that is in them, but only by some *mode* or *respect* peculiar to each, and upon that account causing their distinction. Thus the Animadverter. And what says Sir Scorn and Ignorance to this? Why; that it is all perfect Gibberish: That is in other words, That he is not able to answer or refute one Tittle of it. For let me tell His Emptiness, that such Gibberish as it is, is the Language used by all the Divinity-Schools in Christendom, in the Explication and account they give of this great Point of Divinity. And accordingly I have transcribed the whole Passage, as avowing every Syllable of it against this Ignorant Assumer, and desiring the Learned Reader to pass his strictest Examination, and his severest censure upon it.

But let us see what follows. And here he asks the Question, *What the Three Divine Persons in the Unity of the Divine Essence are? Three Relations, Three Modes, Three Respects without some Being?* p. 86. l. 17. I answer, That they are neither Three bare Modes nor Relations or Respects, but Three Relative Subsistences, or Subsisting Relations of one and the same Infinite Divine Nature, Essence, or Mind, included in and belonging to all and each of the said Subsistences. This is the Account which I have given, and still give of the Three Divine Persons, and which (as I told him before) I shall firmly abide by; and therefore without asking any more such silly Questions, let him

reckon upon it, and set himself to confute it, and prove, that it makes the Divine Persons Three *meer Modes or Relations*, if he can. And whereas he says, *That Three Relatives are not Three Relations, but Three Things related to each other*, p. 85. l. 15. I answer, that the first part of his Assertion, *viz. That Three Relatives are not Three Relations*, is a meer Childish Cavil. For both *Person* and *Relation* are sometimes taken in an *Abstract*, and sometimes in a *Concrete* sence; and no Body says, that *Persons* are properly called *Relations*, but thus *concretely* taken; and as *Relation* implies the *Essence* conjoined with it: though yet, to help us to a better and more distinct conception of these Things, we are sometimes forced to conceive and speak of one as *Abstracted* from the other: but still as the Schools observe, *Relative* and *Relation*, in *Divinis*, are not really distinct Things, but one and the same Thing under several ways of Conception, and Expression. But it is the latter part of his Assertion, in which we are most concerned; *viz. That Three Relatives are Three Things related to each other*. Where, if he understands the word [*Things*] in a strict *Metaphysical* sence, for Three distinct entire Beings or Essences, I deny, That the Three Divine Persons are in this sence Three [*Things*] related to each other. But one Thing, that is to say, one entire Being or Essence under Three distinct *Relations*, or *Relative Subsistences*, mutually respecting or referring to one Another. And this indeed is the Point, which this Man has been driving at all along, *viz. That* each of the Divine Persons has a distinct entire Being or Essence of its own belonging to it, and that as really distinct from the Beings or Essences of the other two, as one Being or Essence can be distinguished

distinguished from another. Which I affirm to be perfect, Rank, downright *Trisheism*. Whereupon he tells us again (with his usual Confidence and no Proof) *That though the Three Divine Persons may, with respect to their Three Real Subsistences be called Three Infinite Eternal Minds, yet they are not Three Absolute simple Beings or Essences*, p. 87. l. 19. To which I answer. First, That the Term [*Mind*] is a Term properly importing [*Nature*] not [*Subsistence*], and consequently, That the Divine Persons can never be called Three distinct *Minds* barely from their being Three distinct *Subsistences* (since all these subsistences may be in one and the same *Infinite Mind*) but from their being Three distinct *Natures* or *Essences*; which because they can never be, neither can they be called *Three distinct Minds*. Secondly I affirm, That the Term [*Mind*] universally signifies an *Absolute Being*; and that to talk of a *Mind* that is not an *Absolute Being*, is as much as to talk of a *Man* that is not an *Animal Rationale*; and so well am I assured of this, That I do here Challenge this Man to produce me so much as one Classick, one Scholastick, or Theological Writer, or Christian Council, that ever used the word [*Mind* or *Minds*] in any other signification than that of an *Absolute Being* or *Essence*. And therefore when he shall have proved, That Three Minds are not Three Absolute Beings or Essences, or that three Absolute entire Beings can be Three Relative Subsistences or Modifications of one and the same Infinite Mind or Being, then I will grant that he has defended his Assertion against the Animadverter; and not only so, but that he has full power also (by a *Theological use of his own making*) to alter the fence and signification of

all words, in spite of the World ; and, by virtue of the same, may (if he pleases) call the Deanry of *Paul's* the Archbishoprick of *Canterbury*, and behave himself accordingly. But it is very pleasant to see him here twice in *p. 87.* proving his Three Infinite Minds to be Three Personal Subsistences by that exploded *Chimera* of a man and his living Image ; which having been so fully baffled, and exposed, and rejected for its Prophaness as well as its Non-sence, this Man surely must have a Degree of *Luck* equal to his *Confidence*, if he thinks to make one gross Absurdity an Argument to prove and make good another.

At length he concludes his lame self-contradicting Answer with these words, *Had the Dean* (says he) *made Three complete, Absolute, Eternal Minds he had been justly chargeable with making Three Gods, p. 87. l. 32.* And that, I assure him is a concession large enough ; For I do here affirm, That he has asserted every one of the said Particulars, whether he will own it or no. For first, he has asserted *Three Infinite Minds* ; and it has been effectually proved against him from the *Signification, Definition, and constant use* of the Term. That *Three Minds are formally Three Absolute Beings.* And secondly, He has asserted these *Three Minds* to be *Three distinct Persons*, and thereby has asserted also their *Completeness* ; since *Personality* is that, which gives the utmost completion to the existence of an Intelligent Nature : And thirdly and lastly, By asserting the said Minds *Infinite* ; he asserts them also *Eternal*. For as much as nothing can be Infinite but what is infinitely perfect, nor can any thing be *Infinitely perfect* without including the Perfection of *Eternity* in it. So that if this Man would but once in his Life abide

abide by his own words (which a Self-Contradictor, when he is pinched, never will) we should need no other proof, but his forecited Confession to convince him, That he stands justly charged with *asserting Three Gods*. And whereas he asserts next, *That one and the same Infinite and Eternal Mind is* [repeated] *in Three Subsistences*, p. 88. l. 1. I must tell him again, That the Term [repeated] is not to be admitted or endured here; since the *Repetition* of a Thing is properly nothing else, but the *Production* of another Individual Instance, one or more, of the same kind. And whether this be applicable to, or affirmable of the Divine Nature or Godhead, let every one, not abandoned by common sense, judge.

In fine, when this Man shall have proved these following Positions collected from him, and held by him, *viz.*

1. That [*Infinite Mind*] and [*Infinite Intelligent Person*] are Terms as equipollent, adequate, and convertible, as [*God*] and [*Infinite Mind*] are.

2. That though [*God*] and [*Infinite Mind*] are Terms adequately convertible and equipollent, yet that Three *Distinct Infinite Minds* are not Three *distinct Gods*: whereas one *equipollent* can never without a contradiction be *multiplied* without a multiplication of the other.

3. That Three Minds are not Three Absolute Natures or Essences; or that Three Absolute Natures or Essences can be Three Relative *Subsistences* (and consequently *Modifications*) of one and the same Infinite Mind.

4. That Three distinct Essences, or Three *essentially distinct* Minds may be *essentially* one.

When,

When, I say, he shall have proved all these with as much Evidence as he has asserted them with Confidence, then will he have secured his *Tritheism* against the Animadverter's first Argument, and not before. And so I pass on to consider what he has to say to the

Arg. 2.

Second, Which is this. "Three distinct Minds or Spirits are Three distinct Substances; but the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Substances, and therefore they are not Three distinct Minds or Spirits. In answer to which the Defender tells us, That the *Dean* does not pretend to know any thing of the Substance of a Mind, and much less of God, who is an Infinite Mind, p. 88. l. 11. But does not this very Man (who never contradicts himself, but when he speaks, or writes) positively profess to give an Account of the Nature of a Mind or Spirit, in p. 7. of this *Defense*, telling us, That it consists in *Internal vital Sensation*? And is not the Nature of a Mind the Substance of it, even according to this Author, who in the 15th line of this 88th page, uses the words [*Nature or Substance*] as signifying the same Thing? And now, will he disclaim all pretence of knowing any thing of the substance of a Mind or Spirit, after he has undertook to give the World an Account what the Nature or Substance of them is, and wherein it does consist? But I leave the Reader to reconcile this Man as he finds him here in this 88th page to himself in the 7th page of the same *Defense*, if he can. But he must not think to carry off this fallacy of the consequent so. For though we understand not, by an immediate inspection of things themselves, the Specifick Nature, or Essence, of this or that kind of Substance, yet surely the

the *General Nature* of Substance may by *discourse* be known : and it would be a pleasant consequence, that because we cannot tell what the *Particular Nature* of such or such a substance is, that therefore we cannot know it to be a *Substance*. And therefore he asks, p. 89. l. 20. *What a Substance is?* Adding withal, *That he hopes the Animadverter will not affirm it to be that quod subsistat Accidentibus ; since that would make God himself, who is incapable of Accidents, to be no Substance.* And it is shrewdly argued, upon my word. But why then does he stop here, without giving us the True Account what *Substance* positively is ? Which the very Elements of Logick and Philosophy might have taught him, *viz.* That *substance is a Being existing by it self, so as neither to inhere in, or be supported by another Being as a Subject.* This, Sir, is the true Account of what a *Substance* is : And such a *Substance* I affirm a Mind or Spirit to be. But as for that which does *Substare Accidentibus*, it imports not the General Nature, or Essence of Substance, but only a *property* of one sort of Substance, *viz.* Such as are created. But he goes on and tells us, *That though understanding and Being, Nature or Substance may be distinguished in Created finite Beings, yet that St. Austin had taught him, that they are the same in God, p. 88. l. 15.* And I grant, that according to the *Real Existence* of the Thing they are so : but, for all that, I affirm, That they differ *formally*, that is, according to the several *conceptus objectivi*, which they afford to the Mind, and of which one *conceptus objectivus* can never be the other, nor be applied to several Notions of one and the same Thing. So that, although God be indeed one pure simple Act, yet if we do not conceive and discourse of this simple Act,

Act, under some Distinction, such as is between a Subject and its Attributes, a Principle and its Acts, together with the several Respects it bears to several Objects, neither St. Austin, nor He, nor any Man alive can discourse of God as of an Intelligent Being, or Agent at all. And therefore, whereas he adds again, *That if in the Unity of the Godhead there be but Three such distinct Understandings, or Minds, or Intelligent Persons, who are not each other, nor understand by each other, but distinctly by themselves, he is not concerned about distinct Substances*, p. 88. at the end. In answer to that, I tell him first, That if he is concerned about *Three distinct Minds* in the Godhead, the Reason of Things shall force him to be concerned about *Three distinct Substances* in the same, whether he will or no. Secondly, That though I grant *Three Intelligent Persons* to be in the Godhead, yet I deny *Three distinct Understandings or Minds* to be in it; but that these *Three Intelligent Persons* are such by one Numerical Infinite Intelligence, Understanding or Mind, common to all Three; and that albeit one of the *Persons* neither is nor can be the other, nor yet understands by the other, but each of them distinctly by himself, yet that they understand by one and the same Understanding distinctly belonging to each Person; and accordingly for his better Instruction, I must tell him, that it is one Thing for each Person to have an Infinite Understanding or Mind distinctly belonging to him, and quite another to have a distinct Infinite Mind belonging to each of them. Which distinction being very great ought always carefully to be attended to; but, that it will be ever able to make its way into this Man's Understanding, I cannot undertake.

But

But he comes now to examine how the Animadverter proves, *That Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Substances*. And because he draws his proof of it from the Definition of a Mind or Spirit, *viz.* That it is *Substantia Incorporea Intelligens*; This Man replies, *Should we now deny his Definition and say, that a Mind is Res cogitans, he would be undone for want of his Substances,* p. 89. l. 7. No, Sir Ignorance, No. While the Animadverter can make good *one substance* in the Godhead he will never be undone for want of more. But could any one imagine this Man so very weak as he here makes himself, by thinking that a *Res cogitans* can be any Thing else but *Substantia Cogitans*? For can an Accident *Cogitare*? or be either the *Principium* or *Subiectum Quod* of any Thought? or does *Res* signify any Thing properly but either a *Substance* or an *Accident*? or can *Substantia Cogitans* be any other than *Substantia Intelligens*? Or lastly, can there, in simple Beings, be a *Substantia Intelligens*, that is, not also *Incorporea*? What gross, thick, abominable Ignorance does this Man in this very one Expression betray? But he is now, as he tells us for *capping Definitions* with the Animadverter, p. 89. l. 10. and to that purpose gives us this as the Definition of a Person, *viz.* That it is *Natura Rationalis Individua Substantia*. Though he has been told before, That this Definition (with all due respect to Boetius be it spoke) was long since rejected by most Divines, Schoolmen and others as *defective*; or explained by others in a very different sense from what the Term [*Individua*] now bears; for that (according to the generally received sense of it) it would certainly infer two distinct Persons in our Saviour upon his Incarnation. It is true

indeed, that every Person is *Natura Rationalis Individua Substantia*, That is to say, true in the Nature of an *Essential Predicate*, as affirming nothing of a Person but what necessarily belongs to it: but, for all that, it is not a *true definition*, as not being adequate to the Thing defined, nor containing all that is in it, and consequently not *convertible* with it, as a definition ought to be: So that if this be his *capping Definitions* (as he calls it) he would be much better employed in *capping Verses* amongst the Boys, if he were able. Well, but though (according to the received sense of the word) this be not a True, that is to say, a *perfect Definition* of a Person, yet if it be an *Essential Predicate* of one (as we have granted) so that every Person is truly said to be *Rationalis Natura Individua Substantia*, must not then *Three Persons* be *Three Individual Substances*? I answer, no: because though each Person be such an *Individual substance*, and *distinctly* too, yet each Person is not a *distinct Individual substance*; For as much as *one and the same Infinite Individual substance* may sustain *Three distinct Personalities*, by reason of three distinct Substances, or distinct ways of subsisting belonging to it; from whence it is that in the Divine Oeconomy the multiplication of Persons, or Personal Subsistences, does not multiply the Divine Substance. But, says he, let us see how the *Animadverter* will bring off *Three Persons* from being *Three distinct substances*, and I will undertake the *Deanshall* do as much, and do it as well for *Three Minds*, p. 89. l. 15. That by his favour shall be Tried. And first the *Animadverter* brings off the *Three Persons* from being *Three Substances*, by this one Argument. That they are but *Three Subsistences* of one and the same Infinite

one Substance included in all and each of them; and to make this out further, I shall premise this Assertion, *vis.* That no *Substance* is properly a *Subsistence*, nor any *Subsistence* properly a *Substance*; But differ from one another as much as an entire Being and the mode of that Being; As a Subject, and as an Affection qualifying or determining the said subject. And let this Author, with his New Logick, and his No Metaphysics, prove the contrary, if he is able; For I here Challenge him to do it: In the mean time I thus argue,

Three distinct Subsistences of one and the same Infinite Substance, included in all and each of them, are not Three distinct Substances;

But the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Subsistences of one and the same Infinite Substance, included in all and each of them; And Therefore the Three Divine Persons are not Three distinct Substances.

And this one Argument I rely upon as so fully conclusive of the Point to be proved, that I judge it perfectly needless to add any more. Only as I have here proved the Three Divine Persons not to be Three Substances, so on the other side, I prove this Author's Three distinct Minds to be Three Substances, thus.

Three distinct Absolute Beings existing by themselves, so as not to exist in or depend upon any other Being, as a Subject, are Three distinct Substances.

But Three distinct Minds are Three such Absolute Beings, and

Therefore Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Substances.

In which Syllogism, to shew the disparity between

[*Minds*] and [*Persons*] let the Term [*Three Persons*] be put into the Room of [*Three Minds*] and then the *Minor* which is true and must be granted of [*Minds*] must be denied of [*Persons*]: for they are not Three distinct Absolute Beings, so *existing*, as was expressed in the Major Proposition: and therefore that Argument which concludes *Three Minds* to be Three Substances, can never conclude *Three Persons* to be so too. And whereas the Defender affirms, p. 89. l. 27. *That Three Eternal Minds are but Three Eternal Subsistences of one and the same Individual Eternal Mind.* I answer, That it is the height of Absurdity, and utterly impossible in Reason and Philosophy, for a *Mind*, which is an Absolute entire Being existing by it self, to be the *Subsistence* of another Absolute Being. For as much as *Subsistence* is properly and formally a *Mode of substance*, and in the Divine Substance or Nature a *Relative Mode* too, though still implying in it the said Nature as modified or determined by it. So that we see here this Man's Philosophy in making one *Mind* the *Subsistence* or Modification of another *Mind*; and Three distinct Minds so many distinct Subsistences or Modifications of one and the same Mind. Which I am sure all the Schools in Christendome will with one voice explode. And so I leave this Defender, or rather this Dean in Masquerade, to bring off his *Three distinct Minds* from being *Three distinct Substances* at his leisure. But I fear it will cost him a new cast of his [*meaning*], to do it: though let that be what it will, it is not any one Man's *meaning* (especially founded upon his Ignorance) but the Universal Judgment and consent of all Learned Men that must determine the proper and distinct senses both of *Substance* and *Subsistence* in this Dispute.

But

But the Animadverter in proving an Absolute Unity, and disproving all plurality of *substance* in the Godhead, had first strengthened his Assertion with the Authorities of some of the most eminent Fathers positively asserting the former, and not without indignation rejecting the other. And what does this Defender answer to these? Why; he tells us, *That the Fathers, by denying Three Substances principally rejected Three divers Natures of different Kinds or Species in Opposition to Arianism, p. 90. l. 5. Very good; they principally rejected a plurality of specifically distinct Substances; and will this Man infer from hence that they did not reject also a Plurality of Individual Substances in the Godhead? Why, yes, if he will invalidate the Authorities alleged by the Animadverter, he does and must do so. And accordingly he tells us, That the Fathers by Unity of Substance here understand only the ομοῖον, and that the ομοῖον signifies only a Specifick Unity of Substance; the Fathers in Opposition to Arianism, designing only to disprove a Specifick plurality of substance in the Godhead, not a plurality of numerical distinct Individuals. So that it seems they resolved, though they fell out upon the Arians, yet to do it so, as to keep fair Quarter with the Heathens. In answer to which, since ομοῖον imports an Union of Persons in such a Nature, Essence, or Substance, as is incapable of being numerically multiplied (as the Divine *οὐσία* essentially is, and cannot but be) I affirm, that the ομοῖον irrefragably proves a Numerical Unity or Identity of substance in the Divine Persons, and withal that all Specifick Unity in the Divine Nature or Persons is absurd and impossible: for I must tell this puny Logician, That it is one thing to dis-*

prove.

*prove a Specifick diversity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons, and quite another to prove a positive specifick Unity of the same; which can never be done where there are not several Individual Natures of the same kind, to collect it from. Secondly, I answer, That though the Fathers in their disputes with the Arians, alleged several Things for the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons, which strictly reached no further than to Specifick Unity, yet when they disputed this matter more exactly with the Heathen Polytheists, they rested not in this but still insisted upon, and contended for a Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature, Essence or Substance, as the Catholick Church has done ever since. And besides, the Truth is, Those very Arguments (or rather Instances of Resemblance) brought by the Fathers against the Arians, though taken from things having no more than a Specifick Unity of Nature, yet did not *derogate minutely* prove either a Specifick or a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons, but only an Unity or Sameness of Nature indefinitely; which being laid as a foundation, the peculiar Condition of the Divine Nature quickly determined the kind of its Unity, and by vertue of its Infinity, proved that that Unity or Sameness could be no other than Numerical. And thus having answered what he has said about the *exordium* and the Testimonies of the Fathers, if he still persists in this Scandalous Assertion, That the Fathers were only against several Kinds and Species of Substance in the Godhead and Divine Persons, but not against several Individual and Numerically distinct Substances in the same; I desire him to satisfy the World in these Two Things. First, How the Fathers*

Fathers came to look upon the Divine Nature or Essence in Three distinct Persons as such an amazing Incomprehensible Mystery (as they still avowed it to be) if the said Nature were not more than specifically one: for that one and the same specific Nature should be in a plurality of Individual Persons, is no wonder at all. Secondly, I desire him to satisfy the World also, Why the Primitive Latine Church with so much Zeal, and for so long a time, refused the word *tres personas*, declaring this for the only reason of their refusal thereof, that they reckoned it to signify Three Substances, for they could not reckon it to signify Three specifically distinct Substances; For as much as they knew, that the Greek Church which used the word *tres ousas* and contended for it, had constantly, zealously, and most expressly, opposed the Arians in their asserting Three Species of Substance in the Trinity, and therefore it is evident, even to a demonstration, that they were only jealous of Three Individual Substances which they feared the *tres ousas* might introduce, and so betray them into another sort of Arianism, or rather Gentilism, as bad as the first. These Two Queries, I say, I challenge this Author to answer me in; by making it appear, notwithstanding the foregoing Particulars, that while the Fathers asserted *plurimam* one Divine Essence or Substance, it was only a Specifick not an Individual Unity of the same, which they all along pleaded for. But after the fore-alleged Testimonies of the Fathers, the Animadverter thought fit to add the Modern Testimony of Bellarmine in those words, That to assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance is Arianism. In reply to which he first scoffingly
excepts.

excepts against *Bellarmino's* Orthodoxy (because forsooth he was a Papist) like that profound Dotard who reprov'd a young Student for reading *Clavius* upon *Euclid*, telling him, That he ought to read none but *Protestant Mathematicks*; for surely the Romish Writers are as orthodox about the Article of the Trinity, as any Protestant Writers whatsoever. Accordingly from these words of *Bellarmino* the Animadverter argued, *That if in the Trinity the Father and the Son were two distinct Substances, for them not to differ in Substance would be impossible.* To which this man replies in these words; *As if* (says he) *to be distinct and to differ in Substance were the same thing.* No, Trifler, no; for *Accidents* may be distinct, and *Modes* may be distinct, which cannot differ in Substance; and the Animadverter speaks not here of any sort of *Distinction* in general, but only of the distinction of Substances; and as to that, he affirms, *That for Substances to be distinct, must infer them to differ in Substance too.* But he asks us hereupon a very wise Question, *Are not two Men* (says he) *Unius Substantia, of one and the same substance, because they are two distinct Men, and each of them has a distinct Nature of his own?* P. 90. l. 19. I answer, *That a distinct Human Nature is a distinct Substance;* and that altho' two Men are notionally and specifically of the same substance or nature, yet really and numerically they neither are, nor can be so. But he has not done with his Questions yet, but asks us, *Whether to differ in Number, and to differ in Substance and Nature be the same thing?* and, *Whether difference in Number prove a diversity of Nature too?* Yes, Sir, a Numerical Diversity of Individual Natures or Substances

ces it does prove, tho' their *Specifick Nature* (which is but a Notion founded upon things) be the same. And here I must tell His Ignorance what it was that betray'd him to these silly Questions, viz. his supposing, That there is no *Essential Difference* or no *Diversity of Nature*, but a *Specifick Difference* or *Diversity*. Whereas an *Essential Difference*, as well as an *Essential Unity*, is threefold, viz. a *Generickal*, a *Specifick*, and a *Numerical*; and this last is as much and as truly an *Essential Difference* as any of the two former, or rather more so; for the two former are properly Notions existing only in the Mind, tho' collected from things actually existing in Nature; but the last has no dependance upon the conception of the Mind at all, but is wholly in the thing itself, whereof it is the difference. And therefore I do here tell this man, That three numerically distinct Substances are three numerically distinct Essences or Natures; and consequently differ from one another as three such Essences or Natures do. As for the Complement he passes upon the Animadverter, at the end of this Paragraph, p. 90. as if he were to be taught by this man to construe the Fathers: For that and sundry other of his Scurrilities, I will not fail to reckon with him in due place.

But after the several Testimonies produc'd by the Animadverter against a Plurality of Substances in the Godhead, he proceeded to argue against the same from Reason; And what does the Defender reply upon this Topick? *Why*, says he, *Whereas the Animadverter would prove, That the Three Divine Persons cannot be Three distinct Minds, because they are not Three distinct Substances, the Dean may safely deny the*

Consequence, p. 90. at the latter end. And may He so? I must tell him, That if the denial of the Genus does and must infer a denial of the Species (as that which is not an Animal cannot possibly be a Man) then that which proves the Three Persons not to be *Three Substances*, must prove them also not to be *Three Minds*: for [*Substance*] respects [*Mind*] as a Genus does its Species, and the consequence from the Genus to the Species negatively is unavoidable. But what then would he have the Animadverter to prove? Why this, *That if Three Minds are Three Intelligent Persons, and a Mind is a Substance, therefore three distinct Minds or Persons are Three distinct Substances, p. 91. l. 1.* But what illogical confused stuff is this? However, since it affords *Three Terms*, I will cast it for him into a Syllogistical Form, and that will quickly shew what may be concluded in this matter, and what cannot. Thus.

Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Substances, but Three distinct Persons are Three distinct Minds, therefore Three distinct Persons are Three distinct Substances.

The Major of which Syllogism has been effectually proved from the Definition of a Mind already: and the Minor being the Defender's avowed Principle and Assertion, can any Thing conclude more plainly than this Syllogism does, That according to this Man's Principles, *The Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Substances?* Which is the Thing that the Defender here calls upon the Animadverter to prove: and accordingly proved it is. But (says he) *Three distinct Minds may subsist distinctly and inseparably in one Eternal and Infinite Substance, as Three Intelligent Persons do, ibid.* To which I answer, First, That let them exist
never

never so inseparably in one Infinite Substance, they are really Three Minds still, and can never be one Individual Substance or Mind, but collectively. And that I am sure is neither *naturally*, *properly*, or *simply* one. Secondly, That Three Minds may as well be in one Infinite Substance as Three Persons are, This is perfectly *gratè dictum*, and (according to his usual way) a gross downright presuming the thing in dispute. For it is and has been all along absolutely denied him, and the contrary more than once proved against him, *viz.* That Three distinct Minds being Three absolute entire Beings, Essences, or Substances, can never subsist in one absolute Being, Essence, or Substance, and that on the other side Three Intelligent Divine Persons being *Relative Subsistences*, not *absolute Beings*, may subsist in one Absolute Being or Substance. So that the disparity between *Minds* and *Persons* is manifest, and as to the present Case irreconcilable. Nay, and I shall add one consideration more to the same purpose, and that of no small moment, *viz.* That no Two or more *Substances* (nor consequently *Minds* or *Spirits*) do or can subsist *inseparably*; (which yet this Man takes for granted) but that, as they are in their own Nature capable of *existing by themselves*, and for that Reason *separable*, so by the Absolute Power of God they may be actually *separated*, provided his Decree does not hinder: And this makes another vast disparity between *Minds*, *Spirits*, and *Substances* on the one hand, and the *Divine Persons* on the other, *viz.* That the *Divine Persons*, from the very nature of the Thing, are even by the Divine Power it self *inseparable* both from the Essence which they belong to, as also from one Another; which, distinct Minds can

never be. But the Defender adds, *That the True and short answer to the Animadverter's Argument is, That the same Substance, repeated in Three distinct Subsistences, is not Three Substances but one, p. 90. ibid.* In answer to which he has been sufficiently told already. That the Term [*Repeating the Divine Substance or Nature*] is New, Odd, and Unjustifiable, and such as the Catholic Church never made use of, and for that cause ought utterly to be condemn'd and thrown aside. But for a further answer to it, I do first affirm in general, That for the same numerical Nature or Substance to be repeated is impossible, and a contradiction; Repetition (as we have shewn) being nothing else but *Another Production*. In the second place, I deny, in particular, that there is any such Thing as a *Repetition* of the Divine Substance or Nature in Three Subsistences. The said Nature indeed [*is*] and [*exists*] in Three Subsistences, but I absolutely deny that it is repeated in them; and it will concern this Bold Novellist to prove, as well as assert, that it is so. In the mean time it is no small shame and calamity to the Church, that he is not called to account for such horrible Innovations.

But the Animadverter had argued further against Three distinct Substances in the Godhead, thus, "That if the Three Persons are Three distinct Substances, then Two distinct Substances will concur in and belong to each Person; to wit, That Substance which is the Divine Essence, and so is communicable or common to all the Persons, and that substance which constitutes each Person, and thereby is so peculiar to him, as to distinguish him from the other, and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him to whom it belongs: since for
"one

“one and the same substance to be common to all
“Three Persons, and withal to belong incommuni-
“cably to each of the Three, and thereby to distin-
“guish them from one Another is contradictory, and
“impossible. And what can this Man oppose to this
Argument with the least shew or shadow of Rea-
son? What part of it does he deny? Or what Term
of it does he distinguish? For the Argument proceeds
upon his own supposal at present, that the Three Per-
sons are Three distinct Substances, as the Animad-
verter had fully proved them to be before. Why, all
that he says, is, *That he is heartily ashamed and sorry*
(good Man) *to see such stuff as must necessarily expose*
our Faith to the scorn of Atheists and Infidels; and there-
fore that he may not contribute to it, he graciously de-
clares, that all this Non-sense shall escape the lash of his
Pen, p. 91. l. 22. That is, according to his constant ne-
verfailing way, he is then highest in Noise and Vapour
when he is brought most to a Nonplus. But I have
some Answers of another sort to make to this passage
alleged out of him; As first, That whatsoever his
Sorrow in this Case may be, he will hardly convince
the World that he has any *shame*. Secondly, That
to expose our Holy Faith to the scorn of *Atheists and*
Infidels, by one’s *Folly and Nonsense*, is very bad; But
that to make *Atheists and Infidels* by one’s *Scandalous*
Writings, and more *scandalous Practices*, is much
worse. Thirdly, That nothing does, or can more
expose our Holy Faith to the scorn of *Atheists and In-*
fidels, than for any one, who wears but the Name of
a Christian, to assert Three Gods; which Three dis-
tinct *Infinite Minds, Spirits, or Substances*, upon all
the Principles of common Reason and Philosophy, cer-
tainly

tainly and undeniably are; and withal, that there can be no Non-sense comparable to the asserting *Three distinct Absolute Infinites*: And fourthly and lastly, Whereas he says, *That all the Non-sense of the foregoing Argument* (as he calls *every thing* which he cannot Answer) *shall escape the lash of his Pen*; I would have this poor *Whipster* know, that the Animadverter is far from dreading the *lash of that Pen* which never yet drew blood of any one but of *Priscian*. And so having answered his compassionate Preamble in behalf of our suffering Faith (forsooth) we will now see what he has to say upon occasion of the Animadverter's Argument (for it can be no more called an *Answer* to it, than to that Learned Reply made to his *Hobbian Vindication of his Case, &c.*) And in order to this, I demand of him first, Whether that one Infinite common Essence or Substance which formally unites the Divine Persons together, does or can formally distinguish them also from one another? Secondly, Whether (since he utterly denies all *Modes* as well as *Accidents* in God) that which distinguishes each Person from the other can be any thing else but a *Substance*? there being nothing in Nature conceivable by the Mind of Man, but what is either a *Substance*, an *Accident*, or a *Mode of Being*: and I defy this Man, or any one besides, to give Instance of a fourth which is none of these: And Thirdly and lastly, Whether each Person hereupon must not either have Two Substances belonging to him, *viz.* One uniting him to, and the other distinguishing him from the rest; or be both *united* and *distinguished* by one and the same substance common to them all? Both of which are Impossible. This is the Argument, though after another and more particular

ticular manner proposed, and I Challenge this Piece of a Disputant to overthrow any one Part or Proposition of it by solid and clear Reason; for fooling and flouncing, and throwing out the word *Non-sense* (from a plentiful stock within) will not do it. But to shew how wofully he is hampered, see what desperate assertions he advances, p. 91, 92. for the disentangling himself. And first in p. 91. l. 28. he roundly tells us, *That the Dean knows not any distinction between the Divine Essence and a Divine Person, but that the Essence makes the Person.* In which words there are Two as false and Heterodox Propositions as can well be delivered by any one professing Divinity, viz. First, *That there is no distinction between the Divine Essence or Substance, and the Divine Persons.* And secondly, *That the Divine Essence makes the Person.* Both of which I will distinctly examine: and first as to the first of them I affirm, That the Divine Essence is and cannot but be virtually and fundamentally distinguished from the Persons. That is to say, it affords a Reason and Foundation in the Thing it self sufficient for the Mind to form thereupon a different Conception of the *Divine Essence*, from the Conception of the *Divine Persons*, by proper and Metaphysical abstraction: and that so distinct, that the *Conceptus objectivus* of one neither is nor can be the *Conceptus objectivus* of the other. And if this distinction (or rather distinguishableness) should not be admitted in the Divine Nature and Persons, as founded upon some Reason in the Things so distinguished, I desire this Man to tell me upon what account it is, that all Divines (not excepting himself) discourse of the Divine Essence as *determinable*, and of the Divine Persons as of those by whom

whom it is *determined*; and again of the Divine Essence as *communicable*, and of the Divine Persons (two of them at least) as those *to whom* it is *communicated*: For can this be done without a *distinct Conception* of that *which* is to be Communicated, and of Those *to whom* the Communication is to be made? or can there be any distinction in the *conception*, where there is not a proportionable Distinguishableness in the *Object*? So that upon the whole matter it appears, that nothing could be more contrary to all the Principles of Christian Philosophy and Theology, than this Author's denial of all *distinction* (in the sense we have given of it) between the Divine *Essence* and *Persons*: for without such distinction it is impossible to conceive or discourse of the said Persons, as *one* in *Essence* and *Three* in *Subsistence*. And so I pass to the Examination of his other Proposition, *viz. That the Essence makes the Person*. Concerning which, I do with the greatest assurance appeal to all the World, whether any Thing more absurd, strange, and Paradoxical, was ever asserted in Divinity. For *how can the Divine Essence be conceived to make the Person*? Since all [*making*] must of Necessity be one of these Two ways, First, Either by an *efficient production*. Or secondly, By a *formal Constitution* of a Thing. For no third way besides these is assignable. But it cannot be by the first, because it is and ever was a received *Maxime* in Theology, That the Divine Essence, considered absolutely in it self, neither *produces*, nor *is produced*. So that if any *Production* or *Operation* be ascribed to it, it must be only as it subsists in a *Person* (one or more), who is the sole proper *Agent*, or *Producer* in every Divine Act or Effect; from whence it is evident, that that
which

which can produce nothing but as it *is* and operates in the Person, cannot produce the Person it self, which it must presuppose, before it can operate. Besides, that if the Essence should produce the Person, it would follow that it must produce *one Person*, as well as another, and consequently the Person of the Father, as well as that of the Son; and of the Holy Ghost: But if the *Essence* should produce the Person of the Father, how could the Father be said to be the fountain of the Deity? (as the Ancient Writers Term him very often) and to be without all *Original*, (which is the peculiar Character of his Person.) For that the Deity or Divine Essence (which are but two words for the same thing) should produce the fountain of the Deity, or a Self-originated Person, no Mortal Man, I believe (this Author still excepted) can imagine. Since therefore it is so insufferably Absurd, to affirm, that the *Essence* makes the Person, by way of Production; let us see whether it can be said to make it the other way, viz. by a formal constitution of it. But if this be admitted, then the Essence must be that by which a Person is formally a Person: whereupon the Essence and the Person being commensurate and convertible, it will follow, That if there be but *one Essence* there can be but *one Person*, and that if there be a *Plurality* of Persons, there must be a *Plurality* of Essences too. For the multiplication of the formal Reason of any Thing must of Necessity multiply the Thing it self of which it is so. And here I must tell this Author, that as much as he disclaims the use of the Term [*Formal Reason*] yet this very expression of his, That the *Essence* makes the Person, truly and properly, neither does nor can import any thing else, than that the *Essence* is the formal Reason

son thereof. And if so, let him, upon this Assertion, keep off the forementioned Consequence, viz. That either there are Three Essences, or but one Person, if he can.

But after all, finding himself pinch'd still harder and harder, and not well knowing which way to turn himself, at length he cries out, *It is an amazing thing to think what strange Conceits this man (viz. the Animadverter) must have of a Trinity of Persons, and Unity of Essence or Substance, p. 92. l. 7.* To relieve him from which Transport, if this Defender, instead of looking into the Fathers, (which he so often mentions) will be pleas'd to read them, he shall find this amazing Conceit or Notion of the Trinity (as he calls it) fully and frequently express'd by the *μία ὄνεια* and the *τρεῖς ὁμοῦς* in the Greek Fathers, and in the Latin Fathers, Councils, Schoolmen, and other Divines Popish and Protestant, by the *Una Essentia*, and the *Tres Subsistentia*, or *Modi Subsistendi*. That is to say, by three distinct Modes of Subsisting, or three Subsistences of one and the same Infinite Essence or Substance included in all and each of them. This is the Animadverter's Notion of *One Divine Essence*, and *Three Divine Persons* (as this man has been more than once told): and the Authorities producible for it, and in a great measure produc'd already in the Animadversions, might (one would think) have serv'd to cure that Amazement, or rather *Stupor*, which this Author upon this account has been so deeply seiz'd with. On the contrary, such a Notion of the Trinity as makes the *Divine Nature or Essence a Person*, and the three Divine Persons to be three distinct Minds

or

or Spirits, and consequently three distinct Essences, Natures, or Substances, is Matter of much greater *Amazement* and *Abhorrence* too, to all that are concern'd for the Faith which they were baptiz'd into; And moreover, for any one to assert three Infinite Minds, and yet to pretend not to assert three Gods, is yet more *amazing* than the former; And lastly, for such scandalous Assertions to wear the Stamp of Publick Licence and Authority, and the shameless *Author* of them to be endur'd, and not only so, but to be also under such Circumstances in the Church of England, is to all sober and pious Minds more *amazing*, *monstrous*, and *astonishing* than all his detestable Heresies put together. But to draw to a close of this Argument against his *Three Infinite Minds*, from a Necessity of asserting *Three Substances* in the Godhead, as unavoidably consequent thereupon; I find this Author utterly at a loss where to fix, and by no means consistent with himself; as sometimes denying, and sometimes allowing his *Three Minds* to be *Three Substances*. His denial of it appears in these words: Let the Animadverter (says he) bring off *Three Persons* from being *Three Substances*, and the Dea will undertake to bring off his *Three Minds* from being so as well; p. 89. l. 19. On the contrary, if this Author does not allow of *Three Substances* in the Trinity; why does he interpret the places alleg'd by the Animadverter out of the Fathers for an *Unity of Substance* in the Divine Nature and Persons, only of a *Specifick Unity of Substance*? for that, all know, is fully consistent with a plurality of *Individual Substances*, which a *Numerical Unity of Substance* would be stick to that; neither is

nor can be. To which he adds, *That no man can have any Idea of Divine Persons, which are not Substances; p. 192. l. 13.* But foul and impudent Self-contradiction is his constant practice from first to last; and therefore without pursuing him any further, I shall conclude all with that Testimony of *Faustinus*, an eminent Divine in the Fourth Century, and one of those who scrupl'd the use of the word *ipſiſ* *in* *pro* *dic* *ti* *o* *n* *e*, for fear of being brought thereby to admit of *Three Substances* in the God-head, and those not *Specifically* but only *Numerically* distinct: as appears from the following Passage at the end of the Confession of his Faith, entituled, *Faustini Presbyteri Fides*, and exhibited by him to the Emperor *Theodosius*. *Miramur* (says he) *illos Catholicos probari posse, qui Patris & Filii & Spiritus Sancti Tres Substantias constituentur; nam, ipsi dicunt, non se credere Filium Dei aut Spiritum Sanctum Creaturam, tamen contra fidem sentiunt cum dicunt Tres esse Substantias: consequens est enim, ut Tres Deos confiteantur qui Tres Substantias constituentur.* *Quam vocem Catholici semper execrati sunt.* I know *Faustinus* was mistaken in reckoning *Hypoſt* *asis* and *Substantia* for Terms of the same signification; but his Argument founded thereupon is certainly so clear a Proof of the Church's disowning *Three Substances* in the Blessed Trinity, that a clearer cannot possibly be: And yet this audacious man, at this time of the day, with his *Three Infinite Minds* or *Spirits*, (which are undeniably *Three Substances*) is new dressing and setting up that Odious Tritheism, which the Primitive Christians so highly abhorr'd, and so zealously declar'd against. Sad therefore at this time must

must needs be the State, and woful the Circumstances of our poor Church of *England* (once so deservedly reputed the Noblest and Best Reform'd part of the Catholick) to have the Pest and Poyson of such an Heresie fretting in her very Bowels; and to be forced to endure what at the same time I am sure she heartily does and can not but deplore. And so I come to canvase his Answer to the Animadverter's.

Third Argument, which proceeds thus: "If *Arg. 3.*
 " it be truly said, That one and the same In-
 " finite Mind or Spirit is Father, Son, and Holy
 " Ghost, (I mean all Three taken together) and
 " it cannot be truly said, That one and the same
 " Infinite Mind or Spirit is three distinct Infinite
 " Minds or Spirits; then it follows, that Father,
 " Son, and Holy Ghost are not three distinct Infinite
 " Minds or Spirits.

" But it may be truly said, &c.
 This is the Argument. In the Defen-
 der's Reply to which, these Two things are
 to be consider'd: 1. The Representation he
 makes of the Argument; and, 2. The Answer he
 gives to it. As to the first of which he tells us,
That the whole of the Argument is this, That One In-
finite Mind cannot be Three Infinite Minds, nor Three
Infinite Minds One Infinite Mind; and that Three In-
finite Persons, who are One Infinite Mind, cannot be
Three Infinite Minds: p. 93. l. 9. Now supposing
 this to be the whole Argument (as confusedly and
 brokenly, according to his known Talent in Logick;
 he repeats it) I demand of this man, which of all
 these Propositions he can charge with *Want of Sense*?
 Nay, I confidently appeal to all the Reason and
 Com-

Common Sense of Mankind; whether there can be in Nature a clearer and more Self-evident Proposition than this; *That one and the same Infinite Mind is not three distinct Infinite Minds*; or, (as even this Defender has curtail'd it) *That one Infinite Mind cannot be three Infinite Minds*? And if so, let the Ingenious Reader judge, whether this Huff's crying out *Want of Sense* could proceed from any thing but extream *Want of Shame*. But if in repeating the Argument he strips it of its proper Sense, nay, and of its principal Terms; and thereby makes it so far *his own*, surely the Animadverter is not responsible for that. For he adds, *That the whole force of his Argument lies in the meer Opposition between Three and One, which is Childish Sophistry*; p. 93. l. 17. But will this man say, That these two Propositions [*Three cannot be One*] and [*Three Infinite Minds cannot be One Infinite Mind*] are the same? For, do not the very Words of the latter Proposition declare, that the Animadverter founds not his Argument upon the bare Numeral diversity or opposition, which is between *One* and *Three*, but upon the *peculiar Nature and Condition* of the Subject to which this Numeral Difference is apply'd? For it is not any Instance whatsoever, but only this particular Instance of [*Infinite Mind and Minds*] which the Animadverter here argues from. And certainly, there is a vast difference (whether this man perceives it or no) between barely saying [*That Three cannot be One*] and [*That Three distinct Infinite Minds cannot be One Infinite Mind*]: For, suppose a man should say, [*That three Gods cannot be one God, nor one God three Gods*] (since whatsoever may be said or deny'd of [*Infinite Mind*] may be equally said or deny'd of [*God*])

[*God*]] Will this man now say, That the whole force of the said Propositions lyes in a meer opposition between the Terms [*Three* and *One*] ? And consequently, that all that can be concluded from them, is but *Childish Sophistry* ? But to relieve his Ignorance, and to correct his Prophaneness, I would have him take notice, that the force of the Animadverter's Argument consists in this, That he argues from an *Infinite Absolute Being*, which, as such, and in the very Nature or Essence of it, is on the one side incapable of all multiplication of it self, and on the other as incapable of any Essential Unity or Union upon supposal of such a multiplication. This, I say, his Argument manifestly rests upon, and not upon those thin, pittiful Terms of [*Three* and *One*] and [*One* and *Three*]. And therefore None surely would have dared thus in the face of the World, and even in sight of *Self-Evidence*, and common sense it self, to have called such Propositions *Childish Sophistry*, but one who had a Brow of Brass, and a Face never made to Blush. But to pass from his shameless representation of the Argument to his senceless Answer to it, he tells us, *That if this Proposition or Rule, viz. That Three cannot be one nor one Three, be universally True, then there is an end of the Trinity, p. 93. l. 23.* To which I answer, That the forementioned Proposition is neither *Universally True*, nor *Universally False* (nor ever affirmed so by the Animadverter) but *True* in some respects, and *False* in many others, viz. according to the Different Nature of the Subjects, which it is applied to. As for instance, it is *everlastingly true* where the Unity and Plurality is in the same kind. And for that Reason three Infinite Minds can be

be no more one Infinite Mind than the three Divine Persons can be one Person; for in either of these Instances the Unity and Diversity is in *eodem genere*: viz. in *genere mentis* in the former, in *genere persona* in the latter; and consequently in both impossible. And therefore, as for that Inference, upon which his whole answer relies, viz. *That if it be no Contradiction for Three to be one in several respects, then it is no contradiction for Three Infinite Minds to be one Mind*, p. 93. l. 18. I must tell this Anti-Logician, That he concludes from a particular Proposition instead of an Universal; and not only so, but from a particular Instance of one kind to a particular Instance of another: His Argument amounting to no more than this, That because it is no contradiction for *Three to be one* upon different Accounts in *some Cases*, therefore neither is it so in the Case of *Three Minds*. But this, by his favour will never follow. For though it be *no contradiction* in some Instances (as particularly in that of three *Substances* in one Essence, or of three *Relations* or respects so concurring in any one thing as to be all predicable of it) yet This does not hold in *all* Instances, nor in *any Indifferently*, nor particularly in this of three Minds; For as much as no respect whatsoever can make *Three Minds* to be essentially *One Mind*, nor Three Spirits to be one Spirit, nor Three Substances one Substance, and the like; and it would be a contradiction for them so to be. But according to this Author's Hypothesis, We have here a *Trinity and Unity of Natures*, that is to say, *Three distinct Natures one in Nature, Three distinct Substances one in Substance, and Three distinct Spirits one Spirit*; and all this only by virtue of several *Respects*; whereas no bare diversity,

fity, either of *Respects* or *Actions*, can give or cause a
 diversity of *Nature* or *Essence* in the substances they
 belong to, and issue from; howsoever in some instan-
 ces it may *prove* or *infer* the same. And therefore,
 since it has been abundantly proved, That the Terms
 [*God*] and [*Infinite Mind*] are so perfectly equipol-
 lent, that whatsoever may be affirmed, or denied of
 the one, must be equally affirmed or denied of the
 other, I challenge this Author to give the World a
 solid Reason, *Why in different respects Three Gods may*
not be one God, as well as in the said respects, Three Infi-
nite Minds may be one Infinite Mind? and particularly
why Mutual Consciousness may not unite several Gods
into one, as well as several Infinite Minds into one, (were
 there several Gods to be so united)? and I will under-
 take to prove (and have indeed more than sufficiently
 proved already) that there are and must be as many
 Gods as there are *Infinite Minds*. But, as for his old
 outworn implement *mutual Consciousness*, which is the
 only *Vinculum* he assigns, to make his Three Infinite
 Minds *essentially* one; it has been shewn, that sup-
 posing it (as this Author does) to proceed from Three
 distinct Minds, it cannot be one Act, but Three dis-
 tinct *Acts*; which therefore can never make *Three Es-*
ences (as the *Three Minds* are, from which the said
 Acts must proceed) to be *essentially* one. Besides, that
 if this *mutual Consciousness* were but one single Act, yet
 being, as such, postnate to the Essence from which it
 flows, it can never give Original Unity to it. I conclude
 therefore, That the Three Divine Persons can in no
 respect whatsoever be *Three Infinite Minds* any more
 than *Three Gods*. For This very Man affirms, in *Ter-*
minis, *That Infinite Mind or Spirit is the Divine Na-*

ture or Essence it self (and that even in contradistinction to any of the Divine Attributes) p. 94. l. 23. And if so, then *Three Infinite Minds are Three Divine Natures or Essences, and Three Divine Natures are Three Godheads, and Three Godheads are Three Gods*: only under a different way of Expression. All which is so very plain, yea so flagrantly, so self-evidently plain, that to dispute any longer with him upon this subject, would be but like disputing with one, who denies that the Snow is white, or that there is any such Thing as motion, even while he himself is walking about the Room. And thus having shook in pieces his crazy Impertinent Answer to the Animadverter's Third Argument; When I look back upon that shrewd remark of his, with which he begins the said Answer, *viz. That Logick is a very troublesome Thing when Men want sense*, p. 93. l. 7. I must confess, that he here speaks like a Man who understands himself, and that having so often shewn, how troublesome a Thing Logick is to him, by his being so angry with it, he now gives us a very satisfactory Reason why it is so; and therefore in requital of it, I cannot but tell him, That, if Logick without sense be so troublesome, Confidence without either Logick, or Sense, or Truth, or Shame, or so much as Confidence of what one says or denies, is intolerable. And so I am at length come to the

Arg. 4. Fourth and concluding Argument which is taken from the form of the *Athanasian Creed*, and runs thus. "Whatsoever Attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in the *Athanasian* Form, so belongs to them all in common, that it can belong to none of them under any Term of Distinction from the rest. "But

"But the Attribute [*Infinite Mind or Spirit*] may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons, in and according to the *Athenasian* Form.

"And therefore it can belong to none of them under any Term of distinction from the rest.

And what has our Defender now to oppose to this Argument? Why, first, according to his usual way of giving a dull scoffy, instead of a Rational Answer, he calls it a *wonderful Argument*; and I confess it may well be so to him, since *Wonder* generally springs from *Ignorance*. But let us hear what the Oracle says; And here we have him telling us, *That Infinite Mind or Spirit is no [Attribute] but the Divine Nature or Essence it self; and that the Metaphysical Animadverter uses to distinguish between Essence and Attributes in God, Def. p. 94. l. 23:* In answer to which, the *Metaphysical Animadverter* would have the *Mightiest* Defender know, That, what *Metaphysically* taken is properly the *Subject* of the *Divine Attributes*; and upon that account stands distinguished from them (as the *Divine Essence* or *Nature* so taken does) may yet, *Logically* considered, be it self an *Attribute*, as it obtains the place of a *Predicate* joined with a *Subject* in a *Proposition*. And therefore to that Senseless Question of his, *Is God an Attribute?* I Answer, that in a *Logical* Sense God may be so: for as much as God may be truly and properly predicated of each of the *Divine Persons*. And I would have this poor *Capechumen* in *Logick* take notice, that whatsoever stands *predicate* in any *Proposition*, so as to be affirmed of another thing, as of a *Subject*, that is *Logically* an *Attribute*. And therefore, though the Term [*God*] *Metaphysically* taken (as we have shewn) be not an *Attribute*, (which im-

ports only some particular perfection of the Divine Nature) but the Subject of all such Attributes; yet in these Propositions, *The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God*; it is a Logical Attribute in every one of them; And let him champ upon this, till he breaks his Teeth upon it, if he pleases. But as Men sometimes in a drunken fit cry out *Fire, Fire*, not from what they see without them, but from what they feel within: So this Man, out of an Internal plenitude of Ignorance, cries out here in most Tragical manner, *What will the Animadverter make of God at last, when the Divine Essence is an Attribute, and a Divine Person a mere Mode?* p. 94. & 30. In answer to which, as it has been sufficiently explained, how the Animadverter makes the Divine Essence concretely expressed by the Term [God] an Attribute; so if this Defender will say further, *That he makes a Divine Person a mere Mode*; I do here Challenge him to point out that place in the Animadversions where the Animadverter says so. He has indeed over and over declared (and that without shuffling from his words to his meaning) That he holds a Divine Person to be properly the Divine Nature under such a certain mode of Subistence; or in other Terms such a certain mode of Subistence of the Divine Nature still including the said Nature in it. This, I say, the Animadverter all along holds and asserts; and if this Man calls this the making a Divine Person a mere Mode (as it is a gross and direct falsehood, and utterly disowned by his Adversary) so, should I take the Liberty of calling Things by their own proper names, it might justly entitle him to a very coarse one.

Now the Proposition from first to last, asserted by this

this Author is this, *That the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits*, which the Animadverter affirmed to be contrary to the *Athanasian Creed* (as he shewed by casting it into the same "Form) and consequently, that if the said Form were "a True way of Reasoning concerning the Divine "Nature and Persons, This Proposition ought to be "rejected as utterly inconsistent with it. And how does our Author counter-argue this? Why; why by running out into an Impertinent proof, that [*Infinite Mind*] *belongs distinctly to the Three Divine Persons, and consequently may be distinctly predicated of each of them.* Both which are as easily granted him, as they can be alleged by him. But by his favour, the Question here is not, Whether each of the Divine Persons be *distinctly an Infinite Mind*, but whether each of them be a *distinct Infinite Mind*, which this Defender affirms, and that so positively, that he lays the whole stress of his Hypothesis upon it in these remarkable words: *That if every Person in the Trinity, considered as a distinct Person, be not a distinct Infinite and Eternal Mind, there is an end of the Dean's Notion, Def. p. 8.* at the end. And the Animadverter on the other side, as positively denies *each of the Divine Persons to be a distinct Infinite Mind*; or that the Term [*Distinct Infinite Mind*] can be truly predicated of, or belong to any of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. And therefore for the clearing of this matter (and that even to this Man's Understanding, if possible) we must always distinguish between *Attributing a Distinct Thing to each Distinct Person*, and between *Attributing a Thing distinctly to the said Person*. For there is a vast Difference between these Two; and yet this Author perpetually,

petually confounds them, and still from the latter infers the former: which is a manifest *Paralogism à Dicto secundum Quid ad dictum simpliciter*, viz. to conclude absolutely a *diverse or Distinct Thing* from a *diverse or distinct mode of a Thing*. As for instance, Omnipotence belongs to each of the Divine Persons *distinctly*, but that does not prove, that there is a *distinct Omnipotence* belonging to each of them, but only one and the same Omnipotence belonging to the Three Persons, according to Three distinct ways; and what I have said of Omnipotence holds equally in Omniscience, or Infinite Intelligence, and in all the Essential Divine Attributes besides. For a *Thing's* belonging *distinctly* to the Three Divine Persons, *distinctly* considered, imports no more, but that it belongs, after a *distinct manner*, to each of them so considered, which one and the same Infinite Being, may, without any multiplication of it self, very well do. But, says our Author, *The Athanasian Form does not forbid us to attribute to each distinct Person what is common to all Three, for it does it expressly, by affirming, that the Father is Uncreate, the Son Uncreate, and the Holy Ghost Uncreate*, p. 96. l. 10. In which words, as by the Term [*Uncreate*] I affirm ought to be understood an *Uncreate Being or Essence*; So I readily grant, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, *distinctly* considered, are each of them an *Uncreate Being*, but for all that shall never grant each of them to be a *distinct Uncreate Being*; But utterly deny, That the Father is a *distinct Uncreate Being*, the Son a *distinct Uncreate Being*, and the Holy Ghost a *distinct Uncreate Being*; as being all of them Propositions absolutely false, and founded upon this perpetual Blunder, **That he shifts the Term [*distinct*]** from

from the Subject to the Predicate; still arguing thus, That because every *distinct Person* distinctly considered is an *Infinite Mind*, therefore every such Person so considered is a *distinct Infinite Mind*. Which no Logic, or Rule of Consequence, will or can infer. And therefore, whereas he makes the Animadverter give this as the Reason of the *Athanasian* Predication, *That what is common to all Three Persons does not distinctly belong to each*, Def. p. 96. l. 22. I must tell him, That it is false. For the Animadverter affirms the same Nature which is *common* to all the Persons, to belong *distinctly* to each Person: but nevertheless denies, That, in the *same respect* in which it is *common* to all, it does or can belong *distinctly* to any one. For it belongs to all as an *Essence* or Being *absolutely* considered; but it belongs *distinctly* to each Person, according to a *distinct* way, or *mode of subsisting*, which the said Being or *Essence* has in each Person: and consequently, since the same Divine *Essence* or Being has *Three Distinct* ways of subsisting, it does, according to each of them, belong *distinctly* to each Person; Yet still (as I said before) not as a *distinct Being* or *Essence* in any Person. And whereas this Man states the Reason of the *Athanasian* Form upon this, *That the Divine Perfections distinctly existing in the Divine Persons, are so inseparably united, as to be essentially one*, p. 96. l. 26. That is still Trumping the same old *Petrino Principii* upon the Reader, for it is still positively denied him (and will be so for ever) *That an Inseparable Union* of Three distinct Infinite Minds (were such an Union possible) can make the said Minds *essentially* one. Since it is not so much as possible to conceive them to be Three distinct Minds without conceiving

conceiving them also to be Three particular distinct Essences, and surely Three distinct Essences can never be essentially one. Besides, That he has been told, That no *Substances* can be so *United*, as to be *Inseparable by God's absolute Power*; And therefore as for that precarious Conclusion, in which he says, *That the Dean has not transgressed the Athanasian Form, by asserting Three distinct Infinite Minds, if we understand by them Three Infinite Intelligent Persons*, p. 97. l. 8. I answer, That since it is impossible for *Three Infinite Minds* (which by their very Essence are *Three Absolute Beings*) to be *Three Relative Subsistences* of one and the same Infinite Mind included in all and each of them, (which the *Three Divine Persons* are) it is evident, that he has transgressed, and (as much as in him lay) overthrown the *Athanasian Form*, and that it is impossible for all the Wit of Man to reconcile *Three distinct Infinite Minds* to the said Form. Besides, that it is manifest, that notwithstanding, he says, *That by Three Infinite Minds, he means Three Infinite Intelligent Persons*, he yet discourses of them all along so, that *Vice versa*, it is evident, that by these *Three Infinite Intelligent Persons*, he means no other than *Three Infinite Minds*: For if each of these Infinite Intelligent Persons be a *distinct Infinite Mind* (as this Author has positively affirmed) I leave it to the Judgment of any one who can tell *Three*, whether *Three distinct Infinite Intelligent Persons* be not *Three distinct Infinite Minds*; so that he is still but where he was, and all that he has said is nothing but dodging and shewing Tricks. In fine, it is extremely in vain to dispute any longer with a Man who has not a clear or True Conception of any one Thing or Term be-
longing

longing to the subject here disputed upon; and therefore I shall add no more upon this Argument, but shut up all with the following passage out of the first of those two Latine Tracts inserted into the second Tome of *Athanasius's* Works, and Entituled *de unitate Deitatis Trinitatis ad Theophilum*, p. 351. Colon. Edit.

“*Cur Pater Spiritus dicitur, & Filius Spiritus nuncupatur, & Spiritus Sanctus Spiritus appellatur? Ad hoc respondetur, An Ignoras, quia Pater unus Deus est, Filius unus Deus, & Spiritus Sanctus Unus Deus est, dum unitum nomen sit in Natura Galas; Sic & Unus Spiritus est, quia unita est Deitas eorum? Nam si Tu per singula Nomina Personarum Unum Nomen Spiritus ter designasti, nunquid Tres oportebat?*”

“*Abst.* Which Testimony I think as plain and full against this Author's *Three Spirits* or *Minds*, as words can well express a Thing. The Author (whosoever he was) seems to have lived since the *Eutychian* Heresy, and may be placed about the seventh Century.

And so I take my leave of the Dean's *Three distinct Infinite Minds, Spirits, or Substances*; that is to say, of his *Three Gods*; and having done this, methinks I see him go whimpering away; with his Finger in his Eye, and that Complaint of *Micah* in his Mouth, *Judg. 13. 24. To have taken away my Gods which I made, and what have I more?* Though I must confess, I cannot tell, why he should be so fond of them, since I dare undertake, that he will never be able to bring the Christian World either to believe in, or to Worship a *Trinity of Gods*; nor do I see what use they are like to be of, even to himself, unless peradventure to swear by. *Nam in iudicium* &c.

And so I have examined and gone over all this Au-

thor's Exceptions against the Animadverter's Arguments, and that with all the Particularity and Impartiality that it was possible to examine any Writing with; and upon a survey of what has been said on either side, I can not perceive, but that the Animadverter's Arguments stand just as they did before; unless possibly something firmer, for this Author's attempts to shake them. For, upon the whole matter, I must profess, that I never met with a weaker, and a lamèr defence of any Hypothesis whatsoever. But he threatens the Animadverter with *an Answer to the Testimonies alleged by him out of the Fathers, and others*, Def. p. 97. l. 18. And I have heard that learned Person mentioned, who is generally supposed to be employed by this Author to do that for him, which he cannot do for himself; though I reckon him to be one of too much judgment, as well as Learning, to appear in the World; both as *Veterum Vindicator*, and *Novorum Vindicator* too.

In the mean time, as for those *Blasphemous* Passages extracted out of this Author's Book of the *Knowledge of Jesus Christ*, and charged by the Animadverter upon him in his Preface, the Animadverter continues and persists in the same charge still; nor does he find, that this Author has at all cleared himself from it, in the *Disproof* of that Book here mentioned by him; p. 98. Nor are the said lewd Passages (as he pretends) proposed there by him as *Objections to be answered*; but as his own vile Defeats upon the received Doctrine of the Church, about some of the most important Points of Christianity. Besides, that what is said, in the Preface, upon this subject, makes but a small part of the said *Preface*; so that if he should attempt to answer

swer it (which he has too much Wit in his Anger, to do) it would be but like this pitiful little scrap of an Answer published by him against the *Animadversions* themselves. But still, after all, the *Blasphemies* there placed to his Account are so very foul and flagrant, that none but he, who uttered them, can pretend to defend them; and the whole Plea, which he or any of his Partisans, ever yet did or could pretend to make for them, was that he uttered them in the Person of Dr. Owen, and as the Results of his Opinion. But since he could never so much as pretend them to be Dr. Owen's words, nor yet prove them to be the certain consequent of his Assertions, the *Blasphemy* is, and must be his, who formed and uttered those Diabolical Expressions. For suppose a *Mahumetan* should single out some passages of St. Paul's Epistles, and dedicate upon them; and affix an impious and Blasphemous sense to them, and being reproved for his Blasphemy and Impiety, should allege in his Defence, *That he spoke them in St. Paul's Person*, and as the genuine Results of St. Paul's Writings, I desire to know of this Man and his absurd Favourers, whether the Charge of Blasphemy ought to lye against St. Paul, or against the *Mahumetan*? The Case is exactly the same as to the Thing it self; abating for the Disparity of the Persons, viz. of an Inspired Apostle, and of any the most Learned Modern Doctor whatsoever. And therefore I do here charge him afresh as guilty of all those *Blasphemies* set down in this Preface, nor has he in the Defence of that wretched Book answered any one of them, saying that at the latter end of it, viz. p. 120. in the *Conclusion* of his Defence of the *Discourse* concerning the Knowledge of Jesus Christ, he seems to knock under

Board, and to own that there is an *apologia* due to the discoursing of Things Sacred, be the Case what it will: Which Apology declares, that, even by his own Confession, he had treated of these Things in a most scandalous unbecoming manner; as in truth he did; and not only so, but (whoever set him upon it) in a most Profane, and *Devilish* way too: So that whereas he here says, *That he had by that answer silenced his Adversaries, so that he heard from them no more,* Def. p. 94. l. 24. I must tell him, that some silence their Adversaries, because they cannot be answered by them, and some because they are not thought worth the answering; which was this Author's Case here. For his Adversaries (as inconsiderable as they were) having effectually baffled and overthrown his whole Book, and broken the strength and sinews of it (if it had any), little concerned themselves at any Insignificant Replies, he did or could afterwards make, though never so many; but were willing to let him have the last word; considering, that, as *Rector of Bilkingsgate*, at that time, he might claim it by his place.

But the following Instruction to his Friend is certainly very diverting, Def. p. 98. at the end, in these words, *Where the Animadverter (says he) charges the Dean with Absurdities and Contradictions; turn to the place, and read it with it's context, and tell me what you cannot answer, and I will:* to which he should have done well to have added, *If I can.* But the whole Passage is just as if he had said, Sir, If you find not Absurdities and Contradictions enough in my Book to satisfy your Curiosity that way, pray come to the Fountain Head, and consult me, and you shall be sure.

sure of a more plentiful supply. But he goes on. If you or any Body else (says he) can be perswaded by the Animadverter, that the Dean understands neither English, Latin or Greek, Logicks, Metaphysicks, &c. I need wish you no other punishment, than, when ever you write, to fall into the hands of such an Adversary, p. 99. l. 1. In answer to which I am bid only to tell him, that touching his Qualifications as to the forementioned respects, the Animadverter is perfectly of the same mind which he was of, when he wrote the ninth and tenth Chapters of the *Animadversions*; but thinks it not worth his while to use many Arguments to perswade the Reader to be of the same opinion, but only refers him to two Irrefragable ones, viz. his own two Eyes to convince him. In the mean time it may be some diversion to him to observe how, that because most Parts of Philosophy, viz. *Physicks, Metaphysicks, Mathematicks, Ethics, Politicks, &c.* are always expressed *plurally*, therefore this Author very wisely expresses *Logick* so too, calling it *Logicks*, *Def.* p. 99. l. 3. which I dare say no Scholar ever called so before; and in my poor Judgment he might have forbore to speak of *Logicks* in the *Plural*, till he had better understood one. But 'tis evident that he knew no better, and we must not expect that any one should speak better than he knows. But since he is such a *grand Exemplar* of Pride and Disdain towards all whom he ever wrote against; that he may not however lie too open to them, when they turn upon him again (as, in all likelihood, the way being now opened to them, they will) I would advise him in time (though I confess it is something with the latest) to procure himself some good honest *Systems* in all the forementioned sorts of Learning.

Learning (adding (to use his own Dialect) *Grammaticks* withal;) since I would not direct him to Books too much above his reach at first. And when he has once got them about him, I would have him ply them hard, assuring himself (which all know, though scarce any one is so much his Friend as to tell him so) that he has a great deal more need of *Studying*, than the World has or can have of his *Writing*. Nevertheless, if *Writing* be so absolutely Necessary to him, that his *health* requires it, and that Nature cannot be at ease, nor enjoy it self, unless the Scripturient humour has sometimes vent by throwing it self off into Paper; let him, at least, make choice of proper Subjects, and forbearing all Controversial Discourses about *Christ's Satisfaction*, *God's punitive Justice*, and *the Trinity* (which he was never cut out for) let him rather jog on in the old beaten Track of *Church Communion*, and of *Death* and *Judgment*, and upon these and such like heads, (the Two last especially) he may continue on, *Writing* and *Printing*, and *Printing* and *Writing* (and the World never the wiser for either) even till his *Subject* overtakes him.

I have now gone through his whole *Defence*, and having done so, cannot but think it very proper, and equally for the Reader's Satisfaction, to lay before him a Brief Scheme or Analysis of it, together with those pittiful mean ways and methods by which (with much ado) it has been patched up and put together; that so he may see what a kind of Antagonist the Animadverter has had to deal with, and that in these following Particulars. As

First, That (for the better salving of his Credit) he imposes his Book upon the World, under the specious

cious but false Title of an *Answer to the Animadversions*; whereas it is but a very small Part of that Discourse which he attempts to answer, passing over the main body of it, without answering, examining, or so much as meddling with it at all.

Secondly, That he boldly and positively denies several Things in this Book, which he had as positively affirmed before. For which, compare what he had said of the Term [*Substance*] in his *Vindication*, with what he says of it in this his *Defense*. In the former he explodes it from all our Discourses of God; for that, as he affirms, the Mind of Man cannot form any conception of *Substance*, either *without matter*, or *without a Beginning*, (upon which score I am sure it cannot be applicable to God) *Vind. p. 69. l. 1. and 70. l. 7.* and yet here in this Book he allows of it in our Discourses of God as a Term not only *very Good*, but *Useful and Necessary*, *Def. p. 3. l. 27.* which two let the Reason of all Mankind reconcile, if it can. Likewise for [*Subsistence*] compare what he says for the utter rejection of this Term from all discourses about the Trinity, *Kind. p. 138. line the last, and 139. line the first*, with what he says in behalf of it in this *Defense*, *p. 25. l. 13.* affirming, *that there could not be a more proper word used to express an Unity in Trinity by*: But all Instances of this kind falling under the Head of *Self-Contradiction*, I pretend not to *Arithmetick* enough to number them.

Thirdly, That when he finds himself overborn by an Argument, he flies off, and quite alters the state of the Question, and in the Room of that Term which he finds indefensible, he presently substitutes another. As instead of the *Act of Self-Consciousness*, which

which he had so frequently, and so expressly made use of, and insisted upon, he puts the *principle* of the said Act, *Def. p. 39. l. 15.*

Fourthly, That he takes shelter in several *fallacious* expressions, which being once stripped of their Ambiguity by distinctions duly applyed, leave the Thing, they would prove, in the lurch, and vanish into Nothing; such as for instance, amongst many others, is his insisting upon a *substantial Trinity* in opposition to such a one, as admits of no greater than a *Modal distinction* between the Divine Persons: by which, if he means, That the said Three Persons, are *Three distinct Substances*, it is false, but if he means that they are *Three Substantial Persons*, so called from one and the same *Infinite Substance* common to them all, and *subsisting differently* in each of them, it is True, and every one grants such a *Substantial Trinity*; but this makes nothing at all for his Hypothesis: the Argument resting wholly upon the Ambiguity of the Term *Substantial*.

Fifthly, That finding some of the chief Notions, which he built his whole Hypothesis upon, quite baffle'd, and by none of his palliating Tricks to be justified, he fairly quits and gives them up, and thereby (whether he will or no) absolutely yields the Point in debate to his Adversary. See this grossly exemplified in his Notion of *Mutual Consciousness* (which frequently comes in my way) made by him at first the *Reason* of the *Essential Unity* of the *Divine Persons*, and afterwards allow'd by him to be no more than the *Result* and *Consequence* of the said Unity. *Defence, p. 75. l. 20.*

Sixthly, That when he is nonpluss'd in any Proposition

position taken and understood according to the universally receiv'd sense of the Words of it, he presently strikes off, from thence to his *Meaning*, and tells the Reader, That he, for his part, *means* quite another thing by it. See his *Def.* p. 81. l. 28.

These, I say, are some of those Arts and Shifts with which he all along encounters the Animadverter; but *Shifts*, by his Favour, will neither pass for *Arguments*, nor yet for *Answers* to them, any more than *Shuffling the Cards* can be reckon'd *Winning the Game*. But, because his chief Engine of all, and which he makes most use of, is his frequent allegation of his *Meaning*, in opposition to his plain express *Assertions*, I think it not amiss to illustrate it by some Examples.

Thus, for instance.

1. When he says, That *we know the Nature of a Body*, *Vind.* p. 4. l. 25. his *Meaning* is, that *we know the Nature of Nothing in the World*. *Vind.* p. 7. l. 19.

2. When he says, That *a Person and an Intelligent Substance are reciprocal Terms*, *Vind.* p. 69. l. 18. his *Meaning* is, That *a Beast or Brute, which is not an Intelligent Being, is and may be called a Person*. *Vind.* p. 262. l. 18.

3. When he says, That *Substances* (and the like Terms reckon'd up by him) *serve only to perplex and confound Mens Notions about the Trinity*; *Vind.* p. 138. l. the last, & 139. l. 3. his *Shameless Meaning* (as we have shewn) p. 25. l. 13. of his *Def.* is, That *there could not have been a more proper Word thought on to represent the Trinity by, than Three Substances in One Individual Nature*.

4. When he says, *A Trinity in Unity is a Venerable Mystery*, and that *there may be a great deal more in it, than we can Fathom*, Vind. p. 86. l. 1. 2. his Meaning is, That it is a plain, easie, and intelligible Notion, (as explain'd by him) and such as gives a plain solution of all the Difficulties and seeming Contradictions in the Doctrine of the said Article. Vind. p. 66. l. 2, 3.

5. When he professes to explain the *Mysterious Union between the Eternal Father and the Son by the Unity of a Spirit*, as the best way of explaining it, Def. p. 6. l. 22. his Meaning in the same Def. from p. 19. to p. 35. is, That the said *Mysterious Union* is best explain'd by a *Man*, and his *Living Image*: though neither of them is a *Spirit*. And I suppose that that which is not a *Spirit* can neither have the *Unity of a Spirit* belonging to it.

6. When he makes *Self-Consciousness* the Reason of *Personality*, *Personal Unity* and *Distinction* in each of the *Divine Persons*, and *Mutual Consciousness* the Reason of their *Essential Unity*, (as we have shewn he does) his Meaning is, That *Self-Consciousness* and *Mutual Consciousness* do only suppose, result from, Prove and infer the said *Distinction* upon the former account, and the said *Unity* upon the latter. That is to say, When he speaks of a *Cause* or *Antecedent*, he always means an *Effect* or *Consequent*. And I need not quote Page and Line for this, having quoted them so often before.

7. When he speaks of an *Infinite Mind*, and of *Three Infinite Minds*, (as he does very often) he tells us, That by *Mind* he means a *Person*, Def. p. 81. l. 32. though [*Mind*] and [*Person*] are Terms quite differing from one-another, both in Signification and Definition.

Definition, and accordingly are, and ever have been so used.

8. When he says, That not to allow the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits, is *Heresia and Nonsense*, (as he affirms in words equally express and impudent) he tells us, his *Meaning* is, That it is *Heresia and Nonsense* to assert Three Persons, who are not Three distinct Intelligent Persons, *Def. p. 81. l. 21.* which, I dare say, no Man alive ever asserted, or any Man of Sense ever imagin'd; any more, than any one ever asserted Peter, and James, and John to be Three Men, and yet deny'd them to be Three Rational Creatures. But an impudent Copy-monger will venture to say something, though in defiance of Sense, and in spite of Nonsense too.

9. When he calls a Man a Person, (as he often does in his Writings) his *Meaning* is, Not that the Man, but that the Soul is the Person, and the Body the Vital Instrument of the Soul; and that neither Soul nor Body are Parts of the Person.

Nor is this sovereign thing of use only in Matters of Argument and Dispute, but also in Matters of a very different nature. As for example,

1st, When a known Writer publish'd some Queries against the Commission and Commissioners for making Alterations in our Liturgy, severely reflecting upon both; his *Meaning* was, only to inform the World what *English Persons* (as he styles them) they were, who so zealously design'd and promoted the said Alterations. See *An Apology*, &c. p. 5. l. 20.

2^{dly}, When a certain Divine told an Irish Bishop (as was hinted before in the *Animadversions*, p. 358.

The wonderful Vertues of a skillfully managed [meaning.]

L. 2. Edit. 2.) *That he would be Crucified before he would take the New Oath to K. W. and Q. M.* his [Meaning] was, That he resolv'd to take it, and accordingly did so.

3dly, And lastly, When one (very well acquainted with the former) said, *That these very Hands of his should restore King James, but that they were tied up from Writing.* His meaning was, That those hands should write Answers to King James's Declaration.

By all which we see the strange and wonderful force of a skilful mannaged meaning, as having certainly something of Enchantment or Spell in it. For it is proof against all Impressions; and no Argument can pierce, or so much as reach it, but it absolutely renders the Person, who carries it about him, Invulnerable, and by Consequence Invincible. And therefore whereas this Author in his *Defense*, p. 78. & 10. prescribes some Rules to the Animadverser, *in case he should think fit to try his skill again upon this subject* (which words seem to sound very much like a *Challenge*.) I must tell him, That the Animadverser ever yet took him for as easy a Combatant as heart could wish, and bids me acquaint him further, that he shall be readier to engage in a Controversial Duel with him, than with any Man alive, provided; That he does not bring his *Meaning* for his *Second*.

But it is now time to discharge the Debt I brought my self under, and to account with this Author (in some measure at least) for the scurrilities which he had so freely bestowed upon the Animadverser. But before I enter upon so just, and (as I think) so requisite a work, I cannot but solemnly declare, that nothing seems to me so strange, Amazing and Unaccountable, as that there should be so much as one mouth

mouth opened, either for this Man, or against the Animadverter; by way of Complaint, as if too much sharpness had been used by one against the other. For did the Animadverter appear against this Man as the Aggressor, or rather as the Vindicator of so many excellent Persons whom he had trampled upon with the utmost Insolence and Contempt? For I Challenge the most Zealous and Partial of his Friends, to shew me that Man, whom he ever wrote against, and did not treat in this manner. Nor is his Conversation (by what I can hear) at all less Provoking and Insulting than his Pen; so that very slavish Animals certainly they must needs be, who can frame themselves to endure either. But what would these Abject Creatures have? Would they have the whole World *lye down* as often as this Man writes a Book? and all Mankind suffer themselves to be *asperged* as long as his Everlasting *Diabetical* Quill shall be disposed to *Drop* Pamphlets? This is very hard upon my word: for his Pen scarce ever lies still for four Months together; but that its old *Laxe* returns upon it afresh; and then so much *Paper* is sure to be *fouled*, and many a worthy and good Name besides. But perhaps these Men would have the Animadverter come cringing to his Deanship, as the *Socinian Considerer* has done, whom I find with the most unparalleled humility, or rather prostration of Carriage (that I ever met with in a Man of Parts and Spirit) in lowly manner Kissing his Reverend Feet; for having so scornfully kicked and trod upon him and his Party, and swallowing all the foul stuff which he had with such Insufferable contumely spit upon them; as if it had not been enough for him tamely to bear his base Reproaches, but that he must:

oh! must also requite him with Panegyricks and Commendations. But I shall pay my Devours to this Gentleman again presently. In the mean time I can assure him, and the whole World, that the Animadverter is quite of another Temper, and accordingly does here by me solemnly declare, That whatsoever he has born or may bear from others, he is resolved not to take the least affront at this Man's hands, but will be sure to repay him to his face. And this is all the Apology that shall be made for any sharpness used either in the Animadversions themselves, or in this Vindication of them. And so I proceed to animadvert upon his Scurrilities, which I shall do in such order as I think fit, since the Reader shall be sure to have the several places faithfully pointed out to him, which I intend to remark upon. And here I shall direct him,

First, to that remarkable passage in this Defence, p. 43. at the end. *The Animadverter (says he) is a Notable man, if he can draw you into a School-Question, for he can make a Shift to read and transcribe, but he has an Esquima and Bûgma-men at his heart, which is none of his Talent, for it requires Thinking.* Concerning which, I desire the impartial and ingenuous Reader to judge, whether it be possible for the Tongue or Pen of man to utter any thing more Opprobrious. And therefore if the byassed and malicious part of the World will not excuse me, they must give me leave to excuse my self, if I answer this Libeller as he deserves. And here in the first place, I require him in the Animadverter's Name and Behalf to declare and assign that Writer from whom the Animadverter ever *transcribed* any Thing, unless by way of *Quotation*; though, I must confess, that I cannot return upon him this

Charge

Charge of *Transcribing* from any Schoolman, or other eminent Greek or Latine Writer, since, I dare swear, he never *quoted* any such, but from those who had first *quoted* them to his hands. But must the Animadverter then pass for a Transcriber? What will this man make of him? Will he make him write *Cases of Allegiance*, and borrow his Arguments out of a *Letter from a Friend*? which a certain Person in the *Dr. w. World has been as good at, as he can be at writing *Letters to a Friend*. But what is this his boasted of *Εἰρηνα* after all? Why, even this one poor Greek word, which having by much ado got by the end, I would have him by all means make the best, he can, of. For I dare say his *Εἰρηνα* will never make him an *Archimedes*, or indeed so much as a *Figure* in any Thing. And therefore whereas he says the Animadverter *hates him*, that is his Mistake, and I wonder that he cannot distinguish between *Hatred* and *Pity*. He owns himself indeed (as all good men ought to do) an Hater of the Character of an *Εἰρηνα* man in matters of *Faith*, which God has proposed to men as objects to employ their *Assent* and *Submission*, but by no means to exercise their *Invention*; and there was no sort of Men whatsoever, whom the Catholick Church always looked upon as such Pests as these *Εἰρηνα* Men, which is only another word for *Venturous*, *Meddlesome*, *Self-Opinators* and *Self-Conscious Innovators*, and that in those Sacred Points, in which all Innovation ever was, and is, and ought to be Intolerable. For *Arsius*, *Macedonius*, *Nestorius*, and *Eutyches*, were all of them great *Εἰρηνα* Men in the several Ages they lived in. Nor were there any whom the Primitive Church still kept so watchful an Eye, and so severe an hand over,

as these Novellists; and had this Author lived, not only under the Discipline of the Church of those Ages, but even of that excellent Copy of it the Church amongst our selves before the *great Rebellion* (which gave it such an Incurable Wound) he would have found to his Cost, what it had been to play the *Eunus* Man upon the *Trinity*; for whatsoever else it might have done for him, it would have been sure to have stopp'd him in his way to *St. Paul's*. But this is not all his Civility to the Animadverter, for he allows him not only able to *Transcribe*, but to make a Shift to *read* too; (for this Author has convinced me, that 'tis not impossible for one to *Transcribe* what he cannot *Read*.) In requital of which Complement, I do here tell this Man, that if he could, and should pay to the Crown a penny for every Greek word which he can neither *Read*, nor *Spell*, nor make any Thing of, I dare undertake that it might save the Nation a Tax for one year at least. In fine, as much a *Transcriber* as his foul mouth would make the Animadverter, let him but prove that he ever transcribed any thing out of His Writings, and I will give him leave to prosecute him, not only for a *Thief*, but for the very worst, the basest and meanest of Thieves, *viz. A Robber of the Spittle*. But I assure him, that for what concerns his own Writings, he is safe; for as to them, let any Man but first *Read*, and I dare undertake he will never be tempted to *transcribe*.

Secondly, The next passage, I shall take notice of, is that in p. 38. at the end, and 39. at the beginning, where (with the grossest Ignorance) pretending to prove *Risibility* the formal Reason of *Humankind*, from an Assertion of the Animadverter, which he understood

not.

not. - This (says he) makes well for the Animadverter to prove him to be a Man, though he is seldom in so good an Humor, as to laugh without grinning, which belongs to another Species. Thus the Courtier of Gravel-lane; By which words it is evident, that the poor man is here offering at *Wit*, but cannot reach it. But as for the *Risibility* he is so much concerned against, do not all the Schools of Philosophy make *Risibility* the Property of a man? and withal deny the *Form* or *Nature* of any Thing to consist in the *Property* of it, as well as the Animadverter? But let him set his heart at rest; for whatsoever *Risibility* may be in others, yet so far as it concerns himself, the Animadverter will hardly allow it for an Argument of *Rationality*, as it is in him, but as it is imployed upon him. But to cut off the Unfortunate Animadverter from all Hopes of ever proving his *Rationality* by his *Risibility*, with one terrible blow he strikes him down into the grinning Species: the meaning of which word is very well known, and a word it is as fit for this Man's *Billinggate* mouth, as his mouth is peculiarly fitted for that. Though by his Favour, he shall never make the Animadverter so far of the grinning Species, as either to find him amongst the sneaking Spaniels, or the Hybrid Mongrils: but rather of that genuine English kind, which having once fastned (as the Animadverter has upon this Man) will not be made to quit their Hold. But if he were desirous to learn that Canine Art of fetching and carrying, (especially between Paul's and Lambeth) he knows where to find one very well able to instruct him. In the mean time I humbly present the World with this Specimen of Mr. Dean's refined Breeding, Civility, and Discretion, that he has no other Answer to give his Adversary, but by calling

him *Grinning Dog*. Which yet, I confess, is very agreeable to the Rage I hear the *Animadversions* have put him into; which is such, that in most Companies he speaks of nothing but *Daggers, Gibbers, and Furnaces*; the very mention either of the *Animadverter* or *Animadversions*, transporring him into such Fits and Agonies, as render him extremely troublesome both to himself, and to all who are so unhappy as to be with him: and much ado has he, in one of those Fits, to forbear cursing Both of them by his Gods. But,

Thirdly, I pass on to present the Reader with another of his Flowers, gather'd out of p. 98. l. 25. of this *Defence*, where he closes a Paragraph with these Magisterial Words pronounc'd (one would think) out of the Chair of *Aristarchus* himself, or some such eminent Grammarian. *It is* (says he) *a tedious thing to dispute with Men who must be taught to construe the Fathers, and understand Common Sense.* But will this *Abcedarian* venture to reproach any one for that, who, but a few Pages before this, construes that Expression of the Fathers, *μία κινῆσις βουλῆμα*®, by *Mutual Consciousness*, p. 71. l. 6? And that in those remarkably positive words; *This μία κινῆσις βουλῆμα*® (says he) *is that very Mutual Consciousness which the Dean holds; that is to say, With the grossest Ignorance he construes βούλημα or βούλου, which signifies an Act of the Will, by Mutual Consciousness, which is an Act of Knowledge, or (as he whimsically calls it) of Sensation.* And therefore let me tell this * *Anti-nicene, Quadrigesimal, Chrysom, Paraphrases-man*, That the *Animadverter* can construe the Fathers, and understand them too, at much another rate than this comes to, provided that he reads them in their own Works; but he confesses, that

* See the meaning of these extraordinary words in Chap. 10 of the *Animadversions*.

that when he reads them quoted by him in his Writings, he cannot construe them for *Solecisms*. In the mean time, I, for my part, am so far from thinking this Author fit to set up for a *Construer* of the *Fathers*, and much less for a *Teacher* of others to construe them, that I shrewdly suspect that it has been for want of a *Construing-Book*, that he is no better acquainted with his *Grammar*.

Fourthly, The next thing which I think fit to take notice of, is his frequent reproaching the Animadverter with the Character of a *Wit*, though joyn'd with such ill-favour'd Epithets as his Witless Malice has thought fit to degrade it with; as, p. 9. l. 19. That he is a *Spightful Wit*; and p. 66. l. 21. a *Wrangling Wit*; and p. 1. l. 6. a *Satyrical Wit*, and the witty, subtle, good-natur'd Animadverter, p. 38. l. 26. &c. Though after all, I think, there is but very little *Wit* shewn in making such Charges. However, if *Wit* be a *Reproach*, (be it of what sort it will) the Animadverter is too just to return this *Reproach* upon the *Defender*; and withal, understands himself, and what becomes him, too well, either to assume to himself, or so much as to admit the Character of a *Wit*, as at all due to him; especially since he knows that *Common Sense* (a thing much short of *Wit*) is enough to enable him to deal with such an Adversary. Nevertheless, there are many in the World, who are both called and accounted *Wits*, and really are so; which (one would think) should derive something of Credit upon this Qualification, even in the esteem of this Author himself, or at least rebate the edge of his Invectives against it, considering that it might have pleas'd God to have made him a *Wit* too. But,

Fifthly, To come to another of his Reproaches, and that of a much blacker import than the former; he tells the Animadverter, That *he is by much an Overmatch for any one who is a Christian*, p. 90. l. 12. And again, That *his Example is too scandalous to be imitated*, p. 90. at the end. Worse than which, I am sure, can be said of no Man. But, in the mean time, what flat downright Railing is this? And, what dull, dry, wooden Blows does he deal forth here, fit only (one would think) to come from an Hand made rather to manage a Flayl, or a Coulstaff, than a Scholastick Pen, and such as I desire him to find any thing like to, in all the Animadversions? But is the Animadverter, in good earnest, so enormously wicked, that his very *Example is scandalous*, and himself a Reproach to his *Christian* Profession? What has he done, besides Animadverting upon a Publick Nuisance, who had affronted and abused the whole World besides? Has he wrote a *Plea for the Lawfulness of taking the New Oath to K. W. and Q. M.* asserting it upon the strictest Principles (as one calls them) of old Church of England Loyalty: and after a few weeks wrote another *Treat* to prove the utter Unlawfulness of the same? (Both which Pieces have flown abroad as far as Manuscripts could well spread) Or did he upon the late Publick Turn of Affairs, not only most zealously own K. James's Cause himself, but also join with and abett those who owned it too, and yet presently after, in a barbarous manner, reflect upon and insult over those very Persons when they had lost all they had for it? This Man indeed, for his part, had his Preferments all the time kept void for him, (Thanks to his Honourable Diocesan, whom, I doubt not but, he has since fairly requited for that supererogation of his Kindness to him) so that his
Stake.

Stake in the Church was sufficiently secured, while his Refusal of the Oath gave him opportunity to enter into the Bosomes of those who refused it too: and to observe their behaviour, and to scan all that was either *said* or *done* by them; which I hope he did without turning it to their Prejudice; though the known Case of Dr. Hⁿ and Dr. I^m (who complain of a scurvy Trick play'd them for their confidence) shews, That in this man, *hearing, and seeing, and saying nothing* do not always go together. Nor was this all, *viz.* That his Places were kept undisposed of during his Suspension, but as soon as he took the Oath (the time of which was fairly intimated by a Friend of his at a Publick Table at Oxon, about *three months* before he took it) as soon, I say, as he had taken it, he was immediately and *per saltum* mounted up to one of the best Preferments in the Church of *England*; which demonstrated that his Recusancy of the Oath so long, was not accounted so criminal a Thing by those who knew him, as to need any time of *Probation*, gradually to clear and set him right again in their Opinions, but that he presently stepped forth *All Worth, Merit, and pure Allegiance*, after the Turn was once served, and the Scene was over. In fine therefore, since he has so reproachfully objected *Scandal of Example* to the Animadverter, I would advise him to lay his *Hand* upon his *Heart* (if he can find *where* it is) and consider how many worthy and sincere Persons have by the fallacious Influence of his *Example* and Pretences (*still bleeding-fresh* both in Their minds, and the minds of many others) been brought, through their Refusal of that Oath, to *Misery and Want*, and a piece of bread, when they can get

get it. Which, let me tell him, is a very dreadful Consideration, and when he comes to look *Death* in the face (which he will find a much harder work than to *write* upon it) may chance to lye cold at his heart. In the mean time, I should be glad to hear how much of the Revenue of his Deanry he lays aside for the Relief of those poor men, who have been so unhappily trapped into this Distress. But not a tittle could I ever hear of this or any Thing like it. So that as ill a Christian as he would represent the Animadverter, let him for me keep his New-fashioned Christianity to himself; with this charitable Wish however, *viz.* That it may do him more good in the other World, than it has done others in this.

7. The last Instance of His Rancor, which I shall mention, and by which, I doubt not, he designed a shrewder Blow to the Animadverter than by any of the rest, is his calling the Socinians *his Friends*, and Admirers,

A Specimen of the *Friendship of the Socinians* to the Animadverter objected to him by this Defender, together with some remarks upon a Socinian Tract, Entitled, *Considerations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, &c. So far as they concern the Animadverter.

Def. p. 97. l. 31. Though these words (to such as know what this Man was) shew only how desirous of late he is to *throw off his old Friends*, whomsoever he throw's them upon; But that the Reader may see, whether the Animadverter, or that disguised Dean, have the greater Interest in the *Friendship* and esteem of the *Socinians*, I must refer him to a certain

Socinian Tract, published something above a year since, and Entitled, *Considerations upon the several Explications of the Trinity*, &c. A Book wrote with such an hearty Zeal and concern for Dr. *Sherlock*, and such a peculiar design to reproach the Animadverter, that it is really a set and formed Defence of the former against

gainst the latter, and can be called by no name so properly as a Panegyrick upon the one, and a Satyre against the other. This Piece the Animadverter read soon after it was published; but finding so few Things said in it with reference to the main Argument, and those so grossly (if not also wilfully) misrepresenting the Doctrine which they were brought to impugn, he could not think himself obliged to answer it. Nor should it have been at all medled with now, but that the bitter reflexive part of it (which I shall chiefly remark upon) offers it self, as so apposite and full an Answer to the Imputation, which the Defender has thought fit to load the Animadverter with, that it could not have been more full and home, had it been contrived and wrote for this very purpose. And here to enable the Reader the better to pass his Judgment on both sides, I think it requisite first to premise after what manner Dr. *Sherlock*, whom this Considerer so much magnifies, had on the one hand, and the *Animadverter*, whom he so reviles, (having first assigned him a Name, or rather a *piece of a Name*, according to his own Fancy) had on the other hand treated the *Socinians*; of which number this Author professes himself to be one. And for this, he will find Dr. *Sherlock* reproaching them in his Vindication for having neither Greek nor Latine, and thereupon very magisterially sending them to School again (I suppose in his own Room) Likewise charging them with Nonsense, and calling their Opinion one of the most stupid senseless Heresies that ever infested the Christian Church, Pref. to Vind. at the end. Vowing withal, never to put up his Goose-quill in this Quarrel against them, *Ibid.* and, in short, treating them with the utmost scorn, that it was possible for words to express:

whereas

whereas on the contrary, the Animadverter, though he could by no means be of their Opinion, nor yet came up to the *Lambeth-strain*, in declaring them the only Scholars and Disputants in the World, and in comparison of whom, some of the most eminent, upon both accounts, that Christendom ever had, were but *meer Bunglers*, yet with a due and just deference to Truth, he frankly acknowledged their *Parts* and *Learning*, and asserted the Reputation of both against their Beloved Dr. *Sherlock*, who had with the utmost contumely and disdain, vilified them. All which considered, the whole conduct of this spiteful usage of the Animadverter, by Persons (even by their own Confession, *Confid. p. 12. 2 Col. l. 41.*) wholly unprovoked by him, is to me (I must confess) all Riddle, and I believe to all sober Persons besides: nor can I see what tolerable account can be given of it, but that they did all this by particular Orders, and then it is easy to judge from whom those Orders came; which by such a mighty Act of *restraining Grace*, put a stop to all *Socinian* Pens, from writing against such a *Bo-some-Favourite*, and turned them against that *sawcy Church of England-Animadverter*, for daring to assert the old Doctrine of the Trinity against the Sentiments of those New Dons, who may perhaps for fashion-sake, own a Trinity, and some such other Articles of the Church of England, but (according to Mr. Dean's excellent, and never to be forgotten words) *not perfectly in her own way.*

Now as to the Argument debated in the Animadversions, the Grand Charge this Considerer brings against the Animadverter is, *That he makes the Three Divine Persons in the Blessed Trinity only Three different*

See the
Animadv.
p. 329,
330.

See Serm.
on Ps. 39.
9. p. 17.
l. 11.

several Postures of the Godhead, Confid. p. 22. Col. 1. 1. 4. repeating the same objection again and again, that none may mistake him. But is this but dealing in dissipation, or a just and true Representation of the Animadverter's Assertion? He asserted indeed, That as *Posture* and *Figure* were Modes affecting the Body, without superadding any new Entity (properly so called) to it. So a *Spirit*, whether *Finite* or *Infinite*, might have its proper Modes also, affecting it suitably to its particular Nature, without superadding to it any new Entity or Being distinct from it. For since the General Nature of a *Mode* consisted only in this, *viz.* That it determined a Being, in it self Absolute and undetermined to some certain state or condition, without superadding to it any such new distinct Entity, as we have mentioned; I would gladly know, why there might not be an Agreement and Analogy in this general Nature of a *Mode* between such particular Modes, as do yet otherwise upon their proper Accounts, vastly and infinitely differ from one Another; (as the Modes of an Infinite Uncreated Being and the Modes of all finite Created Natures must needs do.) Why, I say, these (notwithstanding their peculiar differences) may not agree as Analogous in the general Nature of a *Mode*, as well as an Infinite and a finite Substance do agree in the General Nature of Substance. Let any one by some solid Reason prove. But besides this; the Animadverter affirmed also, That the Personal Modes belonging to the Deity, were of that peculiar kind as to affect it Eternally, Necessarily and Inseparably; though there are several Modes of another kind belonging to the said Nature, which do not so. This, I say, and no more, was the Doctrine delivered by the Animad-

verber concerning the *Divine Mode*; which is so utterly incapable of the Representation made of it by this Considerer, that though he is pleased to sport himself with a thing by no means as to be sported with, yet I am confident, in the present Case, his own Judgment will not suffer him to believe his own words. But he is for putting the whole Dispute to a short issue (if he will say and hold) by the decision of this one Question. To which (he says) if the Antithetizer will give a clear and Categorical Answer, it will appear to all Men, that either he falls in with Dr. Sherlock, and the Trinitarians, or with the Socinians. And the Question is this, Whether there are in God Three infinite Understandings, with all energy, as there are Three distinct Persons? Or whether the Three Persons have but one and the same infinite Understanding, and activity, as there is but one Person, *scilicet* in Number. Consider. 1. 24. Col. 2. 25. To which I answer, and that as Categoricalally as he can desire.

First, That there are not Three distinct infinite Understandings, or, in God, as there are three Persons; and that to assert, that there are, is as arrant Tritheism as any that Dr. Sherlock is guilty of, and greater there cannot well be.

Secondly, That there is but one Numerical infinite Understanding in God or in the three Persons. But then I affirm what, That this one Numerical infinite Understanding has three distinct ways of subsisting, according to which it subsists distinctly and differently in each of the Three Divine Persons. For still Three distinct infinite Understandings, and one infinite Understanding subsisting after Three distinct ways or modes, are two vastly different Hypotheses.

And

And if by this latter the Animadvertiser falls in with the *Sermon*, it is certain that the *Sermon* must also fall in with him. Which I should be very glad to find; for I'm sure it is the received Doctrine of the Church, and that which the Animadvertiser has all along understood for, and this very Manuscript, so much sought and personal Reflection (beyond all that I ever met with) has opposed and reviled. However I have answered him civilly, which is a way of answering, which he seems a stranger to.

But to pass to the main Business of his Paper, which is to expose and ridicule the Animadvertiser as much as (in so small a compass) he can. The first Instance of his Spleen against him (though I think very little favouring of the Spirit of a Gentleman) is his expressing a Grudge at the very Support and Maintenance which the Animadvertiser has from the Church, telling him, *That he is full and even overflows with the Blessings of his Holy Mother, Confid. p. 20. Col. 1. l. 36.* And so much, I hope, I may say in the Animadvertiser's behalf; That if he does indeed overflow, there are many about him who find themselves the better for it, though yet I know several in the Church much fuller, who never overflow. And for this I will instance in a certain Dean, who was applied to by a poor Widow, about the renewing of a Lease; the Fine for which was to be 25 l. And she, to obtain some Abatement thereof, pleaded her Husband's and her own Kindness to him while they had been all formerly of the same *Communion* (that is, during his Probationship for his future Church Prefement.) But to deaf Earl (it seems) being turned to all such Pleas, she at length in plain terms told him, *That her poor*

Children were in a starving condition. To which he presently replied, *What if they do starve; what is that to me?* Concerning which Christian and compassionate Reply, I shall only say thus much: That if this Author can ever prove that the Animadverter sends such an *Object of Charity* away with such an Answer, he will not expect so much *Charity* from him, or from any man alive, as to be accounted by them a *Christian*. But the Considerer goes on; and as if it were not enough for him to expose the Animadverter to the *Odium* of the World, as so much overladen with Church-Preferments, he taxes him also with *Avarice* or *Ambition*, or both, by traducing him as one who *thought that he had not yet enough*. Confid. p. 40. Col. 1. A. 39. But if the Animadverter really thought so, let this Gentleman give some good Reason, why he never applies himself to such as are able to give him more; and particularly let him ask that noted *Quaker* of the same Persuasion with himself (who of late years saw the inside of *Lambeth* as often, and knew it as well as any man) whether ever he saw the Animadverter amongst the *Serjeants*; there it No; let me tell him, and the whole World besides upon this occasion, That from the very bottom of his heart, he scorned it. But in the mean time, may I not calmly ask this Author, whether the Animadverter ever rivalled, or defeated Him, or any of his Brethren in their Suit for any Church-Preferment; that they thus envy and repine at him? Or whether they are in all the poorer for what he has? No, nothing like this, I am sure, can be so much as pretended. But the Truth is, the main Quarrel this man, and others like him, have with the Animadverter is, that (thanks be to God) his condition

condition is such yet, as neither forces him to *swear*, or
swear; and that he can be much sooner brought to the
former, than he can be made to do the latter. But since
it is hardly imaginable, upon Terms of common huma-
nity, that one man should venture to charge another in
so contumelious a manner, but for some very great Rea-
son; Let us see what Reason this Considerer brings
for charging the Animadverter at this rate; and it is
in short this: *Because the Animadverter submitted his*
Explication of the Trinity to the Judgment of the Church
of England; Confid. p. 10. Col. 1. l. 28. Whereupon
he not only brands him (as has been shewn) with
Arrogance and Ambition; but sets him out further, as
one ready at the first Nod of the Church to throw his
Ball into the Game; and in a word as a Person of
neither *Prudence*, *Caution*, nor *restraint*. In Reply to
which odious Stuff, I would have this Man take no-
tice, that the whole force of his charge (if there be
any force in it) must depend upon his Proof of these
three Things, viz.
1. That the Animadverter affirms his Explication
of the Trinity to be a *Fundamental* of the Christian
Faith; which I utterly deny to be any where af-
firmed by him.
2. That a man may not quit his Explication of an
Article of the Faith without parting with the Article it-
self. Which I as positively affirm he may. And
3. That (which is much more) That a Man may not quit
his Explication of an Article of the Faith without so
much as *renouncing* the said Explication as *false*, but
only by his *own* *offer*, publishing thereupon it.
Which I passionately aver, he has never
done. And therefore I do, that I think, that this
Author:

Author (till he proves the contrary) has most un-
 civilly abus'd and defam'd the Animadvertiser, as with-
 out any provocation, so beyond all possibility of
 making him satisfaction. But (Thanks be to God)
 the Charge is so very black and foul, that the
 Animadvertiser dares trust the World with the be-
 lief of it, and thinks it extremely below him so much
 as to offer to clear himself from it. And so he
 goes on to the next Instance of his Silence
 against the Animadvertiser, and that (if possible)
 more hostile than the former, as carrying in it all
 the Symptoms of an extreme Malice, viz. the Endeav-
 our to engage an whole University against him, by
 representing him as a great Under-valuer of one of
 those two Noble Seats of Learning, in comparison of
 the other: For, what else can he mean by that Unre-
 sonable Representation of *Paris, Seville, Alcala, Complut*
by an University on the one hand, and of *The Oxford*
Academy on the other? For this
 the Animadvertiser in his Book gives the full occasion
 for this? Did he speak one title in preference of Ox-
 ford before Cambridge? Or, did he at all reflect upon
 his Adversary, for being of that University, which he
 equally honours with the other? No, no, far was he
 from it, that I have often heard him say, that he could
 not perceive by his *Writings*, that he had been of *any*
University. But let us for the next Complement he
 makes upon the Animadvertiser, viz. his comparing
 him as a *long-tail'd* to *Romance*, with the *Spanish*
Goat, or *the* *Goat*. *But* *the* *Goat*. The Point
 tell him, that the Animadvertiser is not sensible
 of the weakness of his Argument, that he fears
 to *Deny* *any* *thing* *but* *what* *he* *can* *prove* *by* *the* *same* *author* *whom*

whom the World took for a Giant, but whom, by his turning round, he found to be but a Windmill. These, I say, are some of the Instances of the Socinian Reproach and Frivolity, which the Defender has upbraided the Animadverter with. To which we may add the Charge of Barbarity, p. 10. col. 1. *And, of more Severity than Arguing*, p. 19. col. 1. *And of Arrogance*, p. 21. col. 1. *And of Nonsense*, p. 23. col. 1. *And* (which is of a much blacker import) of his *Deserting* in his Religion, p. 20. col. 1. *And* of a *readiness to turn from his Faith* with every Wind, p. 20. col. 1. *And* of *throwing it into the Kennel*, p. 20. col. 2. *And* which, I must tell him, are not mere Scoptical Reflections, but High and Criminal Charges, and fit to carry debate the Judge, than to be debated with the Party, as managing the Animadverter in the face of the World for a Rogue, an Hypocrite, a Renouncer of his Faith, and a man of no Religion. And all this (as has been noted) uttered in by this Confidencé himself with a free and full acknowledgment, *That the Animadverter had not concern'd himself with the Socinians, and that therefore the Socinians would not concern themselves with him*, p. 12. Col. 2. *And* towards the end, and at last closed up by him with this affirmation also, *That he had given the Animadverter no Disputatious Language*, p. 25. Col. 2. l. 36. and consequently, that he ought not to take the foregoing Reproaches ill, but to embrace and accept them all, as pure, perfect Socinian Courtesy and Civility. Though in the Judgment of all that I can meet with, these things clash so irreconcilably both with themselves and some other Passages in the same tract,

tract, and carry in them so much of *Stercorism* and Self-Contradiction, that they evidently shew, how hard (if not impossible) it is for any one to write for Dr. Sherlock without writing *like* him too. In fine, I believe the whole World can hardly shew another instance of such Bitter, Virulent Reproachful Language given (and that even by the Confession of him who gave it) without the least Provocation. Nevertheless I have thought fit to treat this Considerer in a very different way from that, in which I treated Dr. Sherlock, and much more from that, in which He himself has (to the Amazement of all sober Reasoners) treated the Animadverter: not but that I am sufficiently sensible of every one of his Reproaches. But since they are only Personal, and designed against the Animadverter alone, and write (as I am well furnished) by Order too, he may easily Command me (as he has done) to fight and overlook them. But Dr. Sherlock is to be looked upon as a common, or rather an Universal Adversary, and deserves to be treated as such, and that in a due Vindication of all those worthy suffering Reputations (those of the *Fathers* themselves reckoned for the chief) which he has so rudely and illiterately, and in a word (so like himself) made an invasion upon. And so having represented the Invetives of this Socinian Writer against the Animadverter, without *turning* them upon himself (howsoever I have turned them upon him for *whose* sake they were written) I leave it to the Reader and all Mankind to judge from the forementioned Passages, what a share the Animadverter has in the Socinian Controversy, and how much he is the object of their animosity. But

But the Animadverter has been attacked by Un-
 nities from more Quarters than one, and amongst the
 rest, by that Diminutive Oberon in Divinity the little
Oxford-Encommiaturer. A Person little indeed in eve-
 rything but Spight and *Insult*. He in his poor Stiff-
 boned Rambler published against the Animadversions
 endeavours to set off his *small Works* with the specious
 Title (forsooth) of *the Trinity placed in its due light*.
 Though I must tell him, That his Naked Gospel has
 much the Advantage of this Piece, as having been
 plucked by the Execution done upon it at *Oxford*, not
 only in its *due light*, but in its *due heat* too. But has
 not this Man, think we, found out a very odd way
 of explaining this high Mystery to us, viz. by first
 setting his College all in a *Flame*, and then pretend-
 ing to show us the Trinity by the *Light* of it? But
 how in the name of all the Fairies (amongst whom
 he is no small Prince) comes he to be so fierce and fu-
 rious against the Animadverter? For the Animadver-
 ter never *deserted* against him, nor does he know that
 he ever dishonoured this great Doctor either by word
 or deed. Nevertheless since there are some Tempers
 that can be spiteful purely for Spight's sake, This
 Man was resolved to vent his Spleen, though I be-
 lieve it would put him hand to it, to give a good Rea-
 son, *why* whether we respect the Person whom he
 wrote *against*, or whom he wrote *for*. Accordingly,
 several scurrilous Passages of no small Rancor occur in
 his Discourse, which, I assure him, might easily be
 returned upon him and that with threefold Advantage.
 But that I born to foul my *Pen*, and indeed my ve-
 ry *Ink*, upon one of such a Character, by quelling
 Scolds with him in his own way. Nor shall I Rep-
 resent

A Remark
 or Two
 upon the
 Little Oc-
 casional-Ex-
 communi-
 cator, who
 also has
 had a
 Fling at
 the Anim-
 adverter.

or rather

so low, as to engage against a Book wrote in an entire Ignorance of the Subject which it was wrote upon; or think that worth *answering*, which hardly any Man of sense thinks worth *Reading*; as his Bookseller by woful Experience finds. However, in Case the Learned and Judicious shall at any time judge it needful to have so slight a piece replied to; (which I could never yet find) the way is so far already prepared for it, That the Author is more than sufficiently known; how little soever he is *taken notice of*; we have his *name* and his *measure*; there being scarce any one but *knows* and *knows* through him too. For since the World has been acquainted with his *Wicked Gospel* (thanks be to his good Stars for it) he may be distinguished by the *fruit of his bank*, as well as by the *mole on his face*. There are others also who have *discharged* their *Paper* at the *Animadvertiser*; but he does not think it worth his while to fight with every one who *quarrels* *Paper*.

The Conclusion.

And thus, having at length brought the work intended by me to a Conclusion, (after the Church's and the Reader's Pardon begged for all failures that shall appear in it) I cannot but own and declare, that many wise and good Men, and hearty Lovers of our Church (to my knowledge) are of Opinion, That this Important and Fundamental Point, has been sufficiently argued, and the truth effectually proved against this Innovator (whom I have been hitherto dealing with) already; and that the properest way of proceeding against him for the future, is not by *argument*, but *Authority*. And that his Bishop would *anathematise* him of his *Heresy* once and again, and if he persists in it, resolutely Excommunicate him; and that all sober Christians

Christians, who make a Conscience of their Duty, and their Holy Christian Profession, would abhor upon him and abandon, and refuse all converse with him, according to the Rule of Scripture and the practice of the Primitive Church, towards Persons obstinately persisting in any Heresy, and Excommunicated thereupon. In the mean time, let him and his Partisans put the best Face they can upon the matter; yet I know no true Sons of the Church of *England*, who account of him otherwise in his present Station and condition, than as of a *Flagit. Delinquent* to our old established Religion. Nor could I ever imagine from the very first, what his design could be in writing that wretched Book, and of others in approving it, but to confound and embroil that great Article of our Faith, in order to the laying it quite aside. And most certainly, it cannot be for nothing, that even the *Socinians* themselves (as great an opposition as they profess to *Tritheism*) are yet so very fond of, and zealous for this *Tritheist*, that (as it has been shewn) they could almost tear the *Animadverter* in pieces, for *laying it to* against him.

He tells us at the latter end of the Preface to his former Book called his *Vindication*, &c. That his *New Hypothesis of the Trinity* cost him many thoughts, and that it must cost others many too, if they will understand it. And I must confess, that it has cost me several Thoughts also. But since it is certain that a Man may throw away his Thoughts, as well as his money upon that which will never quit Costs, I must profess likewise, that I grudge every Thought, which I have spent upon it. For to beat ones Brains upon such a dull, senseless Hypothesis (having nothing to recommend it but its Novelty) is but just as if a Man should beat his head against

against a Post; which being a dry, wooden, hard Thing (and upon that account a lovely, though not *living Image* of this Man's work) may break one's head indeed, but can never improve it: And therefore, did not my duty to, and concern for our Excellent, and now suffering Church, oblige me to serve her even in the *meanest* (if lawful) Offices. I would never trouble my thoughts with his Heretical stuff more; especially since I can truly say of this New Hypothesis, (what a certain Divine of a very *valuable Conscience* (and known to this Man as well as he knows Himself) said of the *New Oath* before he took it,) *The more I think on't, the worse I like it.*

FINIS.

Advertisement.

A Nimadversions upon Dr. Sherlock's Book, Entitled *A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity, &c.* Together with a more Necessary Vindication of that Sacred, and Prime Article of the *Christian Faith*, from his New Notions and false Explications of it. Humbly offered to his Admirers, and to Himself the Chief of them. By a Divine of the Church of England. The Second Edition with Additions.

